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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The renewed interest in semantics that we have witnessed 
during the past decade or so has led to a great variety 
of approaches towards the subject and to a great divergence 
of opinions. In this situation, any new study that hopes 
to contribute to the knowledge of linguistic semantics should 
therefore be prefaced by a rough indication of its position in 
relation to the most current opinions in semantics. 
1.1. Orientation of the present study 
In her recent book on the delimitation of linguistic semantics, 
Kempson (1975) says that, in spite of the great variety of 
contemporary approaches to semantics, it is possible to mention 
"four conditions which linguists working within the framework 
of a formal model of language would agree must be satisfied 
by a semantic theory" (p.l). Briefly, these four conditions 
are the following: 
1. a semantic model must be able to predict the meaning of any 
sentence on the basis of the meaning of the lexical items 
composing it and the syntactic relations between those items; 
2. the model must be made up of a finite set of rules; 3. the 
model must be able to separate the infinite set of semantically 
non-deviant sentences from another infinite set - that made 
up of deviant sentences; 4. it must be able to predict meaning 
relations such as synonymy, antonyray, contradiction, etc. 
In the present study we subscribe wholeheartedly to conditions 
2 and 4. We also agree in principle with condition 1, but we 
think that the results of our study call for a re-assessment 
of the importance of the respective roles played by lexical 
information on the one hand and syntactic information on the 
other. Condition 3, we think, would have to be reconsidered 
in the light of our findings, because, as it stands, it pre-
supposes a plain dichotomy between what is normal and what 
is deviant - a dichotomy that cannot be upheld, as we shall 
see, as soon as we start dealing to any large extent with 
actual language material. Since we have some reservations 
with respect to two of the conditions on which "linguists 
are agreed", we shall discuss the points contained in these 
conditions in some greater detail. 
1.1.1. Semantic vs. syntactic information 
Like most semantic studies that have come in the wake of Katz-
Fodor (1963), the present one is based on the assumption that 
it is possible to analyse the meaning of most lexical items 
into smaller components. These components do not only serve 
to delimit the meeming of one lexical item with respect to that 
of others, but also to explicate the meaning relations between 
lexical items, such as synonymy, inclusion, etc. Perhaps to a 
greater extent than most semantic studies based on componential 
analysis, the present model employs redundancy rules holding 
between semantic components, in order to achieve greater 
economy in the statement of the meanings of lexical items; 
in the majority of cases our redundancy rules make it possible 
to state one sense of a lexical item by entering just one 
component in the lexicon, the other components making up the 
sense being implied through redundancy rules. 
We distinguish various types of semantic components, 
including some that have not been postulated before, such as 
generative features (see 2.2.1 ) , secondary features (see 2.2.2) 
and predicational relators (see 2.3 ). If the entries for 
(2) lexical items are constructed as we suggest in chapter two , 
(1) Definitions of 'technical' terms are given at the end of 
this chapter. 
(2) For the semantic configuration of an average lexical entry 
for a noun and for an adjective, see fig. 3.1, p.112« 
it is possible to account for the interpretation of an adjective-
noun combination purely on the basis of the information contained 
in the lexical entries for the adjective and the noun. The only 
'syntactic' information that is in fact needed in order to 
construct a 'reading' (i.e. the conceptual structure underlying 
the adjective-noun combination) is the sequential order of the 
adjective and the noun . We thus take into account overt 
syntactic structure (word-order) only, and do not have to rely 
on proposals that postulate a deeper syntactic level for 
adjectival modification. In particular, there is no need to 
rely on transformational analyses of adjective-noun combinations, 
according to which the adjective in premodification is derived 
from an underlying relative clause; these analyses have met 
with a lot of criticism and are, in their generality, un-
(2) 
tenable . The way in which the interpretation of adjective-
noun combinations is accounted for in the next two chapters, 
then, provides us with an interpretive model that need hardly 
rely on syntactic input to recover the conceptual structures 
underlying instances of adjectival modification; instead, these 
structures originate from the information contained in lexical 
entries and the semantic rules that operate on them. 
(1) It might be objected that the syntactic information we need 
in the present study comprises not only the linearity of 
adjective-noun sequences, but also categorial information 
as to which of the two items belongs to the class of adjectives 
and which of them to that of nouns. However, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, the word-class distinction between adjectives 
and nouns is reflected in semantic terms in that the lexical 
entries for adjectives contain special semantic elements 
(predicationalrelators) that do not form part of the lexical 
configuration of nouns. 
(2) Cf., for example, Bolinger (1967), Marchand (1966) and Sandmann 
(1975). More sophisticated underlying structures have been 
proposed by Ljung (1970); some of our findings in the next 
chapter bear some resemblance to his. Ljung, however, concentrates 
almost exclusively on adjectives and pays little attention to 
their semantic interaction with nouns; moreover, he does not 
use semantic features systematically. 
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Apart from the obvious practical reason that it is 
necessary to restrict one's scope if one wants to deal with an 
aspect of language at all extensively, there is another reason 
why we have chosen the field of adjectival modification of 
nouns. The semantics of adjectival constructions have received 
comparatively little attention so far , and there is a 
tendency to underestimate the complexity of the conceptual 
relations that may hold between an adjective and the noun 
it modifies. Symptomatic in this respect is what Lyons (1968) 
has to say about the semantics of modification: 
The example that just has been given [i.e. pregnant mare 
vs. pregnant stallion], which involved the 'modification' 
of a noun by an 'adjective', is one which has never been 
regarded as particularly troublesome by semanticists. Its 
formalization within the framework of current syntactic 
theory is trivial in comparison with the problem of 
formalizing the vast majority of the relations of sem-
antic 'compatibility' which hold in the sentences of 
any language (pp.475-76). 
It is, we think, precisely because discussion of adjectival 
modification has taken place at the level of 'pregnant stallions' 
and 'colourful balls' that there is a tendency to underestimate 
Exceptions are Bolinger (1967) and Ljung (1970). Other 
studies dealing with adjectives are either pre-eminently 
syntactic in character (e.g. König (1971), Marchand (1966)) 
or deal with one particular class of adjectives (e.g. 
Bierwisch (1967), Coates (1971), GivÔn (1970), Kastovsky 
(1974)); what most of them have in common is that they 
pay hardly any attention to the semantic relations between 
adjectives and the nouns they modify. A number of studies 
concentrate on comparative structures and have a clear 
syntactic bias: Doherty and Schwartz (1968), Huddleston 
(1967), Lees (1961), Pilch (1965) and Stanley (1969). 
the complexities of adjective-nour structures ; and it is 
only when one proceeds beyond the illustrative and anecdotal 
and starts investigating a great variety of adjective-noun 
combinations, including metaphorical ones, that these 
complexities become visible. 
It is because the conceptual structures underlying 
adjective-noun combinations are more complicated that they 
are usually assumed to be, and because, in addition, their 
overt syntactic structure is rather crude and proposals for 
deeper syntactic structure have failed, that we have in the 
field of adjectival modification of nouns an ideal testing-
ground for the workability of an interpretive model that has 
to rely almost exclusively on semantic components of lexical 
items and a limited number of semantic rules. The present model, 
then, seeks to reduce the importance of the role played by 
purely syntactic information in semantic interpretation, by 
merely taking overt surface structure as input. We think it 
may be possible to extend this procedure beyond the limits of 
adjective-noun combinations to larger constituents; some ten-
tative proposals to that effect are formulated in 2.3. 
(1) A quotation like the following from Katz (1972:47) would 
seem to suggest that the semantic problem of dealing with 
adjectival modification has, in fact, already been solved: 
"There is a different projection rule for each distinct 
grammatical relation - one for the attribution relation, 
one for the subject-verb relation, one for the verb-direct 
object relation, one for the verb-indirect object relation, 
and so on ... If, for example, the relation is that of 
modifier to head, then the projection rule applies whose 
conditions of application are defined by the modification 
relation". The 'projection rule* apparently involves mere 
concatenation of features (cf. Katz-Fodor (1963)), and 
Katz neglects to tell us what should be understood by 'the 
modification relation'. He seems to imply that this relation is 
an invariable one and is the same in every adjective-noun 
combination; as we shall see in chapter two, however, there 
appears to be a great variety of modification relations. 
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Ι.1.2. Deviance vs. non-deviance 
With respect to the condition that a semantic model should be 
able to distinguish between what is deviant and what is not, 
we can say that in the present study we do not equate 'deviance' 
with non-interpretability. This means that any adjective-noun 
combination, however 'odd', will receive a semantic interpretation. 
The preoccupation with the distinction between deviance and 
non-deviance is probably due to the fact that contemporary 
semantics has developed mainly within the framework of generative 
models of language, which impose the condition that the grammar 
should generate all and only the 'grammatical' sentences of a 
language. For the semantic component of such a grammar this 
means that the interpretation of 'ungraramatical' sentences must 
be blocked, at least within the boundaries of a competence model 
of the grammar. This attitude towards semantic interpretation 
was probably re-inforced by the assumption that a decoding 
model is simply an encoding model read backwards. We regard this 
assumption as neither proved nor disproved, and do not want 
to commit ourselves to either view. The present model has been 
constructed as a purely decoding model, without considering the 
question whether it can be looked upon as some sort of mirror 
image of an encoding model. We think that a linguistic decoding 
model should not reject any language material that has ever 
been produced or conceivably might be produced, as not being 
interpretable. This opinion has also been put forward by Bendix 
(1966) and Weinreich (1972): 
[A hearer] will often accept and make sense even out 
of sentences that initially appear odd or contradictory 
when they are presented to him on semantic tests or in 
actual discourse, or he may reject the sentences and 
then proceed to interpret them anyway (Bendix, p.17). 
A semantic theory is of marginal interest if it is 
incapable of dealing with poetic uses of language, and 
more generally, with interpretable deviance (Weinreich, 
p.117). 
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This conception of what an interpretive model should do entails 
that it should also account for what is usually relegated to 
the shadowy realm of 'performance models' and the like: 
contiguity of senses based on real-world experience, contex-
tually determined extensions of meaning, connotative elements 
of meaning. By trying to open the door of semantics to such 
and similar elements, one runs, of course, the risk of 
letting in a deluge of factual beliefs, stereotyped opinions 
and encyclopedic knowledge about referents as well as emotional 
attitudes towards them. Not to make the attempt, however, is 
to condemn an interpretive model to semantic sterility - a 
model that would rigorously exclude all such elements can 
hardly claim to be a model for 'natural' language. But the 
door should be opened with circumspection in order to prevent 
the model from foundering in a sea of real-world knowledge 
and trivial detail. It is hardly possible to specify in advance 
where the line should be drawn between what is to be included 
in the model and what is not. At this point we can only say 
that in order to keep the model semantically manageable and 
to retain its general validity we have used the following 
rule of thumb in formulating our proposals: if for the inter-
pretation of a given utterance it is necessary to make an appeal 
to the context in which it occurs, to our factual beliefs about 
referents or to our emotional attitude towards them, the 
model should signal that such an appeal is made and try to 
specify the nature of the appeal, but it should not attempt 
to precisely specify the result or to describe it in detail. 
If, for example, we have to account for the interpretation of 
that man is a terrier, the model should tell us that an appeal 
is made to some factual belief about terriers in order to 
attribute some quality to the referent of that man; moreover, 
the formal representation of the interpretation of the phrase 
should indicate that this quality is not attributed to the 
referent directly, by using the lexical item naming the quality, 
but that it is 'borrowed' from the set of qualities that we 
associate with the class of referents denoted by the word terrier; 
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vihat the model should not try to do is to identify the 
particular quality (for example, 'aggressiveness' or 'pertina-
city') which is thus attributed to the man 
The approach to semantic interpretation outlined here 
necessitates, of course, the introduction of a momber of new 
semantic notions and some new applications of notions that 
have already been suggested in the literature, such as: 
generative features, transfer features, mergers of senses, 
predicational relators and the notion "typically associated 
with". These are all discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Here we may draw attention to three points on which the present 
study differs from most other approaches: 1. contextual restric-
tions do not have the blocking function that they have in other 
models,but serve as a means to invoke particular interpretive 
rules and may directly contribute to semantic interpretation; 
2. connotative elements of meaning are incorporated in lexical 
entries and may, under the proper conditions, be turned into 
denotative elements; 3. there is no difference in kind, but 
rather a difference in degree between metaphorical ('deviant') 
and non-metaphorical expressions, and they can be handled by 
the same interpretive mechanism. 
1.2. Modes of interpretation, possible readings and likely 
readings 
Some of the 'readings' (i.e. the formal notation of the semantic 
interpretation of a given expression) that will be proposed in 
the following chapters, may at first sight seem 'unlikely' or 
'far-fetched'. This is partly due to the fact that we deal with 
adjective-noun combinations in isolation, not embedded, that is, 
(1) It ¿s possible to identify the particular quality in the 
case of 'dead' metaphors. See 2.2.2 on secondary features. 
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in a natural context. Our readiness to accept an interpretation 
as a 'likely' one is in direct proportion to our imaginative 
ability to think of an appropriate context, and an inclination 
to reject an interpretation as 'unlikely' will mirror our 
failure to do so. The degree of 'likeliness' that we will 
intuitively assign to a given interprotation does not, 
however, only depend on the extent of our imaginative capacity, 
but also on our willingness to employ it. This willingness, 
we think, varies according to the language variety with which 
we are confronted. The term 'register' is in current use in 
linguistics to refer to different roles of linguistic activity, 
these roles being determined by the occasion and the purpose 
of the linguistic activity and, presumably, characterized by 
special features of grammar and vocabulary. The term is related 
to language production processes; we would suggest that, 
parallel to the different encoding varieties called 'registers', 
there are different decoding varieties, which might be called 
'modes of interpretation' . These modes of interpretation 
are characterized by the degree of willingness on the part of 
the decoder to accept certain interpretations as appropriate 
to the type of discourse with which he is confronted. It is 
not suggested that different modes of interpretation entail 
the application of different interpretive rules, but that they 
determine the extent of the decoder's readiness to employ his 
interpretive resources. We shall not attempt here to identify 
and characterize a variety of modes of interpretation; to 
try to do this is probably just as endless an occupation as 
to try to identify and delimit varieties of registers. But 
just as with the notion of register, this in itself is not a 
reason to say that the notion of mode of interpretation is 
not a real one. Here it will suffice to point out the obvious; 
(1) We are merely calling attention to the parallelism between 
encoding and decoding varieties and do not want to claim 
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between registers 
and modes of interpretation. 
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that, for example, a poem calls for a different mode of inter-
pretation than a business report. In a discourse that a reader 
chooses to read as a poem he will probably admit more inter-
pretations of the phrases and sentences in the discourse than 
in a discourse that he chooses to read as a business report ; 
in the latter he will reduce the number of possible inter-
pretations by, for example, rejecting possible metaphorical 
interpretations where normal ones are available. 
We shall distinguish between possible readings and likely 
readings. A possible reading is any reading that the rules of 
the model will allow. It is thus not difficult to distinguish 
between what is and what is not a possible reading: a possible 
reading is one that application of the model will produce, and 
any other reading is not possible. What constitutes a likely 
reading, however, is dependent on the inventive capacity of 
the decoder as well as on the mode of interpretation that 
he wishes to employ. It is, therefore, possible to distinguish 
between 'more likely' and 'less likely' readings, but by the 
side of this scale of 'likeliness* there is no matching scale 
of 'possibility': a reading is either possible or it is not. 
It goes without saying that an interpretive model should first 
and foremost account for possible readings and that its rules 
should exclude all readings that are not possible. Determining 
the place of every possible reading on a likeliness scale is 
something which, if it can be done at all, is beyond the scope 
of this study, since the present model does not deal with context 
and features of discourse. A first approximation of such a like-
liness scale can be made, however, by considering the 'inherent' 
likeliness of readings, that is, by deciding which readings 
are the products of the more general rules of interpretation 
and which call for a fuller exploitation of the decoder's skills; 
the latter readings may then be ranked after the former. A few 
proposals to this effect are formulated in chapter three. 
(1) We think that purported 'registers' like 'the language of 
poetry' or more generally, 'the language of literature' are 
hardly definable as registers, but had better be looked upon 
as types of discourse eliciting different modes of inter-
pretation. 
1.3. Features, concepts, senses and reference 
The model is conceived in strictly intensionalist terms; it 
makes freely use of notions like 'concept' and 'sense'. It 
is strictly speaking, not even concerned with reference, since 
it only deals with adjectival modification of nouns and not 
with full noun phrases. Nevertheless we shall briefly discuss 
how the semantic notions we employ are related to reference, 
if only to indicate how our proposals fit into a wider semantic 
theory. 
We use the term feature to indicate the semantic components 
into which the meanings of words can be analysed. Although we 
agree with Katz (1972:101) that these components are not of 
the same nature as phonological or syntactic features in that 
semantic components have internal structure and can be parts 
of other components, we prefer using the term 'feature' 
rather than Katz' term 'marker', because it is the more 
general usage and also because we want to avoid the suggestion 
of a Katzian distinction between 'markers' and 'distinguishers' 
We say that features represent concepts. How we use the terms 
'feature' and 'concept' and in what way they can be said to 
have internal structure is best illustrated with an example. 
We say, for instance, that t+human] is a feature and therefore 
represents the concept 'human'; we also state, by means of a 
redundancy rule, that the feature [+human] is dominated by the 
feature [+living] and that this, in its turn, is dominated by 
the feature t+concrete], thus expressing that the concept 
'human' implies the concept 'living' and that the concept 
'living' implies the concept 'concrete'. Features, therefore, 
do not represent - and concepts are not - semantic primitives. 
A configuration of features that can be related to a 
phonological form is called a sense.A sense, then, is the 
(2) 
representation of (one of) the meaning(s) of a lexical item 
(1) See Katz-Fodor (1963:412-16) and Katz (1972:82-88). 
(2) The question of polysemy - that is the fact that more than 
one sense can be related to the same phonological form - is 
discussed more fully in ch. 3. In that section we also consider 
the nature and function of semantic features in greater detail. 
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Such configurations of features may be said to represent 
unified concepts. These are different from individual concepts 
in that it is only on the basis of unified concepts that a 
reference relation can be established. In other words, it is 
only through a sense that a lexical item can be used to refer; 
the reference relation holds between the unified concept that 
is represented by the sense, and the referent. A unified 
concept in isolation - that is, as it is represented by its 
sense in the lexicon - will be said to denote a class of 
potential referents (or reference class). Thus the reference 
class denoted by the sense of an item like car in the lexicon, 
comprises all objects that can function as referents when the 
word car is used in an actual discourse. Finally, when a sense 
is used in context, it is said to refer to an object. The term 
'object' should be considered to include not only physical 
objects but also events, actions, properties, abstract ideas 
(including concepts) or classes of any of these 
In the following chapters we shall occasionally employ 
a sort of verbal shorthand in talking about reference relation-
ships. We may, for example, say something like "lexical item a^  
refers to object x". Such a statement should always be understood 
to mean: 1. that it is not the lexical item itself that refers, 
but the person using it in a context; 2. that reference is 
made not by means of the lexical item but by means of its sense 
or one of its senses. 
1.4. Metaphorical and non-metaphorical interpretations 
As we have said earlier , we consider it to be one of the 
requirements for an interpretive model that it should be able 
to provide interpretations for metaphorical expressions. We 
(1) Cf. Bunge (1974:26): "... the denotata of a sign system may 
be anything whatever: individuals, sets, relations, concrete 
or abstract, possible or impossible. They are objects in the 
general philosophical sense of the word, not in the sense of 
concrete tangible thing". 
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may speak of a metaphorical expression if one of the senses 
composing the expression has a referent that does not belong 
to the reference class denoted by that sense . The question 
that then arises is how we can tell when this is the case in 
a model that, as we have pointed out, is not directly concerned 
with reference. The answer may, at first sight, seem rather 
obvious: we can predict that an adjective-noun combination 
is a metaphorical one when the noun is modified by an adjective 
which is not normally used to predicate a property of a member 
of the noun's reference class. But there are complications, 
as we can see from the following examples: 
(1.1) a. an angry man : b. the man experiences anger 
(1.2) a. an angry letter: b.* the letter experiences anger 
(1.3) a. a sad tree : b.* the tree experiences sadness 
In (1.1.a) angry is a normal modifier for man, as is shown by 
paraphrase (b). Similar paraphrases, however, are not possible 
for (1.2) and (1.3). This would lead to the conclusion that 
the latter two examples are alike and that both call for a 
metaphorical interpretation. But we know intuitively that they 
are not of the same nature and that, whereas (1.3) does require 
a metaphorical reading, (1.2) does not. We know that letter, 
most likely, does have a referent belonging to the noun's 
reference class, and that angry predicates a property of a 
member of the reference class the adjective is usually applied 
to, namely that of human beings (an 'angry letter' is one written 
by an angry person). We see then that the modification relation-
(1) Cf. Reddy (1969:247): "The spontaneous and intuitive 
feeling that a word is operating metaphorically is, I 
believe, contingent upon the failure to find a referent 
for a given word within its 'literal sphere of reference'". 
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ship is not always a direct one and that an adjective which, 
in surface structure, 'modifies' a noun does not always do 
so directly. It is for cases like (1.2) - as well as a great 
many others - that we have to make provision and that we have 
to introduce the special semantic notions we mentioned on 
Ρ.β
;ΐ)
. 
When an expression contains no internal clues that one 
of the senses has a referent not belonging to the reference 
class of that sense, the model will, of course, not assign 
a metaphorical interpretation to such an expression. This means 
that expressions whose metaphorical character is only recog­
nizable in the (verbal or non-verbal) situation in which they 
are uttered, will receive a non-metaphorical reading; this 
does not preclude their being re-interpreted in a metaphorical 
way, if the wider verbal context should contain indications 
that it is necessary to do so. Thus an example like Reddy's 
(1969:242): 
(1.4) The rock is becoming brittle with age 
will receive a normal interpretation, unless in the wider verbal 
context it should become clear that rock must be understood 
to have a [+human] referent. 
1.5. Technical terms. 
We conclude this introductory chapter by mentioning, and, where 
necessary, defining most of the technical terms which we shall 
(1) In the case of (1.2) the superficial anomaly is 'solved' 
by assigning a generative feature to letter, and an 
additional predicational relator to angry which is 
different from the one used in (1.1). 
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use in the following chapters, with the exception of the terms 
that have already been mentioned and of some that will have 
to be discussed in detail. Host of the terms mentioned below 
are discussed more fully in the next chapters. 
A lexical item is any free morpheme, a combination of 
free morphemes or a combination of free morpheme(s) and bound 
morpheme(s). The representation of the meaning of a lexical 
item in the lexicon is called a lexical entry . A lexical 
entry consists of at least one sense; lexical entries for 
polysemous lexical items contain more than one sense. The sense 
of a polysemous lexical item from which its other senses can 
be systematically derived is its basic sense; this is usually 
the most 'concrete', but not necessarily the most frequently 
used sense of the item (cf. 2.2). Senses which can be 
systematically derived from the basic sense of a lexical item 
are called extended senses. By the meaning of a lexical item 
we understand the collection of senses making up its lexical 
entry. That part of a sense which has referring capacity 
is said to constitute the denotative level (or semantic 
foreground) of the sense. Some senses have, in addition to a 
denotative level, a connotative level (or semantic background); 
the element(s) on the connotative level do not have referring 
capacity but represent the attitude of the average 
language user towards the reference class denoted by the 
denotative level. 
As we have said earlier in this chapter, contextual 
restrictions play a key role in determining what interpretive 
rules are applied. Contextual restrictions are represented 
in the form of contextual features. These are assigned to 
adjectives and are stated in terms of basic or extended senses 
of nouns. When an adjective is in syntactic colligation with a 
(1) Strictly speaking, a lexical entry should also contain a 
representation of the phonological form of a lexical item. 
We shall ignore this, since we are not concerned with 
phonological form in the present study. 
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noun, we check whether its contextual feature(s) are compatible 
with one of the senses of the noun . This checking operation 
is called a matching; the senses of the adjective and the noun 
involved in a matching are the members of the matching. The 
matching may be successful or not,- when the matching is 
successful, we speak of a match, when it is not, we speak 
of a met. A match will yield a normal reading; this is a 
construct representing (one of) the semantic interpretation(s) 
of the adjective-noun combination. A met yields either a 
transfer reading (see ch. 2) or a metaphorical reading (see 
ch. 3). We shall use the term metaphor to refer to a met which 
has yielded a metaphorical reading. 
When a given sense of an adjective is matched with a given 
sense of a noun, the other senses which belong to the lexical 
entries for the adjective and the noun but which are not 
members of the matching, are said to be suppressed senses. 
Suppressed senses do not appear in readings. Senses may also 
be backgrounded; a backgrounded sense is one that is shifted 
from the denotative to the connotative level. Backgrounded 
senses form part of metaphorical readings. 
(1) An adjective may have more than one contextual feature; 
the number of contextual features that are assigned to 
it, is equal to the number of its predicational relators. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF LEXICAL ITEMS 
As we have seen in chapter 1, lexical entries are sets of 
senses, each sense being represented by one or more features. 
If a sense is represented by a set of features, the features 
constituting the set are ordered hierarchically. The senses 
and features of a lexical entry appear in a given configuration, 
which is normally fixed, but under certain conditions (meta-
phorization) changeable. In this chapter we shall first 
discuss the different types of features we employ and comment 
on the relation between each individual type and the other 
types and, after that, summarize and discuss the semantic 
configurations in which they can appear. 
We distinguish the following types of features: 
PRIMARY (both HIGHER-LEVEL and LOWER-LEVEL) features, 
GENERATIVE features and SECONDARY features. PRIMARY and 
GENERATIVE features also function as CONTEXTUAL features to 
indicate co-occurrence restrictions. In addition to features, 
the lexical entries for adjectives also contain one or more 
PREDICATIONAL RELATORS, which serve to account for the 
predicational relationships holding between adjectives and 
the nouns they can be predicated of. Finally, we employ 
TRANSFER and EVALUATIVE features; these do not form part of 
lexical entries in the lexicon but may, under certain conditions, 
originate in readings. 
2.1. Classifying features; primary features 
Primary (henceforth: PRIM) features are semantic constructs 
which serve as labels for categories of concepts ranging from 
very general - such as [+CONCRETE] - to very specific. Each 
category, except the two most general ones ([+CONCRETE]), can 
be looked upon as constituting a subclass of a more general 
class. Since features are theoretical constructs, they should 
not be mistaken for lexical items of the language, although 
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the majority of them are homophonous with lexical items (cf. 
nierwisch, 1970:169). The nature and the function of primary 
features are more fully discussed in section 3.1. 
The features we postulate have an intuitive basis and 
have been arrived at by making use of such common techniques 
as paraphrase and substitution and common semantic notions 
such as logical inclusion, implication, synonymy, antonymy, 
contradiction; they have also been tested empirically in the 
application of our rules to a large number of examples. 
We have not attempted to construct a series of tests to give 
our features a more 'objective' basis, although we have 
occasionally made use of tests that have been used previously, 
notably by Bendix (1966) and Lipka (1972). 
However, as pointed out in chapter 1, it is not our main 
concern to identify features that have universal validity 
in a general semantic theory, but rather to show that semantic 
features are workable tools in dealing with semantic inter-
pretation. We trust that in general the features we postulate 
are uncontroversial; if we define house as a manufactured 
physical object and elephant as an animal and therefore, by 
implication, a living being, it is hardly necessary to justify 
this difference in classification by pointinq out that (2.1) 
is interpreted as a contradiction, whereas (2.2) is experienced 
as an irrelevant anomaly: 
(2.1) It is an elephant but it is not an animal 
(2.2) It is an elephant but it is not a house. 
In the present model we use two types of PRIM features: 
higher-level PRIM (henceforth: HPRIM) and lower-level PRIM 
(henceforth: LPRIM) features. 
2.1.1. Higher-level primary features 
We use only a limited number of HPRIM features, namely those 
which can be acconmodated in a binary tree-diagram (see 
fig.2.1). All HPRIM features are true binary features, as 
opposed to most LPRIM features, which are usually pseudo-
binary. (We use the term 'pseudo-binary' rather than 'non-
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binary' because it is not uncommon in the literature to 
find non-binary features used in a binary notation, i.e. 
with a plus or a minus value attached to them). The main 
difference between true binary features and oseudo-binary 
features is that with the former the positive and the negative 
values of the feature each identify a class, whereas with 
the latter it is only the positive value that identifies a 
class. For example, the true binary feature [+MALE] sets up 
two classes; the value [-MALE] does not only specify, 
negatively, that the item to which it is assigned does not 
belong to the class of males but also, positively, that it 
belongs to the class of females. A pseudo-binary feature 
like [+yEHICLE], however, identifies only one class, viz. that 
of vehicles; here the value [-VEHICLE] only specifies that 
the item to which it is assigned does not belong to the class 
of vehicles. The difference can be illustrated as in figures 
2.2a and 2.2b: \ 
-> [+MALE] 
[-MALE] or female: the negative 
value has classifying force. 
fiq. 2.2a 
-> [+VEHICLE] 
-> [-VEHICLE]; the negative value 
does not have classifying force. 
fig. 2.2b 
The classifying force of the minus value of true binary 
features is also apparent from the fact that in most cases 
lexical items are available to denote the class identified 
by the minus value, for example, female for [-MALE], plant 
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for [-ANIMAL], substance for [-SHAPE], event for [-ACTION], 
etc. 
Another general characteristic that distinguishes HPRIM 
from LPRIM features is that among HPRIM features a specific 
hierarchy obtains (see the diagram of HPRIM features on p.19), 
which in most cases is irreversible, although minor variations 
are possible , whereas any hierarchical order imposed on 
(2) 
LPRIM features is usually quite arbitrary . If, for example, 
we should attempt to incorporate the features [+VEHICLE] 
and [+BUILDING] in the HPRIM hierarchy, we find that, although 
both would be dominated by the nodes [+SHAPE, +ARTIF], 
[-VEHICLE] could just as easily be made to dominate the 
distinction [+BUILDING] (see fig. 2.3a), as [-BUILDING] could 
be made to dominate [+yEHICLE] (see fig. 2.3b). 
+SHAPE 
+ARTIF -ARTIF 
I Í 
+VEHICLE -VEHICLE 
I I 
+BUILDING -BUILDING 
fig. 2.3a 
(1) Thus the left-hand side of the diagram of HPRIM features 
might be re-arranged as follows: 
Г 
-LIVING 
I 
ANIMAL 
+LIVING 
I 
+ANIMAL 
I I 
+HUMAN -HUMAN 
(2) For a few exceptions, see the section on LPRIM features. 
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+SHAPE 
1
 , 
-ARTIF 
BUILDING 
— 1 
-VEHICLE 
fig. 2.3b 
Although the two points discussed above - true binarity and 
uniqueness of hierarchical order - are general characteristics of 
HPRIM features, we do not use them as criteria for distinguishing 
between HPRIM and LPRIM features. Ultimately, the reason for 
making a given feature a HPRIM feature is the generality of the 
class it serves to identify. Although, for example, we use the 
true binary feature [+MALE] as a HPRIM branching from the node 
[+HUMAN], because in this case the distinction is considered to 
be of sufficient lexical relevance, we do not use this feature 
as a HPRIM branching from the node [+ANIMAL], because here the 
distinction only serves to create rather small and idiosyncratic 
classes. Another example of a feature that is used as a LPRIM 
feature in spite of its true binarity is [+mature] , which is used, 
where needed, as a LPRIM feature for [+HUMAN] nouns. 
The hierarchical ordering of HPRIM features as illustrated in the 
diagram on p.19 enables the general redundancy rule (2.3) to operate 
with respect to HPRIM features: 
(2) (2.3) The occurrence of a feature [F] in a semantic path 
makes the occurrence of all the features dominating [F] 
redundant. 
(1) In order to distinguish between HPRIM and LPRIM features, the former 
are printed in capital letters, the latter in lower case. 
(2) By a 'semantic path' is understood any set of hierarchically 
ordered PRIM features constituting a lexical entry (i.e. what 
Katz and Fodor (1963) and Katz (1972) call a 'reading'). 
+ARTIF 
+BUILDING 
+VEHICLE 
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With the help of the tree-diagram of HPRIM features, this rule 
enables us to represent lexical entries more economically. 
By assigning, for example, the feature t+MALE] to the noun 
father, the features [+HUMAN, +LIVING, +CONCRETE] are automatically 
implied. 
Not all of the HPRIM features which are included in a particular 
dominance chain in the semantic tree of HPRIM features are neces-
sarily present in the semantic path of a lexical entry. This is 
obvious in the case of very general words like person and object; 
these are sufficiently defined by assigning to them the HPRIM 
features [+HUMAN] and [+SHAPE] respectively. The more specific 
distinctions [+MALE] and [+ARTIFACT] are irrelevant for the lexical 
definitions of these words. However, the lower nodes of the tree 
of HPRIM features may also be 'by-passed' in the case of lexical 
items which need a LPRIM feature to define their meaning. 
For instance, the lexical entry for adolescent would contain the 
features [+HUMAN, -mature], where the distinction [+MALE] is by-
passed; lexical items like porridge, soup, bread would receive 
the feature [-LIVING, e food] , where the distinctions t+SHAPE ] 
and [+ARTIFACT] are by-passed. Owing to the true binarity of 
HPRIM features, however, the concepts indicated by the lower 
HPRIM nodes do play a role in reference: the referent denoted 
by [+HUMAN, -mature] must be either male or female; everything 
that is [-LIVING, € food] is either a natural or a manufactured 
'object' or substance. 
To conclude this section we shall illustrate the use of the HPRIM 
features in the semantic tree by means of examples and give some 
comment on the feature-labels wherever these are not immediately 
obvious. It should be borne in mind that a great number of lexical 
(1) For the differences in the notation of LPRIM features see the 
next section. 
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items have more than one sense. The examples listed below should 
be taken in their 'basic sense' (see below, section 2.2). Their 
use to illustrate one particular feature does not by any means 
imply that other senses than the one given do not occur. 
Examples which, for a fuller definition, need other features in 
addition to the one they serve to illustrate, are given in 
parentheses. Thus a noun like teacher, which is used to illustrate 
the HPRIM feature [+HUM], also receives the LPRIM feature 
[€ professional] in parentheses. 
No examples of adjectives are given. All adjectives are 
classified under the node [+STA],
 So that we distinguish three 
major categories: [+STA, +PH, +DIM], [+STA, +PH, -DIM] and 
[+STA, -PH] (cf.the diagram on p.19). The 'active' character of 
adjectives like slow, fast, active, etc. is not accounted for 
by features, but by predicational relators (see section 2.3) which 
co-occur with [+ACT] nouns or which select an extended 'active' 
sense of a noun (see section 2.2.1). In terms of features an 
adjective like slow is identical with slowness, the only difference 
between them being that the adjective has a predicational relator. 
Because adjectives can be classified only very generally by means 
of HPRIM features, they will not be illustrated here but in 
section 2.1.2.2. 
CONCRETE. The feature [+CONC] represents concepts referring 
to whatever has substance and/or shape in its own right, or 
by virtue of our perceiving it that way. 
Examples no lexical items available; that is, all nouns 
having the feature [+CONC] also have other HPRIM features 
dominated by it. 
LIVING. The feature [+LIV] does not represent the concept 'alive', 
but 'living being*. In fact, [+LIV] serves as the contextual 
restriction for the adjective dead. 
Examples [+LIV]: creature; [-LIV] : no lexical items 
available. 
(1) In this listing we refer to the features exemplified by means 
of the abbreviations which will henceforth be used. 
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HUMAN. Exanples [+HUII] : person, (teacher, inhabitant) ; 
[-HUM] : no lexical items available. 
SHAPE. [+SH] represents concepts referring to any object, 
whether artifact or not, that has size and perceptible 
outline. Examples [+SH] : thing, object; [-SH] : matter, 
substance. 
MALE. Examples [+M] : man, (boy, husband)? t-м] : woman, 
(girl, aunt). 
ANIMAL. [+AN] and [-AN] distinguish between the animal and 
vegetable worlds. Examples [+AN] : animal, (fox, elephant); 
[-AN] : plant,(tree, shrub, flower). 
ABTIFACT. [+ART] represents concepts referring to any object 
or substance made by human agency. Examples [+SH, +АПТ]: 
article, (chair, desk, gun, book, car, house, prison, statue, 
bracelet); [+SH, -ART] : (rock, mountain, cloud, leaf, 
strawberry); [-SH, +ART] : material,(plastic, si]k, mortar, 
asphalt, drug, poison); [-SH, -ART] : (water, rain, snow, 
sand, clay, dew). 
PERCEPTIBLE. [+PERC] represents concepts referring to everything 
which is [-CONC] and pertains to sensory, emotional or 
intellectual experience; [-PERC] denotes concepts referring 
to everything which is [-CONC] and is an intellectual 
abstraction. Examples [+PERC] : phenomenon; [-PERC] : 
concept, idea, notion. 
STATE. [+STA] represents concepts referring to a mental or 
physical condition; [ -STA] refers to concepts denoting a 
process. Examples [+STA] : state, property, (characteristic); 
[-STA] : process, proceeding. 
ACTION. [+ACT] represents concepts referring to any process 
normally involving volition, [-ACT] denotes concepts referring 
to processes not involving volition. Examples [+ACT] : action, 
(smile, walk, murder, attention, decision); [-ACT] : event, 
(accident, fall, tempest). 
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PHYSICAL. t+РН] represents concepts referrina te states or 
actions perceived by the senses, [-PH] to those which pertain 
to the emotions or to intellectual activity. Examples 
[+STA, -PH] : (mood, jealousy, sadness, joy, hate, modesty, 
intelligence, stupidity, smartness, courage, patience, harshness); 
[+ACT, +PH] : act, (tap, slap, kick, dance, cry, shout, scream, 
flight, drive, work, walk, look, expression, glance); 
[+ACT, -PH] : (intention, understanding, plan, plot, compromise, 
accusation, attention, request, refusal, acceptance, decision, 
thought). 
DIMENSIONAL. [+DIM] applies to concepts denoting the spatial as 
well as temporal dimensions; [-DIM] refers to other physical 
states. Examples [+DIM] : (mile, depth, length, height, space, 
volume, evening, night, day, hour, week); [-DIM] : (darkness, 
drought, humidity, weight, fatigue, health, temperature). 
ATTRIBUTE. [+ATTR] represents any quality which is not inherent 
in an object, state or process, but attributed to it by the 
mind, [-ATTR] everything which is not a property of 
something, but an abstract entity. 
Examples [+ATTR] : attribute; [-ATTR]
 :
 abstraction, (reward, 
sin, tribute, benefit, advantage, eternity, democracy, 
community, Christianity, society, government). 
EVALUATIVE. [+EVAL] represents attributes which are exclusively 
ameliorative or pejorative and therefore mainly emotive in 
character ,[-EVAL] refers to attributes which are based on 
intellectual judgment. Examples [+EVAL] : (goodness, badness, 
excellence, perfection); [-EVAL] : (informativeness, vagueness, 
abstruseness, abstractness, ambiguity, intelligibility, 
lucidity). 
2.1.2. Lower-level primary features 
It is obvious that with the thirty-two HPRIM features we employ 
we can fully analyse the meaning of only a very small minority 
of English words. As the examples listed in the previous section 
show, with most words HPRIM features can account for only a part 
of their meaning - the rest of their semantic content remains 
unanalysed. In general it seems to be the case that the more 
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specific the concepts needed for the analysis of meaning are, 
the less relevant their incorporation within a binary system 
becomes. In order to account partly for such specific and 
idiosyncratic elements of meaning we assign, wherever necessary, 
a LPRIM feature to a lexical item. 
2.1.2.1. Lower-level primary features of nouns 
Apart from the rather exceptional binary LPRIM features discussed 
in the preceding section ([+mature] and [+male] dominated by 
[+AN]), LPRIM features of nouns are based on a hyponymy relation-
ship, which enables us to specify, as it were, the sense of a 
lexical entry from the bottom of the semantic tree up, instead of 
defining it from the top of the tree down. That is, instead of 
analysing a sense by first stating its most general feature and 
subsequently less general features, as we do when we use HPRIM 
features, a LPRIM feature defines part of the sense of a lexical 
item by taking what is most distinctive in its meaning and stating 
to what larger class of semantic concepts this belongs. Thus we 
can say that chess belongs to the larger class game; rose is 
included in the class flower. We say, then, that b is a hyponym 
of a^  (notation b € a) when of two sentences X and Y, which are 
only different in that X has b where Y has a, X implies Y but Y 
does not imply X. For example, the sentence (X) "I bought some 
roses", where roses is b, implies the sentence (Y) "I bought some 
flowers", where flowers is a; hence: 
rose G flower, or, as we shall henceforth say, rose has the 
LPRIM feature [£ flower] 
It should be pointed out that, owing to gaps in the English 
lexicon, the higher or superordinate term may not always be 
available in the form of a lexical item (cf. Lyons, 1968:456). 
The words war, battle and quarrel, for example, are clearly hyponyms 
of the same concept, for which, hov/ever, no word is available in 
English and which can only be paraphrased by something like "hostile 
activity". It should be noted that in such paraphrases it is the , 
(1) More examples of LPRIM features are given at the end of this 
section. 
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adjective ("hostile") that carries the classifying force; the meaning 
of the noun ("activity") is already accounted for by the HPRIM 
features of these words [+ACT, +PH]. Therefore we shall say that 
words like quarrel, battle, etc. have the LPRIM feature [€ hostile] 
rather than [G hostile activity]. Another example of this type is 
the LPRIM feature [£ professional] for words like lawyer, teacher, 
sailor, etc. It may also be the case that a mass-noun provides the 
superordinate term for a class of countable nouns. Thus for chair, 
desk, table, etc. we have the superordinate term furniture. We shall 
say that these nouns have the LPRIM feature [€ furniture], although 
for the hymonymy test to apply in these cases we need to use a 
numerative: "piece of furniture". 
How LPRIM features are related to the tree of HPRIM features 
is best illustrated with some examples. In figures 2.4 and 2.5 we 
illustrate the feature hierarchy for the nouns car and anger, 
respectively: 
car: 
+SH 
+ART 
£ vehicle 
-LIV 
+SHAPE 
1 
-SHAPE 
+ART 
— I 
-ART 
vehicle 
bus car train 
fig. 2.4 
anger: 
+STA 
-PH 
£ emotion 
+PERC 
+STA 
— I 
-STA 
+PH -PH 
emotion 
:oy 
fig. 2.5 
anger jealousy 
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In figures 2.4 and 2.5 the dominance relations between HPRIM and 
LPRIM features are represented by a dotted instead of an unbroken 
line. This indicates that very often the relation between HPRIM 
and LPRIM features is not one of immediate dominance, for the 
subclass delimited by a LPRIM feature is not necessarily a member 
of the class delimited by the lowest HPRIM feature dominating 
that LPRIM feature. Instead, the subclass named by the LPRIM 
feature may be a member of a subclass of the class named by the 
HPRIM feature, or a member of a subclass of a subclass of that 
class. The concept denoted by a noun like car, for example, is 
a member of the class of concepts referring to vehicles, which 
is itself a member of the class of concepts referring to 
instruments, this latter class, in its turn, being a member of 
the class of concepts denoting manufactured physical objects. 
To put this, more simply, in terms of features: the noun car 
has the LPRIM feature [€ vehicle], which is dominated by the 
LPRIM feature [£ instrument], this latter feature,in its turn, 
being dominated by the HPRIM features [+SH, +ART]. Some more 
examples of LPRIM features dominating other LPRIM features are 
to be found in the listing of LPRIM features given below. Another 
reason why we do not wish to regard the relation between a LPRIM 
feature and the HPRIM feature that dominates it as an immediate 
one, is that the delimitation of HPRIM features, notably those 
dominated by [+CONC] is based on formal considerations, whereas 
LPRIM features may be based either on formal considerations 
(e.g. [e solid], [€ liquid]) or on functional considerations 
(e.g. [€ food], [€ vehicle]). It is obvious that many concepts 
might be classified in either of these two ways, both on the basis 
of their functional and on the basis of their formal properties. 
We avoid doing this as much as possible, however, since this 
would result in having two lexical entries for the same lexical 
item and thus in the creation of a great many homonyms. Whenever 
there is a statable and regular connection between two senses of 
a lexical item we account for this by means of extended senses 
(see 2.2), thus avoiding double class membership of the item in 
question. In dealing with extensions of meaning, we always take 
the most formal or concrete sense as the basic one (see p. 50), 
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because, as we have pointed out, most HPRIM features are based 
on the formal qualities of the concepts they are applied to. 
The possibility of setting up smaller classes of concepts on 
the basis of more than one criterion, is only one of the reasons 
why LPRIM features are more idiosyncratic than HPRIM features. 
In general we can say that classifying criteria tend to become 
more idiosyncratic and diversified in the same proportion as 
the classes they serve to identify become smaller. This is found 
in its most extreme form in what we call linking constructions. 
These are cases of adjective-noun combinations where the linguistic 
context imposes a particular classifying criterion on the class 
of concepts denoted by the noun; the classifying criterion is 
named by the adjective. Thus, to take a well-known example , 
the concept denoted by the lexical item elephant might be 
classified on the basis of a great many inherent properties of 
its referent, e.g., 'having a trunk', 'having four feet', 'large 
in size', 'non-extinct'. Usually these properties do not play 
a classifying role. Hence the lexical entry for elephant simply 
contains the HPRIM feature [+AN] (together with a semantic 
residue; see 2.1.4). On this basis, however, a sentence like 
(2.4) A small elephant is a biq animal 
would be interpreted as a contradiction because it would assert 
that "a [+AN] that is small is a [+AN] that is biq". The fact 
that it is not a contradiction indicates that big animal should 
be taken as a linking construction, so that the sense of big 
is now used with classifying force. It delimits a subclass of 
animals, namely that of 'big animals'; we might say that an 
ad hoc, contextually bound LPRIM feature [€ big] is added to the 
set of features for elephant. The feature hierarchy for elephant 
in this context is now as illustrated in figure 2.6, which 
resolves the apparent contradiction of (2.4): 
(1) See, among others, Leech (1969:86-7). 
+AN -AN 
I 
, ' 1 
big small 
... elephant ... 
fig. 2.6 
In spite of the fact that there are various ways of classifying 
some items, it is, in general, possible to delimit fixed subclasses 
for the majority of lexical items in the English lexicon by means of 
LPRIM hyponymy features. In the following list we give a number of 
examples of LPRIM features (second column), state which HPRIM features 
they are dominated by (first column) and illustrate each of them 
with some lexical items to which they apply (third column). 
Whenever a LPRIM feature is dominated by another, this is indicated 
in the second column, the feature on the left of the arrow being the 
dominant one. It should be borne in mind that, as in the listing of 
HPRIM features, the fact that a lexical item is given as an example 
of a particular LPRIM feature, does not imply that its meaning is 
restricted to just that one sense. 
dominated 
by: 
[+H] 
[+11] 
LPRIM feature 
[б professional] 
[E relative] 
examples 
lawyer, doctor, teacher, 
actor, policeman, sailor, 
student, carpenter, 
nurse, pianist 
sister, father-in-law, 
grandson 
L 
dominated 
by: 
[-AN] 
[+SH, +ART] 
[+SH, -ART] 
[-LIV] 
[-SH] 
[+DIM] 
LPRIM feature 
[€ tree] 
[£ instrument] 
[G instrument]-» 
[G furniture] 
[G building] 
[G writing] 
[G bodypart] 
[б food] 
L 
[б solid] 
[G liquid] 
[G location] 
[£ period] 
examples 
cedar, birch, elm 
eraser, drill, knife, 
wrench, needle 
car, train, bike, plane, 
bus, boat, ship 
desk,table, bookcase 
prison, house, cottage 
book, letter, novel, 
paper, magazine 
eye, face, hand, mouth, 
leg, arm, head 
bread, milk, beer, 
spinach, salt 
wood, iron, granite, 
concrete 
water, rain, lava 
country, countryside, 
home, province, 
neighbourhood, centre, 
corner, middle 
day, night, evening 
season, month 
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dominated 
by: 
[-DIM] 
[+STA, -PH] 
[+ACT, +PH] 
LPRIM feature 
[E weather] 
[€ emotion] 
[£ volition] 
[€ intellect] 
[€ attitude] 
[€ hostile] 
[É expressive] 
[€ communicative] 
te sound -* € physical] 
[e sound -» € musical] 
[€ motion-» € vertical] 
£ motion-» ε horizon­
tal] 
examples 
weather, climate 
anger, sadness, joy, 
jealousy 
will, determination, 
readiness, compliance 
intelligence, stupidity, 
smartness, sense 
courage, patience, 
harshness, cowardice 
quarrel, battle, fight 
look, expression, glance 
frown, gesture, hug, 
embrace, shrug, wave 
cry, shout, scream, yell, 
laughter, snort, squeak 
voice, tone, pitch, 
note, scale 
dive, jump, leap,bounce 
walk, run, swim 
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dominated 
by: 
[+ACT, -PH] 
[-ACT] 
LPRIM feature 
[e communicative] 
[ε natural] 
examples 
voice, tone, speech, 
remark, answer, state­
ment, question, review 
wind, breeze, gale, 
tempe st, earthquake 
2.1.2.2. Lower-level primary features of adjectives 
In general, we can say that LPRIM features of adjectives delimit 
categories of concepts which can be used to describe other categories 
of concepts. Their function is primarily to state the meaning of 
adjectives in greater detail than the HPRIM features allow, for, as 
we have seen in section 2.1.1, HPRIM features create only three major 
categories of adjectives, viz. [+STA, +PH, +DIM], [+STA, +PH, -DIM] 
and [+STA, -PH] . As we shall see later (section 2.3), LPRIM 
features of adjectives may also be redundantly associated with 
predicational relators denoting the predicational potential of 
adjectives. 
We shall first list all the LPRIM features we shall use in the 
next chapters and give examples of adjectives they are assigned tö, 
and after that discuss the nature of adjectival LPRIM features and 
(1) We make an exception for present participles used attributively. 
These are given the features [+АСГ, +PH]. Past participles have 
the features [+STA, +PH]. In addition to these, present and past 
participles are assigned the features [Progr] and [Perf] respectively. 
In order to distinguish between 'apparent' present participles like 
amusing, charming and 'real' present participles, the 'very...'-test 
can be used. Thus (a) and (b) are acceptable, but (c) is not: 
(a) a very amusing story 
(b) a very charming girl 
(c)*a very running man 
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their relation to LPRIM features of nouns and comment on some of the 
features individually. As with nouns, classes of adjectives delimited 
by LPRIM features may be members of larger classes which are also 
defined by a LPRIM feature. Wherever this is the case, this dominance 
relation is again indicated by means of an arrow, the feature on 
the left side of the arrow being the dominant one. 
1. Features dominated by the HPRIM features [+STA, +PH, +DIM]: 
[€ diml] •* [G horiz]: wide, broad, narrow, long, short 
[£ diml]-> [€ vert]: tall, deep, shallow, high, low 
[G dim2]: large, vast, extensive,small 
[€ dim3]: voluminous,spacious, roomy,big, huge 
[€. temp.ord.]: previous, preceding, subsequent, following, next, 
(2) last, latest, late , future, former 
[€ duration] : brief, continuous, long-lasting, eternal 
[€ freouency] : frequent, rare, regular 
[€ frequency] -» [€ iteration] : recurrent, occasional, daily, 
weekly 
2. Features dominated by [+STA, +PH, -DIM]: 
[€ substance] : material, substantial 
[G substance] -* [ε solid] : solid, iron, wooden, gold, stone 
[ε substance] -* [ε liquid] : liquid, watery, fluid 
(1) Whenever applicable, standard abbreviations are given. 
See the list of abbreviations and symbols, appendix 2. 
(2) As, for example, in her late husband. 
(3) The durational sense of adjectives like long and short 
is accounted for by an integrated secondary feature. 
See section 2.2.1. 
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€ substance] -» [£ gaseous] : gaseous, vapoury 
£ substance] •* [6 texture] : coarse, fine, powdery, granular 
€ luminosity] : bright, shining, clear, dull, dark 
£ humidity] : wet, dry, moist 
€ temperature] : hot, cold, cool, tepid 
G colour] 
G weight] 
ε smell] 
ε taste] 
ε vision] 
ε touch] 
ε sound] 
ε sound] -
red, blue, green 
heavy, light 
fragrant, sweet-smelling, musty, smelly 
tasty, palatable, savoury 
visible, vague 
hard, smooth, even, rough, soft 
loud, noisy, quiet, silent 
[ε mus]: high-pitched, low-pitched (1) 
ε weather] : rainy, windy, stormy, sunny 
ε fixity] : firm, loose, shaky 
ε property] : rich, poor, wealthy 
ε content] : full, crowded, empty 
ε corp.cond.]: tired, hungry, weary, thirsty, rested, 
healthy, nervous 
ε corp.fune] : blind, deaf, mute, dumb, lame, dead 
ε velocity] : fast, quick, slow, hurried, speedy 
ε activity] : active, inactive, bustling 
3. Features dominated by [+STA, -PH] 
[ε emotion] 
[ε attitude] 
[ε intellect] 
[ε truth] 
[ε comm.] 
[ε manner] 
: sad, angry, jealous, happy, joyful 
: bold, courageous, lenient, harsh, strict, 
patient, vicious, pious, humble, kind 
: smart, intelligent, stupid, crazy, knowing 
: true, false, obvious, evident, dubious, doubtful 
: talkative, taciturn, gossipy, communicative, 
vague, abstruse, abstract, informative 
: difficult, easy, skilful 
(1) Integrated secondary senses of low, deep, high also belong 
to this class (cf. 2.2.1). 
[€ evaluation] : good, bad, excellent, fair, perfect 
IG degree] : true, real, utter, absolute, mere, sheer, 
genuine 
[£ modality] : possible, likely, certain, probable 
As pointed out earlier, LPRIM features of adjectives are similar 
in nature to LPRIM features of nouns, in that they also serve to 
state the senses of adjectives in greater detail than their HPRIM 
features allow. The resemblance between the two sorts of LPRIM 
features is not complete, however. We cannot say, for example, 
that "temperature" is the superordinate term for the adjectives 
hot and cold, or that wet is a hyponym of "humidity"; application 
of the hyponym replacement test would fail in these cases. The 
superordinate terms for these adjectives would rather be 
paraphrasable by something like "having a certain temperature" 
and "having a certain degree of humidity". In other words, the 
paraphrases would have to contain some predicational element which 
is inherent in the meaning of acjectives in order for the test to 
apply. We do not account, however, for the predicational element 
in the sense of an adjective in terms of PRIM features; this 
predicational element is isolated from the referential content of 
adjectives and expressed by means of a predicational relator 
(see below, section 2.3). A LPRIM feature like [£ temperature] can 
be looked upon as a label for the semantic field comprising such 
items as hot, warm, cold, cool, etc. The resemblance between the 
LPRIM features of nouns and those of adjectives, is only to be 
found in the function they serve in the present model: both are the 
less general, more specific features used to analyse the senses of 
nouns and adjectives. But whereas the LPRIM features of nouns are based 
on a true hyponymy relationship, the LPRIM features of adjectives 
serve to delimit semantic fields, or more specifically, descriptive 
categories; that is to say, they name categories of concepts that 
ι 
are used to describe other concepts. 
The majority of the LPRIM features enumerated above denote 
properties which are scalable, that is, properties which are 
expressed iby relating them to a given norm. This norm is the 
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average if the adjective denoting the property is used in the 
positive degree in a non-coraparative context, as in John is tall/ 
short, it is contextually bound if the adjective is used in a 
comparative context, as in John is taller/shorter than Peter. 
This means that among the adjectives whose lexical entry 
contains a LPRIM feature naming a scalable class, we find one or 
more pairs of adjectiveè which are in polar opposition, or, in 
other words, adjectives that denote degrees of the property in 
question that are situated on the positive and negative side of 
the nom, such as, for example, hot - cold, warm - cool, wet - dry, 
long - short, rich - poor, etc. Such pairs have been called 
contraries (cf. Katz, 1972:159). This seems to be a better term 
than the much vaguer "antonyms" (cf. Lipka, 1972:58); the term 
"antonyms" would also include pairs like mortal - immortal and 
alive - dead, which we shall called contradictories,following Katz. 
The difference between contradictories and contraries is formulated 
by Katz as follows: "Contradictories admit of no possibility between 
them. They divide a common range of significance that is exhaustive 
as well as mutually exclusive. Contraries, on the other hand, 
admit of possibilities between and beyond them. They mark out 
regions on their range of significance that are incompatible but 
do not jointly cover the whole range". It should be noticed that 
Katz's contradictories resemble our true binary features, whereas 
contraries are members of classes of adjectives that denote 
scalable properties indicated by our LPRIM features. Within such 
classes it is often possible to identify more than one pair of 
contraries. This is exemplified by the pairs hot - cold and warm -
cool, where all four of the adjectives have the LPRIM feature 
[6 temperature]. It is not necessary, as seems to be suggested by 
this example, to have four items in order to set up two pairs 
of contraries; instead of having two pairs a - b and c_ - d, it 
is also possible to have two pairs a - b and a - c. An example is 
provided by [€ humidity], which has the pairs dry - wet as well as 
dry - moist. Bierwisch (1967:7) suggests a test for identifying pairs 
of contraries in German, which can also be applied to English. The 
test involves sentences like: 
(2.5) a. the wall is too high 
b. the wall is not low enough 
(2.6) a. the wall is not too high 
b. the wall is low enough 
Whenever such (a) and (b) sentences are pairwise paraphrases, the 
adjectives in them form a pair of contraries. In order to 
distinguish contrary adjectives within classes denoting scalable 
properties we use the feature [ijj, where "I" stands for "intensity". 
This notation is preferred to Bierwisch's [+POL] because the latter 
seems to suggest a binary opposition, or, at the least, an opposition 
between the two extremes of a scale; but this is contradicted, for 
example, by the existence of a pair like warm - cool by the side 
of hot - cold (unless one would maintain that there are two 
temperature scales, one for 'warnmess', the other for 'hotness'), 
or by the existence of a pair like huge - tiny by the side of, 
or rather beyond, the pair big - small. The features [l+] and [l-], 
on the other hand, do leave open "possibilities between and beyond 
them". Thus, the attribution of [l+] to warm does not preclude the 
possibility of there being another term beyond warm, which is also 
situated on the positive side of the norm 
In order to establish to which member of a pair of contraries 
the positive and to which the negative value should be assigned, 
Bierwisch (1967) proposes another test. According to this, those 
adjectives receive the feature [+POL] which can be modified for 
degree by phrases like twice as ("doppelt so") and half as ("halb so"). 
Thus (2.7a) and (2.7b) are said to be acceptable, and (2.8a) and 
(2.8b) unacceptable; this would mean that high, long and fast are 
[+POL], whereas low, short and slow are [-POL]: 
(2.7) a. twice as high, long, fast 
b. half as high, long, fast 
(2.8) a. twice as low, short, slow 
b. half as low, short, slow 
(1) In the present model we do not distinguish between adjectives 
like warm and hot. Both adjectives receive the features 
[G temp. 1+]. 
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Although the results of the test, in the examples given, are 
intuitively satisfactory, reactions of informants to it are, at least 
as far as English is concerned, various and hesitant. The twice-
as and half-as tests, therefore, seem to be less suitable 
to determine polarity in cases which have a less secure intuitive 
grounding. A better test, especially in intuitively dubious cases, 
is one which does not ask for a judgment about acceptability and 
deviance but for a semantic judgment on the question whether or 
not presuppositions are involved. On the basis of intuitively clear 
cases like high - low it is possible to observe the contextual 
semantic potential of positive and negative scalar adjectives. It 
appears that a positive adjective like high is used in neutral 
questions inquiring about the height of something, whereas a 
negative adjective like low seems to presuppose a low 'height' 
Thus, of the two questions 
(2.9) How high is it? 
(2.10) How low is it? 
the first is a non-committal inquiry about the height of an object 
(which may be high, low or average),while the second presupposes 
(2) that the object about which the inquiry is made, is low . On the 
basis of such intuitively clear examples, one may use the how - test 
to determine whether a positive I-value should be assigned to adjectives 
whose polarity is less immediately obvious, as is, for example, the 
case with the pair deep - shallow. If we compare the sentences 
(2.11) How deep is it? 
(2.12) How shallow is it? 
we find that (2.11) carries no presupposition as to the depth one 
inquires about, while (2.12) presupposes that this depth is shallow. 
Deep, therefore, receives the feature [l+] and shallow [l-]. 
(1) Often the noun denoting the scalable property is lexically 
related to the positive term: cf. long - length, high - height, 
wide - width. 
(2) Cf. S.С.Dik (1969:16). 
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Some examples of the LPRIM features assigned to scalar 
adjectives are: 
[б vert, I-] 
[€ horiz, I-] 
[E velocity, I-] 
[G temp, I-] 
[G dim2, I-] 
[G horiz, I-] 
[G content, I-] 
[€ fixity, I-] 
[G dim, € vert, I-] 
high 
long 
fast 
hot 
large 
wide 
full 
firm 
deep 
[G vert, 1+] 
[G horiz, 1+] 
[G velocity, 1+] 
[€ temp, 1+] 
[G dim2, 1+] 
[G horiz, 1+] 
[e content, 1+] 
[С fixity, 1+ ] 
[e dim, G vert, 1+] 
low : 
short : 
slow : 
cold : 
small : 
narrow : 
empty : 
loose : 
shallow: 
Among the classes of adjectives delimited by LPRIM features we can 
distinguish, first of all, between classes which do and those which 
do not denote scalable properties. Among the former we find classes 
whose members divide up between them just one common range of 
significance and others whose members divide up more than one 
common range (e.g. long and wide which are both [e horiz], but 
which belong to different ranges of significance). Finally there 
are also "mixed classes" of which only a few members can form 
contrary pairs while others are non-scalar (e.g. [e intellect] comprises 
the contrary pair intelligent - stupid as well as the non-scalar 
knowing). 
It is obvious that classes covering more than one range of 
significance as well as mixed classes could be analyzed into 
smaller sub-classes. Within the scope of the present model, however, 
we do not make these finer distinctions in terms of LPRIM features. 
In the listing below we indicate to which of the four types the 
classes referred to by LPRIM features belong. 
non-scalable: temp, order, substance, colour, weather, 
corp. function, activity, truth, degree, modality. 
one range of significance: dim 2,3, duration, frequency, luminosity, 
humidity, temperature, weight, smell, 
taste, vision, sound, fixity, property, 
content, velocity, evaluation. 
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more than one range of significance; diml, touch. 
mixed classes: intellect, attitude, corp. cond., emotion, 
communication, manner. 
2.1.3. Primary features of nouns as contextual features 
HPRIM and liPRIM features serve to analyse the senses of lexical items 
into more primitive semantic concepts. But besides this meaning-
defining function, their second major role in the present model is 
to indicate co-occurrence restrictions between lexical items. 
More specifically, within the scope of this model the co-occurrence 
restrictions holding between an adjective and a noun determine 
whether the matching of the noun and the adjective is successful or 
not, or, in other words, whether the matching yields a match (which 
results in a normal reading of the adjective and noun combination) 
or a met (which may result in a metaphorical reading). For this 
purpose contextual (henceforth: CONT) features are assigned to 
adjectives ; one way of indicating these is to state them in 
terms of the PRIM features of the class of nouns that the adjective 
can be predicated of. Thus an adjective like sad, which is 
normally predicated of human beings, receives the CONT features 
(2) [+CONC, +LIV, +HUM] - , so that (2.13) renders a normal reading: 
(2.13) sad person 
+CONC 
+LIV 
+HUM 
+CONC 
+LIV 
+HUM 
(3) 
(1) CONT features are associated with the predicational relators 
of adjectives (see section 2.3). For the sake of simplicity 
we shall ignore this in the present discussion. 
(2) CONT features are distinguished from non-contextual features 
by a line on each side of the brackets enclosing the feature. 
(3) In the examples given in this section we list, for the 
sake of clarity, all the HPRIM features of the lexical entries, 
although the redundancy rule (2.3) allows us to state only 
that feature which comes lowest in the semantic hierarchy. 
LPRIM features are only given where necessary. 
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In (2.14), however, the features -[+HUM] - of sad and [-HUM] of 
tree are found to be in opposition and, consequently, a met is 
signalled on the level [HUMAN]. 
(2.14) sad 
+CONC 
+LIV 
+HUM MET 
tree 
+CONC' 
+LIV 
-HUM 
-AN 
A met may also occur on the level of LPRIM features, as in: 
(2.15) savoury book 
+CONC' 
-LIV 
€ food 
— 
«— 
^^^ 
-(MET)—» 
+CONC 
-LIV 
+SH 
+ΑΚΓ 
G writing 
Here the lack of correspondence between the LPRIM hyponymy features 
- [€ food] - and [e writing] results in met-assignment. A combination 
like (2.16), on the other hand, renders a normal reading: 
(2.16) savoury 
+CONC" 
-LIV 
G food 
curry 
+CONC 
-LIV 
G food 
In section 2.1.1. we formulated a redundancy rule which operates on 
lexical entries in so far as these are stated in terms of PRIM 
features, and which is based on the dominance relations specified 
in the semantic tree of HPRIM features and on those holding between 
HPRIM and LPRIM features, stated elsewhere 
These dominance relations can also be made to operate with respect 
to CONT features, but instead of stating the rule in terms of upward 
(1) Cf. the listings of LPRIM features in sections 2.1.2.1 and 
2.1.2.2. 
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dominance relations as we did in (2.3), we have to state the rule for 
CONT features in terms of downward dominance relations: 
(2.17) the occurrence of a CONT feature — [ F ] — in a 
statement of contextual restrictions makes the 
occurrence of all the features dominated by [F] 
redundant. 
The difference between rules (2.3) and (2.17) is best illustrated 
with an example. By applying the redundancy rules to the lexical 
entries for green and tree, their features can be stated as in: 
(2.18) green tree 
- [+CONC] - [-AN] 
Here the feature [-AN] of tree stands for the semantic path 
illustrated in figure 2.7: 
+CONC 
+LIV 
-H 
-AN 
fig. 2.7 
The assignment of the CONT feature - [+CONC] - to the adjective 
green indicates that the adjective may colligate with any noun whose 
lexical entry contains any number of the features dominated by 
[+CONC], as illustrated in figure 2.8: 
- 4 5 -
+CONC 
+LIV "^^ -LIV 
+Н -H +SH -SH 
^ Х ^ А ч А ч 
+М -М +AN -AN +ART -ART +АКГ -APT 
fig. 2.8 
Because the noun tree has the feature [-AN], which is one of the features 
dominated by the CONT feature —[+CONC] — of green, (2.18) renders 
a normal reading. 
In stating the contextual restrictions of an adjective we do 
not explicitly mention, in the form of a CONT feature , the lexical 
item that denotes the descriptive category to which the adjective 
belongs. In other words, we assume that every adjective can be 
predicated of a noun that is the label, or is synonymous with the 
label for the class to which the adjective belongs. It is thus taken 
for granted that, for example, adjectives like heavy and light can 
be predicated of the noun weight, which is their class-label and 
LPRIM feature, that large and vast can be predicated of size, solid 
and liquid of substance, red and blue of colour, etc. This rule 
may in some cases allow for combinations which are analytic or 
seemingly contradictory such as silent sound, false truth, 
true truthf active activity. Howeverf we would rather accept 
such combinations as semantically acceptable - although factually 
anomalous - than not make use of this important generality. 
2.1.4.Residue of meaning 
It is obvious that we cannot make the claim that the HPRIM and LPRIM 
features discussed in the previous sections enable us to analyse the 
senses of nouns and adjectives in full. All they do is distinguish 
a number of larger and smaller classes of concepts, and, by assigning 
them to lexical items, we can indicate.the membership of these 
classes. The nearest we get to a full statement of the sense of a 
lexical item is when we assign the feature [l+] to adjectives denoting 
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scalable notions; thus the basic sense of the adjectives hot and 
cold would seem to be defined sufficiently by assigning to these 
words the features [€ temp, 1+] and [ζ. temp, I-], respectively. 
However, it is only with contrary adjectives that we can distinguish 
individual members of a class; in all other cases our features 
only enable us to say that the sense of a particular lexical 
item belongs to this or that conceptual class. It would, of 
course, be possible to devise a formal solution for this problem 
of the semantic residue of lexical entries by attributing to each 
of the members of a given class a label standing for the un-
analysed part of its sense. We might even try to make this label 
'meaningful' by attempting to describe the meaning of the semantic 
residue . But this 'solution' would only provide the semblance 
of completeness in our semantic definitions and add little or 
nothing to our understanding of the problem how the semantic 
residue should be analysed. It is in fact doubtful whether the 
full sense of a lexical item can ever be accounted for in terras 
of features alone. 
This question has been discussed by Leech (1969:87). In 
dealing with the problem of how to give a full semantic definition 
of a word like elephant, he mentions three possible solutions. The 
first is "embodying all the characteristics of the species (physical, 
social, geographical, etc.) in the definition". He rejects this 
solution because "the result would be an encyclopaedia entry, not a 
definition". The second solution "would be a selection of any group 
of properties sufficient to distinguish elephants from other species". 
This is also rejected because "there appears to be no systematic 
basis on which one set of properties could be preferred to another". 
Leech opts for the third solution which is in fact the formal one 
we mentioned above. He would "assign a single contrastive component 
to every species, e.g. 1SPE for 'dog', 2SPE for 'cat'jSlSPE for 
'elephant'". At the same time. Leech mentions the drawback of this 
solution: "in this analysis we fail to represent any of the known 
(1) Cf. Bierwisch (1967) and Katz (1972). In his discussion of polar 
adjectives in German, Bierwisch uses the label R together with a 
subscript to indicate a remainder of semantic components in these 
adjectives. Katz re-defines the term 'semantic distinguisher' 
introduced in Katz and Fodor (1963) as follows: "Distinguishers 
can be regarded as providing a purely denotative distinction 
which plays the semantic role of separating lexical items that 
would otherwise be fully synonymous" (p.84). 
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zoological facts about elephants - we merely note that the elephant 
is a distinct species, separate from and contrasting with all other 
species". 
At the basis of the problem that Leech discusses there is of 
course the distinction between meaning and reference. The discussion 
also shows that this distinction is not nearly so clearcut as we 
would like it to be. When we analyse the meaning of a word into 
semantic components and place the set of components in the lexicon 
in the form of a lexical entry, we say that we are dealing with 
meaning, not with reference. But at the same time it is the task of 
the lexicon to predict how a speaker may use a word meaningfully 
in actual contexts, that is, how he may use the word with referential 
meaning. If, as is usually the case, a word can be used meaning-
fully in a number of different contexts, we compose the lexical 
entry in such a way that it contains more than one sense, specifying 
for each sense, by means of a CONT feature, in what kind of context 
it may be used, and we say that the actual context will select one 
of these senses, while the other senses are suppressed . The 
problem is only that we cannot predict all the ways in which a 
word can be used meaningfully;the features specifying potential 
contexts can only predict the most likely contexts. We know, however, 
that a word may be used meaningfully in other contexts than the 
predictable ones. This means that in a semantic model like the 
present one, which purports to be able to account for the semantic 
interpretation of adjective-noun combinations in any interpretable 
context, we have to make provisions for senses and contexts that we 
are not able to predict, or can predict only in a very limited way. 
Leech's proposal, therefore, to reject the first two solutions and 
accept the purely formal one is only non-vacuous in a semantic 
system which allows for such provisions to be made. In the present 
model we allow for non-predictable or partly predictable senses of 
lexical items by means of linking constructions, which create ad 
(1) Cf. for example, Katz (1972:97) on the notion 'suppressed 
sense'. 
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hoc (i.e. contextually motivated) LPRIM features , transfer 
features , and rules for metaphorical readings 
As we have already observed in chapter one, we would need many 
more features in a model that would account for the interpretation 
of complete nominal groups. We would need not only more detailed 
features of the types we employ now in analyzing meanings, but 
also features of a different type to account more directly for 
syntactico-semantic relations in readings of nominal groups 
exhibiting a sentence-like structure. In dealing with actual 
adjective-noun combinations we have found it necessary, however, 
to add some features of this kind, without which it proved to be 
impossible to account satisfactorily for the interpretation of 
some adjective-noun combinations. These features are mentioned and 
discussed below. 
[COLL]. This feature is given to collective nouns and added after 
the feature that comes lowest in the hierarchy. 
Some examples are: 
[£ tree, COLL] : wood, forest 
[G building, COLL] : town, village, hamlet 
[ -AN, COLL] : vegetation, flora 
[ +AN, COLL] ; fauna 
[€. professional, COLL] : police, clergy 
[G]. In order to get readings that are also fully explicit 
syntactically, nouns that have the feature [+ACT] would have to be 
assigned case-frames indicating what roles are played by the arguments 
involved in the predication that is implied by the feature [+ACT] (In 
the same way, of course, case-frames would be needed for the semantic 
(1) One example (2.4) of a linking construction was given in 2.1.2.1, 
where it is the context that provides a "property sufficient to 
distinguish elephants from other species". For a more detailed 
discussion of linking constructions see 2.3 and chapter 3. 
(2) See 2.2.1. 
(3) See chapter 3. 
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analysis of verbs). As we are primarily interested in adjective 
and noun combinations, however, we can usually do without a 
specification of case-frames. But in some cases the syntactic 
functions specified in case-frames can play an important role in 
the semantics of adjective and noun combinations. Thus there is a 
group of [+ACT] nouns which are typically goal-oriented, such as: 
review, opinion, influence, accusation, judgment. Such nouns can 
indeed render readings where adjectival modification pertains to the 
goal . To account for such instances, the case label [G] is 
associated with the lexical entries for these nouns, in the following 
(2) 
manner: e.g. review: [+ACT, -PH] ( [ G ] ) . Goal-oriented readings 
can only arise from matches with adjectives which have the feature 
[€ eval.]. The goal-oriented reading introduces a special pre-
dicational relator (P%) , which stands for the activity 
typically associated with the goal of the [+ACT] noun. In the 
case of review, which has an optional [G] feature we will 
therefore get two readings if we combine the noun with an[€ eval.] 
adjective like bad. The reading of bad review which does not involve 
the [G] feature can be paraphrased as: "a review which is badly 
written"; the goal-oriented reading can be paraphrased as: "a 
revievr which judges some piece of writing to be badly done" 
With some [+ACT] nouns the goal-oriented reading is obligatory. 
Thus poor opinion cannot be interpreted as "an opinion which is 
held in a poor manner" but only as "an opinion which judges 
something to be in a poor state or some activity to be carried out 
(3) badly" v ; . 
(1) When no case is specified in a reading containing a [+ACT] 
noun, an agent of the action denoted by the noun is tacitly 
implied. The relation agent-action in these cases does not 
affect the relation between noun and adjective, however. 
(2) The parentheses denote optionality, i.e. both the goal-oriented 
reading and a reading without respect to a particular case-
function are possible. 
(3) For examples of such readings in formal notation, see chapter 4. 
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[PROG] and [PERT]. These are aspectual features which are given 
to present participles and past participles respectively, in 
order to account for the aspectual part of their meaning. [PROG] 
indicates that an activity is in progress; [PERT] indicates that 
a particular state has arisen after and as a result of a terminated 
activity. 
2.2. Meaning-extending features 
The types of features discussed so far serve, as we have seen, 
to analyse the senses of lexical items and to indicate co-
occurrence restrictions holding between nouns and adjectives. 
The two types of features to be discussed next - generative and 
secondary features - account for actual or potential extensions 
of the meanings of nouns and adjectives. Such features can produce 
contextually motivated shifts of meaning and may therefore be 
regarded as some sort of semantic rules; under the appropriate 
conditions they enable us to derive from the basic sense of an 
item a new sense based on the denotative or connotative potential 
of the item in question. 
The use of meaning-extending features thus creates the need 
for the notion of a basic sense from which the related senses of 
a given lexical item may be derived by means of certain general 
rules. It should be emphasized that we employ the notion 'basic 
sense of a lexical entry' mainly as a practical tool; we do not 
want to claim that some such notion as 'basic' or 'core' sense 
has theoretical significance in a semantic theory, nor do we wish 
to join in the debate concerning the question of polysemy vs. 
homonymy. We acknowledge that, ultimately, such distinctions are 
rather arbitrary and idiosyncratic (cf. Lyons, 1968:406-07). In 
the present model we have a polysemous item when we happen to be 
able to make a general statement about the relation between one 
sense of the item and another, so that we can incorporate both 
senses in the lexicon as parts of the same lexical entry; when 
we are unable to observe any regularity in the relation between 
two senses realized by the same phonological form we enter the 
two senses in the lexicon as two separate lexical entries, that 
is, we consider the phonological form in question to be a homonym. 
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It should be pointed out that the basic sense of a word does not 
necessarily coincide with what we intuitively judge to be its 
'most frequent' or 'most likely' sense. For example, we define the 
basic sense of an item like letter as [+SH, +ΑΚΓ, € writing], 
whereas we account for the sense which views a letter as a means 
of communication by means of a meaning-extending feature, although 
the latter sense is quite probably the more frequent sense of the 
noun letter. Usually, however, the basic sense that is required 
by the semantic rules has some sort of intuitive foundation. In 
most cases it is that sense which is felt to be the 'most 
concrete' or 'most literal' one, while the extended senses are 
'more abstract' and, in most cases, predicational extensions of 
the basic sense. 
Extension of the basic sense of a word can take place in two 
different ways. In the first place, there may exist a conceptually 
predictable relationship between basic and extended sense; that is, 
we can predict the relation between the two senses on the basis of 
our experience of the contiguity of two concepts in the real world. 
When such extensions of meaning have been lexically integrated in 
the language they are accounted for by a generative (henceforth: 
GEN) feature, which together with the basic sense and other possible 
extended senses constitutes one entry in the lexicon. When lexical 
integration of the extended sense of a noun has not taken place, 
a transfer (henceforth: TR) feature is elicited in the reading 
yielded by a match of the noun with certain predicational relators 
of adjectives. An extended sense may also be not conceptually, but 
emotionally motivated, and hence only partly predictable. In that 
case the extended sense arises through metaphorization processes; 
when such a sense has been lexically integrated (i.e. when it is 
a 'dead metaphor') we account for it by assigning a secondary 
(henceforth: SEC) feature to the lexical item in question. The 
difference between GEN and TR features on the one hand and SEC 
features on the other may be summarized by saying that the former 
are based on the denotative potential of a word, while the latter 
are based on the word's connotative potential. 
GEN and TR features are associated with nouns. SEC features 
are associated with nouns as well as adjectives. 
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2.2.1. Generative features and transfer features 
Generative features are of two types: (1) X -* Y; (2) X : Y. 
The arrow of type (1) signifies a replacement relationship: 
X is replaced by Y, where X and Y stand for the basic senses of 
two different lexical items. The colon of type (2) denotes a 
cross-referential relationship: the basic sense of X is extended 
so as to include a cross-reference to the concept denoted by Y. 
We employ only one feature of the first type. It is used to 
account for pars pro toto cases. Notationally, it has the form: 
[pt -» w 'y'] 
where pt stands for 'part', w for 'whole', and 'y' stands for a 
lexical item different from the one to which the feature is 
assigned. The feature is to be interpreted as follows: 
because item X. (the item to which the feature is attributed) 
denotes a concept which stands in part-whole relationship to the 
concept denoted by Y, the PRIM features constituting the basic 
sense of X. are suppressed and replaced by the PRIM features 
constituting the basic sense of Y .It should be noted that, 
since Y_ replaces X, the PRIM features of Y cause a match with 
any adjective whose CONT features are identical with the PRIM 
features of Y. GEN and SEC features of Y_, if any, are not trans-
ferred to Jf· The 'whole* is specified by adding the word in 
question within single quotes, in order to avoid any possible 
ambiguity. Some examples of this type of feature are: 
hand : [pt -• w 'worker'] 
mind : [pt -» w 'person'] 
sail : [pt -» w 'ship'] 
soul : [pt -• w 'person'] 
(1) When we say that a particular sense of a lexical item is 
suppressed, we mean that that sense does not occur in the 
reading of which the lexical item is one of the members. 
The suppressed sense may, however, be recovered where 
needed by the context. Cf. Katz (1972:97) on the notion of 
'suppressed sense'. 
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GEN features of the second type differ from the first in
that the basic sense of the item to which they are attributed is
not suppressed, nor even backgrounded. Such features, therefore,
can be looked upon as mergers of two senses: the sense denoted
by the feature on the left side of the colon and the one denoted
by the feature on the right-hand side of the colon. As an example
let us consider the noun actor which has as its basic sense:
[+H, £ professional] and in addition the GEN feature £[+h ] :
[+ACT] , where [+ACT] stands for the activity typically associated
(1)with the basic sense of the noun . We shall indicate the two 
senses as actór1 and actor2 respectively. A phrase like poor actor 
will therefore yield two readings, one with actor1 and one with 
actor2. In the reading with actor1, poor is predicated of the noun 
in the 'normal' way, expressing that the referent of actor1 is in 
a state of penury; in the reading with actor2, the manner of the
activity typically associated with actor1 ('acting') is qualified
(2 ) 1as 'ooor1 . Thus the reading with actor1 would refer to a
penurious person who also happens to have acting as his profession,
whereas the one with actor2 would refer to someone who acts in a
poor manner. The difference between the basic sense and the
extended sense of actor is manifested by the fact that (2.19) is
an acceptable paraphrase for poor actor1, but not for poor actor2:
(2.19) the actor is a poor person
where the noun person is the lexical realization of the HPRIM 
feature [+H] of actor1.
(1) We use the term "typically associated with" to indicate a concept 
which is contiguous to another in our real-world experience.
That is, concept Y is "typically associated with" concept X ,if
X naturally and~ïmmediately suggests Y. The associated concept 
can be identified by asking such questions as: "what does an X 
do?" (if X has the LPRIM feature [€ professional]), or "what 
is an X used for?" (if X has the LPRIM feature [€ instrument]), 
etc. For a fuller discussion of the notion "typically associated 
with", see 3.2.
(2) The two different ways in which the adjective is predicated 
of the noun are accounted for by two different predicational 
relators of poor, one of which is associated with a CONT feature 
that selects the basic sense, the other with a CONT feature that 
selects the extended sense of actor.
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That in the GEN features [+н] : [+ACT] the basic sense of 
actor is not backgrounded is apparent from a comparison of 
sentences (2.20) - (2.22). 
о 
(2.20) χ is a poor actor 
(2.21) χ acts poorly 
(2.22) χ is a poor actor^, but χ is not a person 
Sentence (2.21) paraphrases the meaning of poor actor2 in (2.20), 
and through its syntactic form also brings out the predicational 
character of the GEN feature. But in spite of the fact that (2.21) 
highlights the [+ACT] element of the GEN feature, the unaccept-
ability of (2.22) shows that in (2.20) the feature [+H] of actor2 
is not suppressed or backgrounded, but is needed in the reading 
of poor actor2. If it did not occur in the reading, (2.22) would 
be acceptable, because the second half of the sentence would then 
merely assert that a lexical entry which contains the feature 
[+ACT] does not contain the feature [+н]. 
The fact that GEN features of the second type combine two 
senses causes both the feature on the left side and the one on 
the right side of the colon to lose their validity in matchings 
which involve either one of these features as CONT features. Thus 
the adjective tall which has the CONT feature - [+CONC] - matches 
with actor1 (because the redundancy rule (2.21) applies), but 
not with actor2. This prevents the phrase tall actor from 
yielding two readings. The only reading we get is with the sense 
[+H, € professional]. This seems to be intuitively correct, since 
tall actor is interpreted as referring to a human being who is 
tall (and who also happens to have acting as his profession). The 
CONT features - [+H] - and - [+ACT] -, then,do not bring about 
matches with the GEN feature | [+H] : [+ACT]1. This means that GEN 
features of this type must also, like PRIM features be associated 
as CONT features with the proper predicational relators of 
adjectives. An adjective like poor has thus two CONT features 
associated with it: — [ + H ] — and — [ [+H] : [+ACT] 1 — . 
In the present model, we use ten GEN features of the second 
type. They are enumerated below; each individual feature is 
discussed briefly and examples are given of nouns to which it 
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is assigned as well as of some adjective-noun combinations in 
which the feature is used. 
[+H] : [+АСТ]1. This feature is assigned to nouns which have 
the LPRIM feature [G professional] as well as to de-verbal nouns 
denoting the agent of an action. The extension [+ACT] refers to 
the activity typically associated with the basic sense of the noun. 
In most cases there is a lexical item available to indicate this 
activity. Usually this item is also morphologically related to 
the noun (e.g. : actor - act,, student - study; smoker - smoke) . 
Sometimes, however, the activity cannot be expressed by a single 
lexical item (e.g.: secretary, policeman, lawyer). Some examples 
of nouns to which the feature is attributed are:student, secretary, 
teacher, pianist, actor, policeman, lawyer, poet, professor, 
sailor, carpenter, surgeon, worker, preacher, smoker, driver. 
When the GEN feature produces a match between a noun and an 
adjective, the adjective qualifies the manner in which the 
activity associated with the basic sense is performed, or the 
frequency with which it is performed, for example: 
a good/bad secretary, surgeon, carpenter; a strict teacher; 
a bold sailor; a wild driver; an occasional actor; a part-time 
worker. That adjectival modification in these cases is restricted 
to the GEN feature, and not extended to the basic sense of the 
noun, is apparent from the fact that sentences like (2.23) are 
not contradictory: 
(2.23) he is a bold sailor but a timid man. 
[[€ instrument] : [+АСГ]]. As the label on the left of the colon 
indicates, this GEN feature is only assigned to nouns which have 
the LPRIM feature [€. instrument]. Again the extension [+ACT] 
denotes the activity typically associated with the noun. In 
matches with adjectives, the adjective functions as a manner 
adverbial qualifying this activity. Some examples of nouns which 
have this GEN feature are: knife, wrench, drill, needle, eraser, 
lock, screwdriver. The feature is used in combinations like: 
a good/bad/excellent eraser, knife, wrench; a difficult lock, 
an easy can-opener. 
Nouns with the LPRIM feature [£ vehicle], which form a sub-
class of [£ instrument] nouns , receive the more specific 
GEN feature [[€ vehicle] : t+АСТ]J. This feature is given as 
a CONT feature to [£ velocity] adjectives, thus accounting foi 
(2) 
combinations like: a fast/slow car, train, bus, boat 
[[-ACT] : [+ACT]J. This feature is attributed to nouns 
basically denoting events ([-ACT]) whose meaning is extended 
so ε s to include a reference to the activity of the persons 
involved in the event. It is assigned to nouns like: war, riot, 
ceremony, trial, meeting. When the feature is used in adjective-
noun combinations, the adjective again functions as a manner 
adverbial modifying the [+ACT] element. Examples of such 
combinations are: a quiet ceremony; a difficult meeting; a wild 
riot. 
([€ writing] : [€ communication]J. This feature is assigned 
to a fairly small class of nouns, namely those which have[G writing] 
as their basic sense. The limited membership of the class enables 
us to specify the semantic class to which the activity introduced 
by the GEN feature belongs: [£ communication]. The feature is 
(1) See p. 32. 
(2) These first two extensions of meaning have been discussed 
informally by Fillmore (1971:382-3), who points out that: 
"many definitions of nouns contain a component which expresses 
a typical function of the entity the noun can refer to ... 
A noun which refers to a 'typical' (e.g. 'professional') Agent 
in an activity is evaluated according to whether the Agent 
conducts this activity skilfully; a noun which names a typical 
instrument in an activity is evaluated according to whether the 
thing permits the activity to be performed easily. In these 
ways we can make intelligible our ability to understand 
expressions like a good pilot, a good pianist, a good liar, 
a good knife, a good lock, etc." Cf. also Chomsky (1972:32): 
"The ambiguity, being characteristic of all expressions that 
refer to humans by virtue of some function that they fulfill, can 
be handled by a general principle of semantic interpretation". 
Kooy (1971:142) seems to be making the same point when he says 
that "inherent to the sense of nouns like president and pope 
and noun phrases like chairman of the women's league are a 
component 'somebody' and a component 'function'". 
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associated with nouns such as book, paper, novel, letter, journal, 
magazine, report. When these nouns are used with an adjective 
having this GEN feature as a CONT feature, the adjective may be 
predicated of the extended sense of the noun in a number of ways. 
First of all, it may indicate that the concept denoted by the 
noun serves to manifest or communicate some emotion (expressed 
by the adjective) which is experienced by the agent of the 
communicating act, as in: a jealous letter; an angry report; 
a joyful journal. It may also refer to the attitude of the agent, 
as in: a bold letter; a vicious report. Then, like the GEN 
features already discussed, it may function as a manner adverbial, 
as in: a good/bad book, novel, paper; a difficult magazine. 
Finally, the adjective may be used with reference to the frequency 
or temporal order of the activity involved: his next/previous 
book, novel; an occasional letter; frequent reports. 
We have already pointed out (p.5l) that the basic sense of 
a lexical entry is not always necessarily the most frequent or 
the most likely sense. The [€ writing] nouns mentioned above 
probably illustrate this; it seems reasonable to suppose that 
their 'active', 'communicative' sense has a greater frequency 
of occurrence than their [+SH, +ART, С writing] sense. The 
following quotation, apart from showing that a noun like journal 
does have a [+SH, +ART] sense, suggests that the 'concrete' sense 
is the less likely one, since the writer finds it necessary to 
make clear that he has this sense in mind by adding the word 
physically: 
We are grateful for permission to reprint 
corroborating excerpts from the unpublished Russian 
journal of Henry Bech. The journal, physically, is 
a faded red expenses diary, measuring Те" by 4У, 
stained by Moscow brandy and warped by Caucasian dew. (1) 
(1) From: John Updike, Bech: A Book, New York 1970, p.191. 
-58-
I [+ACT, +РН] : [G communication]]. Unlike the features 
mentioned so far, which all involved a shift of sense from one 
major category to another, this GEN feature creates an extension 
of meaning only on the level of LPRIM features. The feature is 
assigned to certain [+ACT] nouns, providing an extension of their 
basic meaning to [€. communication]. Some examples are: kick, tap, 
slap, dance, trot, grip, yawn. In matches between these nouns 
and adjectives, the adjective indicates that the concept denoted 
by the noun manifests an emotional or corporeal condition 
experienced by the agent of the basic [+ACT] sense of the noun, 
for example: an angry/furious/friendly kick, tap, slap; a^  
weary trot; a nervous grip, a hungry yawn. 
[[£ sound, € phys] : [€ communication]J. This feature also 
involves a shift of sense on the level of LPRIM features only. 
It is attributed to a number of [£ sound] nouns, the most 
important of which are: cry, shout, yell, scream, laughter, snort. 
In matches with adjectives the adjective indicates that the agent 
involved in the [+ACT, +PH, €. sound] sense of the noun experiences 
an emotional state manifested by the action denoted by the noun, 
for example: an angry/joyful cry, shout; happy laughter; 
a contemptuous snort. 
\_[Ε bodypt] : [£ expression] J. Through this feature a major 
shift of sense is brought about, since the LPRIM feature of the 
basic sense of these nouns is dominated by [+CONC]. The feature 
applies to a very limited group of nouns, notably: hand, face, eye, 
mouth. In matches with adjectives, the adjective indicates that 
the part of the body manifests some emotional or corporeal state 
experienced by the human being involved: nervous hands; sleepy 
eyes,- sad face, angry mouth. 
[[+н] : [+STA]]. This feature can be attributed to a great many 
nouns which also have the GEN feature [[+H] : [+ЛСТ]] as well as 
to some others, such as fool, rogue, brute, bastard, knave, friend, 
stranger, saint. The [+STATE] extension stands for the typical 
property or properties associated with the basic sense of the noun. 
The feature functions as a CONT feature of [€ degree] adjectives. In 
matches with these adjectives, the adjective denotes the degree to 
which the human being possesses the property associated with the basic 
sense of the noun, for example: a true poet; a genuine preacher; an 
utter fool; a perfect knave; a real friend; an absolute stranger; 
a rank traitor. For some of the nouns mentioned above (fool, 
knave, rogue, brute) it seems hardly possible to occur with a 
basic [+H] sense; thus combinations like a tall fool and an angry 
knave are; unlikely. To these nouns, whose semantic function seems 
to be primarily adjectival, we therefore prefer to assign only 
the GEN feature [[+H] : [+STA]J and not the basic [+H] sense. 
[[-SH, -ART] : [-ACT]J. This feature is only assigned to the 
nouns rain, snow, hail and extends the basic sejise of these nouns, 
which defines them as referring to a substance (possibly their less 
frequent sense)so as to have them also refer to events. As such, 
they can be modified by adjectives having the LPRIM features 
[€ frequency], [6 temp, order] or [€ modality] as in: recurrent/ 
occasional/subsequent/possible rain, snow, hail. 
[l+CONC] : [6 location]). This feature is given to nouns which 
all include the HPRIM feature [+CONC] in their basic sense, 
extending this sense in such a manner that it is also viewed 
as a location where certain conditions may obtain, people may 
experience emotional states, and activities may be performed in 
a certain manner. It is assigned to the following classes of 
nouns: (1) [-AN, COLL], e.g.: wood, forest, jungle; (2) [€ building] 
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e.q.: prison, house, office,- (3) [6 building, COLL], e.g.: street, 
square, town, village; (4) t+SH, -APT], e.g.: mountain, rock, 
river, valley, shore. The GEN feature of these nouns is used in 
combinations like a sunny street; a hot valley; a windy mountain; 
a rainy forest; a happy town; a cheerful house; a quiet square; 
a noisy office. 
As the above discussion of GEN features shows, it is not always 
possible to accurately specify the extension of meaning of 
individual lexical items; the fact that we want to make the 
features as general as possible prevents us from doing so. This 
does not mean, however, that it is impossible to identify the 
typical extension associated with the basic sense of a lexical 
item. In fact, we only assign a GEN feature in those cases 
where the possibility of identifying the typical extension does 
exist. Even when we use a general label like [+ACT] on the right 
hand side of the colon, it is easy enough to identify the 
typical activity associated with the basic sense by means 
of the LPRIM feature of that sense, even without using test-
questions of the kind suggested above (see p.53, fn.). Thus 
there can be hardly any disagreement about the typical activities 
associated with the basic senses of words like pianist, sailor, 
knife or needle. When these nouns co-occur with an adjective like 
good , there can be no doubt that the adjective refers to the 
activities denoted by play the piano, sail, cut, sew, respectively 
Good, in a good pianist, could not possibly refer to any other 
activities in which the pianist might engage, such as driving a 
car, raising his children, playing tennis, and so on. In some 
cases, however, more than one typical activity may be associated 
with the basic sense of a noun, with the result that the reading 
yielded by a match between such a noun and an adjective may be 
ambiguous. For example, a difficult letter may refer either to 
(l)As we have already pointed out (pp.48-49), the case-relations 
involved may be different. 
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a letter which is difficult to write, or to a letter which 
is difficult to read. In such a case, the ambiguity can only 
be resolved by the wider context. 
It is clear that there are many nouns which cannot, in isolation, 
be associated with a typical activity or state, in other words, 
there are many nouns to which we cannot assign a GEN feature, for, 
as we have pointed out, in the lexical entry for a given word we 
can only specify those elements of meaning which are predictable. 
However, the fact that a given noun does not have an extension 
of meaning in the lexicon does not preclude the possibility of 
its being associated with a particular activity or state by means 
of the context in which it occurs. A phrase like a good stick 
is practically 'meaningless' in isolation, because we cannot 
predict what activity is associated with the basic sense of 
stick and qualified by the adjective. Only in context can it be 
established whether the stick is good to lean on, to make a fire 
with, to beat a dog with, or whatever other activity in which 
the stick could be involved as an 'instrument'. To be able to 
account for such cases, where the lexical entry for a noun 
does not provide an extension to [+ACT] or [+STA] and where such 
an extension is needed by the ptedicational relator of the 
adjective co-occurring with the noun, we use transfer (TR) 
features. TR features, therefore, are not found in the lexicon 
but can only originate in readings; they provide an extension of 
meaning for a noun whenever the noun co-occurs with a predicational 
relator that calls for such an extension of meaning 
(1) Weinreich (1972:61-65) was the first to introduce the concept 
of transfer features. It should be noted that our use of the 
term differs from his. With Weinreich, transfer features 
are specified as such in the lexicon. They are features 
belonging to the set of features defining a particular sense 
of a lexical item; when such a sense is used in syntactic 
colligation with a second lexical entry, the transfer feature 
is given to the second entry. Thus herd would be defined as 
'group' <'livestock'> (where the angular brackets indicate 
that the feature is a transfer feature). In the phrase herd 
of animals, the feature <'livestock'> is transferred to animals, 
so that herd of animals = 'group of livestock'. 
In our model there is no question of a direct transfer from 
one lexical item to another; TR features do not form part of 
lexical entries, but originate in readings through the application 
of contextual rules. 
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When, for example, a predicational relator specifies the predicational 
force of an adjective as being that of a manner adverbial, an 
extension to [+ACT] is created in the reading with a noun which 
does not have [+ACT] as a PRIM feature or as part of a GEN 
feature. When a predicational relator specifies the predicational 
force of an adjective as being that of a degree adverbial, the 
noun with which the adjective co-occurs receives an extension to 
[+STA] in the reading. To distinguish such ad hoc, contextually 
motivated extensions of meaning from GEN features specified in the 
lexicon, the label TR is prefixed to the extended sense of the 
noun used in the reading. Thus the sense of stick in the reading 
of good stick is specified as: [[+SH, -ART] : TR [+ACT]J, whereas 
the extended sense for wrench, for example, is simply \[£ instrument] : 
[+ACT]J. 
To say that under the proper conditions nouns denoting living 
beings, objects and substances cam undergo an extension of meaning 
to [+ACT] or [+STA] is, of course, to make a prediction about the 
semantic value these words may have in context. Still, we do not 
want to account for such contextually determined extensions by 
means of attributing a specific feature to such words in the 
lexicon, because of the impossibility to further specify the 
[+ACT] or [+STA] element. For in the case of TR features this 
impossibility is due to the nature of these idiosyncratic 
extensions and not, as in other cases, to a lack of sophistication 
in our feature system. We therefore prefer merely to observe 
that certain nouns have the potential of creating an extended 
sense and to elicit this extended sense in readings through 
certain contextual rules, rather than entering a 'meaningless' -
because multiply ambiguous - feature in the lexicon 
(1) For a formal discussion of how elicitation of TR features 
occurs, see the section on predicational relators in this 
chapter and chapter 3. 
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2.2.2. Secondary features and evaluative features 
SEC features are used to account for extensions of meaning which 
are intuitively recognized as metaphorical. In this section we 
shall mainly deal with metaphorical senses that have become 
lexically integrated, that is, with cases of 'dead metaphors'. 
However, in discussing the SEC features we employ in the present 
model, we shall also have to deal with the question of how they 
have originated. We shall therefore also examine certain regular 
metaphorization processes that can produce new metaphorical 
extensions of meaning. 
The line between metaphorical and non-metaphorical extensions 
of meaning is not always easy to draw, and in some cases the 
distirction is rather arbitrary; some of the extensions of meaning 
that we indicate by means of SEC features appear to be more 
'regular' and can be more easily accounted for than others. In 
general, however, we can say that what distinguishes metaphorical 
from non-metaphorical extensions is the fact that in metaphorical 
extensions of meaning the whole or part of the basic sense of a 
lexical item is backgrounded (and replaced by the metaphorical 
sense), whereas in extensions that are accounted for by means of 
GEN features the basic sense is not backgrounded . Thus (2.24), 
where the SEC sense of fox is used, is not contradictory, whereas 
(2.25), with the GEN feature of pianist, is: 
(2.24) Peter is a fox, but he is not an animal 
(2.25) Peter is a good pianist, but he is not a person. 
We distinguish two major types of SEC features: experiential 
and symbolic features. We have an experiential extension of meaning 
in those cases where the experience that human beings have of the 
concept denoted by the basic sense of a lexical item enables them 
to relate a part of this sense to another concept or class of con-
cepts (2)#in a symbolic extension of meaning, on the other hand, 
the relation between basic and extended sense appears to be 
(1) This is not true of the pars pro toto extensions of meaning 
discussed in the preceding section. Perhaps these extensions 
had better be regarded as metaphorical. 
(2) This idea, underlying our postulation of experiential SEC features, 
also forms the basis of Dik's (1974) notion of "inductive generalis-
ation", which he uses to account for historical shifts of meaning. 
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completely arbitrary and idiosyncratic. It is for example possible, 
as we shall see, to account in semantic terms for the fact that an 
adjective like blind has the extended sense 'unheeding' (where 
the negative prefix paraphrases the part of the basic sense of 
blind which is retained, standing for the negative element in 
blind), but it is impossible to provide a semantic explanation for 
the fact that an adjective like square has the extended sense 
1
 conservative·. 
The first type of experiential extension of meaning shows 
some similarity to the extensions which have been accounted for 
by the GEN feature [[+н] : [+STA]J and the TR feature introducing 
[+STA] in readings. As we saw in the preceding section, a TR 
feature of the form [[x] : TR[+STA]J can be elicited by the 
adjective in an adjective-noun reading to refer to properties 
of the concept denoted by [x] which are not lexically integrated, 
but referred to in the wider context of the adjective-noun 
combination. When the [+STA] element refers to a property 
typically associated with the basic sense of the noun (i.e. when 
it does not need to be contextually established) we account for 
it by means of a GEN feature which is entered in the lexicon. 
Now, besides the nouns to which this GEN feature is assigned there 
is another group of nouns which have a lexically integrated 
extension of meaning referring to some property associated with 
the basic sense of the noun. Some examples of such nouns, most of 
which denote animals, and their extended meanings are : fox: 'sly'; 
cat; 'vicious'; ass: 'stupid'; chicken: 'cowardly' ; rat: 'mean'; 
lamb: 'meek'; snake : 'treacherous'; worm: 'abject'; tiger: 
(2) 
'aggressive' . It should be noticed that there is no need for 
(1) The adjectival character of the extended sense of chicken is 
manifested syntactically by the fact that the indefinite article 
can be left out: he is chicken. 
(2) Occasionally human proper names are used in the same way, for 
example : he is a Hitler, our President is no Lincoln. 
Cf. also Geach (1968:42): "A proper name is never used predicatively 
- unless it ceases to be a proper name, as in "He is a Napoleon of 
finance" or (Frege*s example) "Trieste is no Vienna"; in such 
cases the word alludes to certain attributes of the object 
customarily designated by the proper name". 
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paraphrases like 'sly person', 'vicious person', etc., because 
semantically these extended senses can only function as adjectives; 
that is, they cannot be used to denote persons, they only serve 
to predicate a particular property of a person. The reason why 
we treat such senses as SEC rather than GEN extensions is in the 
first place, as we have already pointed out, that in the SEC 
feature the basic sense of the lexical item is backgrounded, 
whereas in a GEN feature it is not. Moreover, a GEN feature refers 
to a property which is typically associated with the basic sense 
of the noun, whereas these extensions are arbitrarily associated 
with the noun. Foxes may be sly, but they are also fast and 
rapacious; there seems to be no particular reason for selecting 
slyness as their most typical characteristic. In John is a fool, 
John is a saint the nouns fool and saint may be said to name the 
property attributed to John, but we cannot say that fox or rat 
name the properties of slyness or meanness in John is a fox, 
John is a rat. Notationally, these SEC extensions of meaning are 
represented by a feature of the following form: 
(2.26) [> SEC 'x'] 
which is to be interpreted as "has developed the lexically integrated 
metaphorical extension to the basic sense of 'x'", where 'x^  stands 
for an adjective. When the feature is used in a matching, it 
replaces the PRIM features constituting the basic sense of the 
item to which it is attributed by the PRIM features of the basic 
sens of 'χ', while the original set of PRIM features is backgrounded. 
Unless otherwise specified in the lexicon, the predicational 
relator(s) and CONT feature(s) of 'x^  are also carried over in the 
replacement . Thus the metaphorically extended sense of fox 
is represented by [>SEC 'sly'], that of snake by [>SEC 'treacherous'], 
and so on. 
(1) With most of the extended senses the CONT feature - [+H] -
is carried over from 'x'. In some cases, however, a more 
restricted CONT feature has to be associated with the extended 
sense, as, for instance, for the extended sense of cat, which 
is assigned the CONT feature - [-M] -. 
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There is a special group of adjectives which are morphologi­
cally derived from [+AN] nouns and which can be looked upon as 
lexical realizations of the metaphorical senses discussed in the 
above paragraph. By the side of fox, for example, we have foxy to 
denote the extended sense 'sly', and the lexical realization of the 
extended sense of cat is catty. The coincidence of morphological 
and semantic extension is not general, however; for instance, 
we do not have denominal adjectives to denote the extended senses 
of lamb and chicken. Conversely, there are also adjectives which 
derive their sense from a metaphorical extension of the corresponding 
noun, although the noun does not have this extension as a lexically 
integrated sense, e.g.: mulish, sheepish bearish. These adjectives 
have, respectively, the meanings 'stubborn', 'stupid' and 'gruff', 
which are properties associated with the animals denoted by the 
root of the adjectives. That the nouns do not have these adjectival 
meanings as lexically integrated extensions appears from the 
fact that sentences like John is a sheep/bear/mule are hardly 
acceptable as normal readings. It should be noted that this group 
of denominal adjectives does not have the 'literal' sense of 
'belonging to ...'. In other words, they are not related to the 
basis, but only to the extended senses of the corresponding nouns. 
To refer to the basic senses of the [+AN] nouns, adjectives of Latin 
origin are used. Thus we have the following pairs of noun and 
adjective referring to the basic sense of the noun: cat-feline, 
bear-ursine, dog-canine, worm-vermicular, rat-rodent(ial), 
tiger-tigrine 
In the feature representing the meaning of these adjectives 
like foxy, catty, etc., we use the notation [<SEC of 'зс'] in order 
to indicate the relation between the meaning of the adjective and 
the SEC extension of the noun 'x/. To facilitate the handling of 
these features we add the LPRIM feature identifying the class to 
which the extended sense belongs, i.e. [£ attitude] or [€ intellect]. 
In those cases where the extended sense is not a lexically integrated 
one of the noun, we add the adjective denoting the extended sense, 
(1) The adjective asinine is an exception in that it has both the 
literal and the extended sense. 
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so that the feature may have either of the following forms: 
(2.27) [< SEC of 'x' [e y]J 
(2.28) Γ< SEC of 'x' [€ y, 'z']! 
In (2.27) 'x' names the noun whose SEC extension is given to the 
adjective and 'y' stands for the label of the class to which the 
extended sense belongs; this feature is assigned to those adjectives 
which are derived from nouns whose metaphorical extension is 
lexically integrated. In (2.28) 'z' names the adjective referring 
to a metaphorical extension of the noun which is not lexically 
integrated. Examples of the two forms of the feature are: 
foxy :[< SEC of 'fox' [€ attitude]] 
mulish : ["< SEC of 'mule' [€ attitude, 'obstinate']] 
sheepish: Γ< SEC of 'sheep' [6 intellect, 'stupid']] 
The sort of relationship holding between the adjective-noun 
pairs discussed so far can also be observed in another group of 
denominal adjectives which mainly comprises adjectives derived 
from nouns referring to objects and substances, such as weedy, 
peachy, rosy, flowery, rocky, stony, knotty, glassy, greasy, peppery, 
snowy, soapy, watery. 
A few adjectives derived from [+AN] nouns also belong in this group: 
spidery, elephantine. This category of adjectives is mentioned 
separately because it differs from the previous one in three 
respects: (1) most of the adjectives have a literal basic sense, 
paraphrasable by 'containing, consisting of, covered with ...'; 
(2) though they may have a metaphorical extension of meaning which 
is associable with the corresponding noun, the noun itself never 
has this as a lexically integrated SEC sense; (3) they all have an 
extension of meaning which is intermediate between literal and 
metaphorical. This extended sense denotes any kind of formal 
resemblance between the concept referred to by the basic sense of 
the noun and the new concept of which the adjective is predicated. 
Thus we have by the side of the basic sense of flowery (a flowery 
field) and the metaphorical extension (a flowery style), the * inter­
mediate' sense of the adjective in a combination like a flowery 
-68-
odour, where the adjective indicates that the odour resembles that 
of flowers; by the side of the basic sense of knotty (a knotty rope) 
and the metaphorical extension (a knotty problem), we have the 
intermediate sense in a knotty tree, where tree is described in 
terms of the shape of a knot; by the side of the basic sense of 
elephantine (elephantine ivory) and the SEC extension (elephantine 
humour) we have her elephantine legs where the adjectives expresses 
that there is a formal resemblance between the legs of a human 
being and those of an elephant. Sometimes the basic sense is 
lacking and we have only the intermediate and the metaphorical 
sense, for example: rosy cheeks and a rosy future, but not *a rosy 
garden. In other cases we have only a basic and an intermediate 
sense: watery grounds and a watery liquid; watery in a watery style 
is, although recorded in the dictionary , not felt to be a 
lexically integrated, but a contextually created metaphorical 
extension. 
In general we can say that in an intermediate sense some 
formal characteristic of the concept denoted by the noun from which 
the adjective is derived is used to express some formal characteristic 
of a new concept. As we saw earlier in this chapter (see sentence 
(2.4), p. 30), such formal characteristics can be used in context 
to subclassify the concept to which they belong, or, to put it 
differently, such characteristics may be used to create ad hoc 
LPRIM features in linking constructions.Since in an intermediate 
sense a transfer of a formal characteristic with classifying 
potential is involved, this sort of extension of meaning may be 
said to derive from the (potential) LPRIM features of the original 
concept. In order to indicate this and to distinguish this extension 
from SEC extensions of meaning, we specify such intermediate senses 
by means of the following feature: 
(2.29) [< LPRIM of 'x1] 
where 'x' stands for the noun from which the adjective is derived. 
The feature may be paraphrased as "(possessing) some formal 
(1) Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Springfield, Mass., 
1963. 
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characteristic which resembles one of the formal characteristics 
of 'jc'". We are unable to specify precisely which of the formal 
characteristics of 'x^  is involved; there may be resemblance 
between the original and the new concept in terms of size, shape, 
colour, substance, etc. 
The table below gives a survey of basic, intermediate and 
SEC senses of the adjectives mentioned above,- examples of nouns 
that select one of the senses are given in the appropriate 
columns. The absence of a noun in one of the columns indicates 
that the sense in question is not a lexically integrated one. 
Because the nouns from which the adjectives are derived do not 
themselves have a lexically integrated metaphorical extension, the 
adjectives which name the metaphorical senses are added in the 
third column. It should be emphasized that the list only serves to 
illustrate the three types of senses and has no pretension whatever 
to exhaustiveness. 
elephantine 
flowery 
glassy 
knotty 
peachy 
peppery 
rocky 
rosy 
snowy 
soapy 
spidery 
stony 
watery 
weedy 
basic 
ivory 
field 
-
rope 
-
sauce 
terrain 
-
hill 
hands 
thicket 
ridge 
grounds 
garden 
<LPRIM 
legs 
odour 
surface 
tree 
skin 
grains 
shape 
cheeks 
beaches 
feel 
handwriting 
shell 
liquid 
figure 
<SEC 
humour ('ponderous•) 
style ('ornate') 
eyes ('expressionless') 
problem ('intricate') 
dogs ('fine') 
speech ('passionate') 
-
prospect ('cheerful') 
-
letter ('ingratiating') 
-
silence ('expressionless 
-
-
) 
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The next type of SEC extension of meaning involves a transfer of the 
Intensity-value of adjectives denoting scalable concepts (see pp. 38-41) 
to a new class of concepts which are usually less concrete than the one 
referred to by the basic sense. The I-value of an adjective can be 
predicated of nouns whose features conflict with the CONT features 
of the class to which the basic sense of the adjective belongs. The 
adjective deep, for example, which has the basic sense [€ vert, 1+] 
and the CONT feature — [ - L I V ] — , can be predicated of a noun like 
thought which has the features [+ACT, -PH]. In such cases the 
original I-value of the adjective is carried over to the qualifying 
class which is typically associated with the noun. The feature [+ACT] 
(2) 
of thought serves as typical CONT restriction for manner adjectives 
this means that in the reading of deep thought, deep is represented 
as an [€ manner] adjective with a positive value. This positive 
value is derived from the positive I-value of the basic sense of 
the adjective, so that in the reading the manner of the action referred 
to by thought receives a positive evaluation. 
We have given the example deep thought because the SEC extension 
of deep to the class [E manner] is perhaps not fully integrated, so 
that the example serves to show the way in which the adjective is re-
interpreted in terms of the meaning of the noun of which it is 
predicated; the example also shows that in the case of such semi-
productive metaphorization processes the transfer of the adjective 
is usually to a rather general class. With fully integrated metaphorical 
(1) It should be pointed out that in the case of adjectives like deep, 
which belong to classes covering more than one range of significance, 
the number of features we employ is not sufficient to distinguish 
them unambiguously from adjectives belonging to the same class but 
covering another range of significance. In our present feature 
system, high and deep receive the same features, viz. [£ vert, I+]. 
In a fully elaborated feature system a distinction between 'upward' 
and 'downward' verticality would be needed. 
(2) For 'typical' CONT restrictions, see section 2.3 on predicational 
relators. 
extensions the transfer is usually to a more specific class. An 
example is bright as in bright student, where a transfer has taken 
place from the class [£ luminosity] to the class [£ intellect]. Here 
we see a narrowing of the extended sense to a fairly specific class; 
[€ intellect] adjectives form only one of the several classes which 
can be used to modify [+H] nouns. 
In the lexicon this kind of SEC extension of adjectives is represented 
by a feature of the following type: 
(2.30) [< I,£ χ] , 
where the notation <I indicates that there is a transfer of the 
I-value from the basic sense of the adjectives to a new class; this 
class is named by €x, where χ stands for a LPRIM class label. The 
value of the item in the new class is not included in the feature. 
The reason for this is that under certain conditions the value of 
the original 'I' may turn up as a different value in a reading of 
adjective plus noun. However, before we can discuss the conditions 
under which such a change of I-value takes place, we first have 
to point out how we deal with an element of meaning that has not 
yet been mentioned. 
Although we have been able to indicate some general tendencies 
for metaphorical extensions of meaning, all the extended senses 
discussed so far are idiosyncratic in that the specific nature of 
the new semantic element they contribute to the meaning of a word 
varies with each individual lexical item and depends both on the 
basic meaning of the individual item and on the word or words it 
co-occurs with. By the side of these specific extensions there is a 
more general semantic element which forms part of the semantic 
make-up of a great number of words. This is the emotional value 
which is attached to the concept denoted by the lexical item and 
which marks the concept as 'a good thing1 or 'a bad thing'. This 
emotional value - the ameliorative or pejorative connotation of 
a word - cannot, owing to its lack of specificity, contribute a new 
element of meaning of its own accord. In other terms, its proper 
realm is that of the connotative force of lexical items; it cannot 
develop into a lexically integrated extension of meaning. It should 
be noted that we use the terms "connotation" and "connotative" in 
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a restricted sense. Our use of the terms excludes a wide ranqe of 
semantic elements which have also received these labels, such as 
phonetic expressiveness (as when crash is considered to be onomato-
poeic in character), or stylistic value (as when bloke is regarded 
as slangy, chap as educated colloquial, and person as formal) or 
associative links (as when hyacinth becomes associated with new 
life). It is true, of course, that it may be a highly subjective 
matter whether a particular lexical item has or has not an emotional 
value associated with it, or, if it has, whether this value 
is positive or negative. On the other hand it is also true that 
there are a great many words whose emotional value is invariable 
and not subjectively determined; thus there can hardly be 
disagreement about the fact that love and hate have a positive 
and negative value respectively, that self-confidence is positive 
whereas conceit is negative, that patriot is an emotionally 
positive, chauvinist an emotionally negative, and nationalist an 
emotionally neutral term . Whenever a lexical item has a 
fixed positive or negative connotative value attached to it, 
we indicate this in the feature(s) of the sense the value is 
associated with by adding [E+] or [E-]. These values are preceded 
by a slash to indicate that what comes after the slash does not 
belong to the denotative, but to the connotative level of the 
sense, so that such features have the following form: 
(2.31) [... /E+], 
where the dots represent whatever sense the emotional value is 
attributed to. 
If we now return to the role played by the I-value when the basic 
sense of an adjective belonging to a scalable class is transferred 
to a new class, we see that, in the reading of such an adjective 
with a noun, the transfer may either result in an I-feature with 
(1) The last three examples are taken from F.A.Philbrick 
(1947:59). 
the same value as the original one, or give rise to an 'evaluative' 
feature which may or may not have the same value as the original 
I-feature. 
We have a straightforward transfer of the original 
I-value if, like the original class, the new class denotes a 
scalable concept. For example, short, originally [€ dim 1, I-], 
has the lexically integrated sense [< I, G duration, I-] in the 
reading of short time; high, originally [€ dim 1, I+], becomes 
[< I, € sound, 6 mus, 1+] in high tone; bright turns up as 
[< I, € intellect, 1+] in the reading of bright student. 
This transfer of part of the basic sense of a scalable 
adjective may also take place to a mixed class, as in the case 
of the example quoted above, deep thought . When we have a 
transfer to a mixed class, the extended sense cannot receive 
an I-value; instead, in such readings the extended sense of the 
adjective has an evaluating function: evaluation of the concept 
denoted by the noun takes place in terms of the semantic class 
to which the adjective is transferred and on the basis of the 
adjective's original I-value. Thus in the reading of deep thought, 
the 'manner' (the class to which transfer of the adjective has 
taken place) of the 'mental action' referred to by the noun is 
'positively evaluated' on the basis of the original positive 
I-value of the basic sense of deep. Positive and negative 
evaluations are represented by [Ev+] and [Ev-] respectively, so 
that, in the reading, the extended sense of deep appears in the 
notation [< I, € manner, Ev+]. 
As we have already indicated, a positive I-value of the 
original sense need not always turn up in the reading as a positive 
Ev-value, nor a negative I-value as a negative Ev-value; values 
may change in combinations of scalar adjectives with nouns that 
have the connotative [E+J feature. As we have seen in the example 
deep thought, a positive I-value transferred to a mixed class 
emerges in the reading as a positive Ev-value, if no positive or 
(1) Transfer to non-scalable classes does not seem to occur. 
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negative connotative value is associated with the noun. 
Similarly, a negative I-value emerges as a negative Ev-value 
if the noun with which the adjective is combined has no 
ameliorative or pejorative connotation (e.g. narrow mind). 
However, if the noun has an [E+] value this affects the transfer 
of the I-value. Thus a positive I-value reinforces a negative 
Ε-value, and does not turn it into a positive value; a positive 
I-value reinforces a positive Ε-value; a negative I-value denies 
a positive Ε-value; a negative I-value denies a negative E-
value. This can be illustrated as in the table below: 
Ad j . : 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-
^
( 1 ) Noun: 
0 
-
+ 
0 
+ 
-
E 
-» 
-* 
-» 
-* 
-» 
-» 
Reading: 
+ 
-
+ 
-
~ + 
r-wl _ 
Ev example 
deep thought 
big blunder 
deep love 
narrow mind 
shallow love 
small offender 
The denial of a positive or negative Ε-value is indicated in the 
reading by the features [Ev ~ +] and [Ev ~ -] respectively. 
These features are to be interpreted as "not having the positive/ 
negative emotional value usually associated with the concept 
denoted by the noun". 
There are two factors which may complicate these regularities 
in the transfer of I-values. In the first place adjectives, like 
nouns, may have pejorative and ameliorative values. When these 
are associated with scalable adjectives, a positive emotional 
value usually coincides with a positive I-value, and a negative 
Ε-value with a negative I-value. In fact, when adjectives are 
demonstrably either positive or negative in I-value, it is some­
times difficult to determine whether or not in addition to their 
(1) The table can also be read with the values in the first 
column representing Ε-values of adjectives. Cf. ρ, 134. 
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I-value they have an E-value . But in a few cases there seems 
to be no coincidence of Ε-value and I-value. For example, the 
(2) 
adjective heavy, which is clearly [l+] , has an unfavourable 
connotative value (cf. heavy heart, heavy tidings), whereas light, 
which is [l-] seems to have an [E+] value (cf. light hand). Now if 
heavy occurs in combination with an emotionally neutral noun, as in 
heavy tidings, we find that the combination receives a negative Ev-
value. This contradicts the regularities of I-transfer observed 
above. In the interpretation of heavy tidings the [l+] value of 
heavy does not play a role; the negative Ev-value of the phrase can 
only derive from the [E-] value of heavy. On the basis of this 
example one would be inclined to say that the Ε-value of an adjective 
overrides its I-value in cases where the two values do not coincide. 
That this is by no means a regularity, however, can be seen from 
the erratic behaviour of light ([€ weight, I-] ). In groups like 
light hand, light heart, light mood the positive Ev-value can only 
arise from the positive Ε-value of the adjective. On the other hand, 
in combinations of light with nouns which themselves have an [E-] 
value, like light punishment, light illness, light misfortune, light 
sin, the [l-] of the adjective regularly denies the negative E-value 
of the nouns, resulting in [Е ь^  - ] . Similarly, in combinations of 
light with emotionally neutral nouns like conduct, character the 
negative evaluation of these combinations is regularly derivable 
from the negative I-value of the basic sense of light. As it seems 
to be unpredictable under what conditions the E-value of an ad­
jective may supersede its I-value we indicate it in the lexicon 
whenever this is the case by means of the notation [< E, ...] 
(instead of [< I, ...]). It is obvious from the examples that the 
contextual restrictions for such a feature will be very narrow 
and idiosyncratic. 
(1) Are, for example, low and small not only [l-], but also [E-], and 
high and big not only [l+], but also [E+]? 
(2) Consider How heavy is it?, which does not presuppose heaviness, 
but is a neutral question about the weight of an object (cf. p.40). 
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Another factor which may influence and modify I-transfer is 
contiguity of senses. The adjectives deep and low, for example, which 
have a positive and a negative I-value respectively, both have an 
extension of the basic sense to [£ sound, € mus]. However, when the adjectiv 
are used in their extended sense, as in deep tone, low tone, we find that 
they both mean 'low in pitch', that is, they both have the feature 
[< I,С sound, £ mus, I-]. This means that there is a regular I-transfer 
for low, but not for deep. It is not unlikely that this deviant behaviour 
of deep is caused by the contiguity of its sense with that of low; the 
positive value of deep on the scale of downward verticality can be 
'translated' as a negative value on the scale of upward verticality, as 
is illustrated in fig. 2.9. 
shallow: I- high: 1+ 
deep: 1+ < > low: I-
fig. 2.9. 
It should be noted that deep tone and low tone are probably not entirely 
synonymous for the former seems to be slightly 'favourable' and the latter 
'neutral' in meaning. This favourable meaning of deep is paraphrased in 
the dictionary (OED) by the addition 'full-toned, resonant', and it is 
not impossible that it derives from the originally positive I-value of 
deep. Whenever contiguity of senses results in an irregular I-transfer 
as in the case of deep, the value of the extended sense is indicated in 
the lexicon, so that the extended sense of deep is specified as 
[< I, € sound, С mus, I-]. The extended sense of low, however, is 
represented by the feature [< I, € sound, G mus], because in this case 
there is a regular I-transfer. 
Another type of regularity in secondary extensions of meaning can be 
observed in the small but important class of adjectives having the LPRIM 
feature [£ corp.func] and comprising as central items blind, deaf, dumb, 
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lame and dead. The most striking thing about this class is that its 
central members are adjectives which deny that the animate or human 
being of which they are normally predicated, possesses the corporeal 
function denoted by the adjective . This is expressed notationally 
by prefixing the negative operator (~) to the Predicational relator of 
these adjectives. The reading of a phrase like blind man, therefore, will 
be represented as follows:~ PRl ([+H, +M], [£ corp. fune.'see']) which 
can be paraphrased as "'man' is modified as not having the corporeal 
function of seeing". 
In the present model, negative predicational relators are only 
assigned to [€ corp. fune] adjectives. It is not impossible that a wider 
use of them would result in a simplification of our feature system. They 
would seem to be especially suitable for the negative members of contra-
dictory pairs of adjectives. Thus for the contradictory pair mortal -
immortal, quite natural paraphrases would be "having mortality" and 
"not having mortality", respectively. In other words, the distinction 
between the senses of the two adjectives might easily be accounted for 
by assigning to mortal a positive predicational relator (PRl) and to 
immortal its negative counterpart (^Rl). 
There are two reasons why we make only a limited use of the 
negative predicational relator. In the first place, [€ corp. fune] 
adjectives differ from contradictories in that the negative member of a 
contradictory pair (such as immortal) can only have semantic and 
lexical existence by virtue of the positive member, whereas in the 
case of the negative [€ corp. fune] adjectives there is no question 
of such dependence on positive members. Secondly, it is only with 
[ G corp. fune.] adjectives that the negative semantic element plays 
a productive role in raetaphorization processes; it is not unlikely 
that this is so precisely because the negative semantic element in 
these adjectives is independent of a positive counterpart, thus 
constituting a much more essential part of their meaning. 
The typical metaphorical extensions of [€ corp. fune] adjectives 
are aptly paraphrased by such dictionary descriptions as: "lacking its 
essential character or quality", "deprived of or wanting some 'vital' 
(1) It is true that there are 'positive' counterparts for some of these 
adjectives, like hearing, seeing, sighted, living, live, but they are 
marginal rather than central in the class. 
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Or characteristic physical quality", "not fulfilling the normal 
and ostensible purpose" . The predicational parts of these 
descriptions: "lacking", "deprived of", "wanting" and "not 
fulfilling" may be looked upon as verbalizations of the negative 
predicational relator of these adjectives. We see, therefore, 
that the negative element of the basic sense is retained. The 
real metaphorical extension of meaning is to be found in the non-
predicational parts of the secondary senses of these adjectives. 
The nature of the extension is expressed by phrases like: 
"essential character or quality", "characteristic quality" and 
"normal and ostensible purpose". These definitions indicate that 
the negative element should be considered to operate on what 
we have called earlier "the state or action denoted by or 
typically associated with" the basic sense of the noun that the 
adjective in question co-occurs with (cf. the section on transfer 
features, (pp. 61 ff.). The class of nouns that most usually co-
occurs with the extended sense of [£ corp.func] adjectives is 
that delimited by the features [+ACT, -PH]. We therefore indicate 
the most usual integrated secondary extension of these adjectives 
in the following manner: 
(2.32) |< SEC [С mental fune.]J 
where the label 'mental' reflects the HPRIM feature [-PH] of the 
noun that the adjective modifies. With fully integrated secondary 
senses it is possible to label the mental function denoted by the 
secondary sense,.in the same way that we label the corporeal 
function of the basic sense. Thus the most usual integrated 
metaphorical sense of blind may be represented by |< SEC [€ ment. 
fune. 'perceive']], that of lame by [<SEC [£ ment.fune, 'convince'] 
The typical predicational relator of these extended senses is the 
(1) See OED under deaf 6, dead A II, and dead 15, respectively. 
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one indicating manner. The reading of a phrase like blind decision 
may thus be paraphrased by: "without perception is the manner in 
which the decision is taken"; the paraphrase of the reading of 
(2) 
lame story would be: "without conviction is the manner in 
which the story is told (or received)". 
So far in this chapter we have differentiated several of the 
senses which may constitute a lexical entry. We have first made 
a distinction between the basic sense of a lexical item on the 
one hand and its extended senses on the other. Within the group of 
extended senses ve have distinguished between senses represented 
by generative features, transfer features and secondary features. 
Finally, we have divided up the group of secondary senses into 
those represented by experiential features and those represented 
by symbolic features. Before going on to discuss this last type 
of extended sense,let us briefly review the types of features 
discussed so far. 
We have seen that the basic sense of a lexical item is that 
sense which is selected from the lexicon if the context in which 
the word occurs provides no special clues as to which sense 
should be selected. We have argued that, independent of the 
question whether or not the notion of a basic sense can be 
given some sort of objective basis (a statistical one, for 
example), it is an indispensable one in the practice of semantic 
analysis; from a pragmatic point of view, we can say that the basic 
sense of a lexical item is that sense from which other, related 
senses can be derived easily and by means of general rules. 
Among the extended senses the ones represented by a GEN 
feature are senses that are predictably and on rational grounds 
derivable from the basic sense. If, for example, a word has the 
basic sense [6 building], it is predictable that it can be used 
not only to refer to the building as a physical object but also to 
refer to it as a locality where certain activities take place which 
(1) The formal representation of blind decision: 
~ PR7 ((PRN ([+ACT, -PH])), [< SEC [€ ment.fune, 'perceive']]). 
(2) The formal representation of lame story: 
~ PR7 ( (Р% ([+ACT, -PH])), f< SEC [G ment. fune, 'convince']]). 
-80-
are typically associated with the building . The closeness of 
the relation between basic and GEN sense is evinced by the fact 
that, with nouns that have a GEN sense, both the basic and the 
extended sense may be needed for the interpretation of a NP of 
which such a noun is the head; consider, for example: 
(2.33) a tall teacher of linguistics 
where for the premodifier tall the basic sense [+H,G professional] 
is needed, and the postmodifier of linguistics requires the GEN 
feature [[+н] : [+АСТ]|. 
With GEN features it is the basic sense itself that provides 
the clue to the extended sense. In a great many cases the extended 
sense is not only semantically derivable from the basic sense, 
but also recognizable in the morphological shape of the lexical 
item. Consider, for example the GEN feature [[+н] : [+ACT]J of the 
noun teacher, where the [+ACT] element is morphologically represented 
by the root teach, and the feature [[+H] : [H-STA]] of fool, whose 
[+STA] element can be lexicalized as foolish. In contrast to GEN 
features, TR features are not thus inherently linked with their 
basic sense; they are potential extensions which may be elicited 
by a particular context. Because of this, as we have seen, TR 
features are not entered in the lexicon. The nature of the extended 
senses provided by TR features, however, is similar to that of GEN 
senses, for TR features provide extensions from the basic sense to 
either [+ACT] or [+STA]. There is thus no difference in kind 
between GEN and TR features; there is only a difference between 
them in terms of the closeness of the relation holding between 
basic and extended sense. 
Whereas the extended senses represented by GEN and TR 
features are not intuitively recognized as metaphorical, the 
extended senses represented by SEC features are, on the whole, 
recognized as such. Although a TR sense is thus considered to 
be a more 'normal' derivation from its basic sense, the lexical 
(1) The full representations of basic sense and GEN sense are, 
fespectively, [+CONC, -LIV, +SH, +ART, € building] and [+CONC] : [e location]]. 
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link between SEC feature and basic sense is far less tenuous 
than that between TR feature and basic sense, because SEC 
features represent dead metaphors which are firmly established 
in the lexicon. That SEC extensions of meaning are looked upon 
as metaphorical is probably due to the fact that such extended 
senses are derivable from the corresponding basic sense not 
so much on rational as on emotional grounds. It is, for example, 
entirely logical that some instrument can be viewed and talked 
about in terms of the activity for which the instrument is 
designed (i.e. it can be assigned the GEN feature |[£ instr.] : [+ACT 
But that the quality of slyness is associated with foxes, and 
treachery attributed to snakes is something that is non-rational, 
traditional, and culturally determined. Another and perhaps more 
important difference between GEN and TR features on the one hand 
and SEC features on the other is, as we have seen at the beginning 
of this section, that in the latter the basic sense is back-
grounded and in the former it is not. 
As this brief survey of extended senses shows, a gradual loosening 
of the conceptual link between basic and extended sense may be 
perceived when we proceed from GEN features, via TR features, to 
SEC features. This conceptual link is at its most tenuous in the 
SEC senses which we have called symbolic. They are called 
symbolic because it is hardly possible to reconstruct the way 
in which they have been derived from their basic senses. The 
reason for this is probably that most of them have originated in 
specialized registers, such as the language of jazz-musicians, 
drug-addicts, homosexuals. Some examples are: square (conservative), 
blue (gloomy), yellow (cowardly), high, stoned (under the influence 
of drink or drug), straight (undiluted), gay (homosexual), fast 
(hedonistic), nutty (crazy). With such secondary senses all we 
can do in terms of features is indicate that the sense in question 
is a secondary one and either cross-refer to another lexical entry 
by adding a synonymous lexical item in quotes, or give the 
feature(s) representing the secondary sense. The entry for yellow, 
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for example, may thus have either of the following two forms: 
(2.34) [> SEC, 'cowardly'] 
(2.35) [> SEC, € attitude / E-] 
2.3. Predicational relators 
ι 
Traditionally, an adjective is said to denote a quality or property. 
In his historical survey of the treatment of English grammatical 
categories, Michael (1970:294) gives the following examples of 
typical definitions of the adjective in grammars of the 17th and 
18th centuries. These say that an adjective 
... implieth a quality belonging to a Substantive; 
... signifies the nature and property of a thing; 
... denotes the properties of nouns; 
... explains the quality of things. 
What these definitions have in common (apart from the confusion 
between things and words which was not unusual at the time) is 
that they are entirely semantic in nature and that they consist 
of two parts, one part labelling the semantic class to which the 
concepts denoted by adjectives belong, the other part indicating 
that the concepts denoted by adjectives bear some sort of semantic 
relation to the concepts denoted by nouns, which only name things 
The first part is expressed by words like quality, nature, property; 
the second is expressed explicitly, in the first of the definitions 
quoted, by belonging to, more implicitly in the others by of. Since 
the days that these definitions were written down there have not 
been many drastic changes in the treatment of adjectives. Later 
definitions, like "modifiers of nouns" were semantically trivial 
and were essentially based, as Fries already pointed out, on word-
(2) 
order . Occasionally, the terms "lexical meaning" and "grammatical 
(1) Cf. Michael (1970:284): "The name of a thing is a Noun (Lowe,1737)". 
(2) Cf. Fries (1952:204): "We cannot hope to define "modifiers" in 
terms of meaning content ... "Modification" is a structure, 
and ..., like all structures, it must be described in terms of 
the formal units of which it is composed and the characteristic 
arrangement of these units". 
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meaning" have been used to indicate, respectively, the 'purely 
conceptual' and the 'relational' components of the meaning of 
adjectives . Lyons (1966:221) was one of the first to identify 
the 'grammatical meaning' of adjectives as being equivalent to that 
of verbs: "... unlike the noun, the 'adjective' and the 'verb' are 
syntactically complex categories ... What may be constant and 
universal in language is a distinction between nouns, on the one 
hand, ancj. 'predicators' (which combine with one or more nouns) , on 
the other". Since the middle sixties it has been common practice 
in transformational grammar to treat adjectives and verbs as members 
(2) 
of the same lexical category, viz. that of the verbals . Although 
these later treatments recognize the 'grammatical meaning' of the 
adjective as being predicational in nature, they do not attempt 
to specify the predicational force of adjectives semantically; the 
semantic analysis of the predicational component of adjectives is 
still in the "belonging-to" stage of the early definitions. This 
is probably partly due to the way in which adjective-noun combinations 
are derived in transformational grammar: from underlying relative 
clauses through relative clause reduction and adjective pre-
position. Whether or not an explicit be is postulated in deep 
structure, this derivation presupposes some sort of semantically 
'empty', copular link in the underlying relative clause. The problems 
experienced in deriving adjective-noun combinations from underlying 
relative clauses have been discussed several times - as, for 
example, in Marchand (1966) and Bolinger (1967) - but these 
discussions have not resulted in an analysis of the predicational 
component of the meaning of adjectives. Rather surprisingly it was 
Fries (1952) who was the first to point out that the predicational 
(1) See, for example, Lyons (1968:436). 
(2) See, for example, Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968:63-66). It should be 
noted that Ross, in his article "Adjectives as Noun Phrases", does 
not contradict this. About the claim that adjectives and verbs are 
members of the same lexical category he says that " tit is] a claim 
which I will not further justify in this paper, but will assume is 
correct" (1969:353). Ross's only concern in the article is to point 
out that in derived structure adjectives may behave as noun 
phrases. 
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value is not the same in all adjectives and that it may vary 
according to the meaning of the noun that an adjective co-occurs 
with. He says that it is a mistake to think "that whenever a 
Class 1 word [i.e. a 'noun'] is "modified" the relation of the 
"modifier" to the modified head is always that of character or 
quality to a substance" (p.219) and points out that the relation 
between adjective and noun in black hat is entirely different from 
that in perfect stranger. He also makes an attempt to specify some 
of the different semantic relations that may obtain between 
adjective and noun. Thus he says that "when the modifier of the 
Class 1 word is a Class 3 word [i.e. an 'adjective'] the meaning 
in the modification structure is that of "quality" (represented 
by the Class 3 word) to substance (represented by the Class 1 
word)" (p.221), as in messy room, crooked street. When certain 
adjectives "appear as "modifiers" of Class 1 words that are 
derivatives of Class 2 words [i.e. 'verbs'], the meaning in the 
modification is not that of "quality of substance" but rather 
"manner of action""(p.222 ), as in a continuous worker, a rapid 
performance. A third type of adjective-noun relation that Fries 
distinguishes arises when degree adjectives modify nouns derived 
from adjectives (as, for example, stranger). Then "the meaning in 
the modification is not that of "quality of a substance" but 
rather "degree of the quality"" as in perfect stranger, absolute 
necessity, utter blackness (p. 223). 
There can be little doubt that what Fries calls "meaning in 
modification" is identical with what has been called the 
"grammacical meaning" of adjectives and what we have called the 
predicational component of the meaning of an adjective, that is to 
say, that element of meaning which has led later linguists to class 
adjectives with verbs. In the present model we try to capture this 
part of the meaning of adjectives in a number of predicational 
relators (henceforth: PR's). PR's are only assigned to adjectives; 
they can therefore serve to distinguish adjectives from nouns in 
the lexicon. It is, indeed, not uncommon for an adjective to differ 
semantically from a related noun only in that the adjective has a 
PR while the noun has not. The phrase angry man,for example, may 
be paraphrased by "the man experiences anger", where the verb 
"experiences" represents the predicational component of the 
meaning of the adjective and the noun "anger" the non-predicational 
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component. The non-predicational component of the adjective is 
thus identical with the meeming of the noun anger, so that in the 
lexicon this sense of angry may be represented by the set of 
features constituting the lexical entry for anger together with 
the relevant PR (i.e. PR- = 'experience'). 
Since every adjective-noun combination is essentially a 
predicate structure (apart from so-called "linking constructions"), 
the reading which stands for the interpretation of such a 
combination can be represented as a two-place predicate with 
two sets of features as terms. A reading of an adjective-noun 
combination, in its simplest form,looks as follows: 
(2.36) PR
n
 (χ , v) 
where χ stands for the set of features representing the meaning 
of the noun, γ_ for the set of features constituting the non-
predicational component of the meaning of the adjective, and the 
given PR for the predicational force of the adjective. 
With angry man we have given an instance of direct modification; 
there is a direct link between the concept denoted by the 
adjective and that denoted by the noun, for we can say that angry 
denotes a mental condition of the man. But when angry is predicated 
of a noun like letter, we cannot say that angry denotes a mental 
condition - or, for that matter, any condition - of the letter. 
Therefore it does not directly modify letter and we may call angry 
letter an instance of indirect modification. The meaning of angry 
letter may be paraphrased by "a letter manifesting the anger 
experienced by the writer". From this paraphrase we can conclude 
that the semantic interpretation of an adjective-noun combination 
like angry letter requires two predicates, "manifest" and "experience", 
of which the former dominates the latter. In terms of PR's we say 
that PR·, (= 'manifest') dominates PR2 (= 'experience') . The 
fact that one PR may require another, subordinated PR, also means 
that one of the terms in a reading may itself be a predicate 
structure. Thus we have for angry letter the following reading: 
(1) The example given is by no means the only instance of PR 
dominance. Other cases are discussed below. 
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(2.37) PR3 (letter, (PR2 (X, angry))) 
where the predicate structure PR2 (X, angry) is one of the two 
terms related by PR3. (The semantic status of the unidentified 
first term X, dominated by PR2f will be discussed below). 
The prédicational force of an adjective is determined by its 
meaning. Therefore it is possible to associate PR's with classes 
of adjectives - usually classes of adjectives having the same 
LPRIM features - rather than with individual adjectives. PR2 
(= 'experience'), for example, is associated with two sets of adjectives: 
those which have the LPRIM feature [€. emotion] and those with the 
feature [£ corp. cond.]. But, as we have seen, PR2 is only used 
when an [6 emotion] adjective like angry co-occurs with a noun 
like man, which has the feature [+н]; in other words, PR2 requires 
the contextual restriction —[+H]—. When the adjective angry 
co-occurs with a noun belonging to a different semantic class, like 
letter - which has the feature [€ comm.] - the reading requires 
a different PR, in this case PR3 (= 'manifest'). Because it is 
always a particular (set of) feature(s) that determines the 
predicational force of an adjective, PR's can be associated with 
classes of adjectives sharing the same feature by means of 
redundancy rules, rather than be assigned to lexical entries 
individually. Such redundancy rules will be discussed later in 
this section. 
As can be seen from the example of angry, the predicational 
value of an adjective may change according to the noun it co-occurs 
with, while its non-predicational meaning remains constant. Very 
often, therefore, an adjective may have more than one PR, and it 
depends on the meaning of the co-occurring noun which of them is 
used in the reading of the adjective-noun combination. As we have 
already pointed out in passing (cf. p. 42f fn. 1), the CONT features 
which are assigned to adjectives to indicate co-occurrence restrictions 
with nouns, are therefore associated with the PR's of an adjective, 
(1) For the sake of simplicity we shall use words instead of 
(sets of) features in the illustrations of readings given 
in this section. 
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not with the non-predicational part of its meaning. Hence, in 
order for a PI^ to be used in the reading of an adjective-noun 
combination, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the set of 
features for the adjective must contain a feature marking the 
adjective as belonging to the class of adjectives with which PR
n 
is associated; (2) the set of features for the noun must contain 
a feature which is identical with (one of) the CONT feature(s) 
associated with PRn· 
Most PR's have more than one CONT feature associated with 
them. If this is the case it is usually possible to indicate which 
of the CONT features is the one which is typical of the PR in 
question. It is, in fact,necessary to do this for those PR's 
which are dominated by another . When two PR's are involved 
in a reading, one of the terms of the dominating predicate is, as 
we have seen, also a predicate structure. In such an embedded 
predicate structure two terms are needed, only one of which is 
provided by the adjective-noun combination. Thus in (2.37) - the 
reading of angry letter - we have the embedded predicate structure 
PR2 (X/ angry), where the unidentified first term X. is not lexically 
realized in the adjective-noun combination. However, we know that 
emotions ('angry') are normally experienced ('PR2,) by human 
beings; in terms of features, this is reflected in the assignment 
of the CONT feature - t+н] - to the PR2 of [€ emotion] adjectives. 
We say, therefore, that - [+H] - is the 'typical contextual 
restriction' of PR2. It is now possible to replace the unidentified 
£ of (2.37) by [+H] if we apply the following general rule: 
(2.38) in an embedded predicate structure the term which 
is not lexically realized is given the value of the 
CONT feature which is typically associated with the 
PR of the embedded structure. 
(1) Typical contextual restrictions of PR's are also needed in 
order to elicit PR's in certain metaphorical readings. 
See ch. 3, pp. 134-137, 
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Hence the full reading of angry letter is: 
(2.37)a. PR3 (letter, (PR2 ([+н], angry ))) 
The referent of the [+H] in the embedded structure cannot, of 
course, be recovered from the phrase angry letter itself. For the 
identification of the referent a wider context is needed, such 
as (2.39) or (2.40): 
(2.39) John's angry letter 
(2.40) John wrote/sent an angry letter to his solicitor. 
It is worth noticing that it does not seem to be possible for 
a phrase like angry letter to occur in a verbal or situational 
context that does not provide a referent for the [+H] that is 
elicited in the reading. Consider, for example, the oddity of 
(2.41) When I came into the room Peter was standing 
at the window reading an angry letter. 
When we insert a genitive noun, however, as in (2.39), the 
sentence becomes much more acceptable: 
(2.41)a. When I came into the room, Peter was standing 
(2) 
at the window reading John's angry letter 
In the present model we use thirteen PR's; they are distinguished 
by subscript integers. We shall first enumerate them, stating their 
number and the predicational relationship they stand for and give 
the type of reading in which they most usually occur, together with 
a paraphrase of the reading; we also indicate the typical contextual 
restrictions of each PR. It should be noted that when it is indicated 
that a particular PR dominates another given PR, this does not mean 
(1) It may be noted that our notion of 'typical CONT feature' is 
functionally equivalent to that of Weinreich's 'transfer feature'. 
(2) For a further discussion of the role played by the wider context, 
see chapter 4. 
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that it cannot dominate other PR's than the one given and, 
consequently, occur in other readings than the one illustrated. 
PR1 : 'HAVE' 
usual reading : 
paraphrase : 
typical CONT feature: 
ecample : 
PR2 : 'EXPERIENCE * 
usual reading : PR2 (N,A) 
paraphrase : N experiences the mental state 
(or corporeal condition) A 
typical CONT feature: [+н] 
example : angry man 
PR3 : 'MANIFEST'; dominates PR2 
usual reading : PR3 (N,(PR2 (t+н]. A))) 
paraphrase : N manifests that some person(s) 
experience(s) (experienced) the mental 
state (or corporeal condition) A 
typical CONT feature: [C comm. ] 
example : angry letter 
(1) When used in a reading, N and A stand for the set of features 
of noun and adjective respectively; when used in a paraphrase, 
they should be read as "the concept denoted by the noun/ 
adjective". 
PR1 (N, A) 
N has A as a temporary or permanent 
property 
[+CONC] 
heavy table 
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PR4 'TIME - WHEN' ; dominates PR2 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
PR4 (N, (PR2 ([+H], A))) 
N is the time when some person(s) 
experience(s) (experienced) the mental 
state (or corporeal condition) A 
[6 period] 
happy days 
PR5 'PLACE - WHERE' ;dominates PR2 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
: PR5 (N, (PR2 ([+Н], A))) 
: N is the place where some person(s) 
experience(s) (experienced) the mental 
state (or corporeal condition) A 
: [£ location] 
: happy home 
PR6 'CAUSE• 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
; dominates PR2 
: PR6 (N, (PR2 ([+H], A))) 
: N causes some person(s) to experience 
the mental state (or corporeal condition) A 
typical CONT feature 
example 
: [+PERC] 
: sad event 
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PR7 'MANNER - IN - WHICH' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
PR7 (A, (PRN (N))) (1) 
A is the manner in which the action N 
(or the action associated with N) is 
performed 
[+ACT] 
rapid calculations 
PR8 : 'DEGREE - OF' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
: PR8 (A, (PRJY (N))) 
: A is the degree of intensity of the 
quality or condition N (or of the 
quality or condition associated with N) 
: [+STA] 
: utter fool 
PR9 'FREQUENCY - OF' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
PR9 (A, (PRj^  (N))) 
A is the frequency of occurrence of the 
action or event N (or of the action or 
event associated with N) 
[-STA] 
occasional showers 
(1) The function of PR is explained below. 
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PRlO 'TEMPORAL - SEQUENCE - OF' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
: PR10 (A, (PRfj (N))) 
: A is the relative point in time 
at which the action or event N (or the 
action or event associated with N) occurs 
: [-STA] 
: (the) next meeting 
PR11 'FACTUALITY - OF' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
example 
: PR11 (A, (PRjj (N) ) ) 
: A is the degree of factuality of the 
action or event N (or of the action or 
event associated with N) 
: [-STA] 
: possible breakdown 
PR12 'PERFORM' 
usual reading 
paraphrase 
typical CONT feature 
: PR12 (N, A) 
: N performs the action A 
: since this PR is assigned to present 
participles of verbs, its contextual 
restrictions are those holding between 
the verb and the agent-noun 
example rotating knives 
(1) That is, relative to the time of occurrence of another action 
or event N. 
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PR13 : 'UNDERGO' 
usual reading : PR13 (N, A) 
paraphrase : N has undergone the action A 
typical CONT feature : since this PR is assigned to past 
participles of transitive verbs, 
its contextual restrictions are those 
holding between the verb and the object-
noun 
example : felled trees 
Of the PR's enumerated above there are five which are used in 
structures where the adjective stands to the noun in a relationship 
similar to that holding between an adverb and a verb. This is the 
case with the adjective-noun combinations involving PR 7, 8, 9, 
10 and 11. One way of illustrating the 'adverbial character* of 
the adjectives which have one of these PR's associated with them 
is by comparing the pairs of examples below, which can be said 
to be equivalent in meaning: 
(2.42) a. he made rapid calculations (PR7) 
b. he made calculations rapidly 
(2.43) a. he is an utter fool (PR8) 
b. he is utterly foolish 
(2.44) a. occasional showers (PR9) 
b. showers (that) occur occasionally 
(2.45) a. the next meeting (PR10) 
b. the meeting (that) takes place next 
(2.46) a. a possible breakdown (PR11) 
b. a breakdown (that) will possibly occur. 
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In each of the (b) examples the adverb paraphrases the adjective 
of the (a) example. The adverbs in the (b) examples are predicated 
of verb phrases containing the verbs: be, make, take place and 
occur. These verbs are entirely typical of the nouns with which 
they co-occur, the nouns having the feature [+ACT] (calculations), 
the feature [-ACT] (showers, meeting, breakdown) or the feature 
[+STA] (fool) either as part of their basic sense or as part of 
their extended sense. To put this in words: "be in a state", 
"perform ('make') an action" and "an event occurs" (or "takes 
place") are phrases where the noun seems to naturally elicit the 
verb. The verbs that co-occur with these nouns are characterized 
by a relative semantic 'emptiness'; they can be looked upon, in 
fact, as lexical realizations of the predicational force that is 
inherent in the nouns. It is this predicational force of the 
nouns that is represented by the PR^ used in the readings 
involving PR7-11. Just as in the case of adjectives, the creation 
of a PRj. in 'adverbial' readings is, therefore, an attempt to 
extract the predicational force from a semantic entity and 
isolate it in a PR. It may at first sight seem a little strange 
to isolate the predicational force from a typically 'verbal' 
noun like calculation, which itself denotes an action. It is, 
however, a phenomenon which is firmly established in the language 
itself. There are a great number of so-called 'verbo-nominal' 
phrases like to give a chuckle, to take a breath, to make an 
enquiry, to have an argument, to do a dance, etc., in which the 
verb may be looked upon as the lexical realization of the 
predicational component of the verbal noun . This is precisely 
why, as we have already said, they are semantically 'empty'. They 
are merely a means to make the predicational force of the noun 
explicit; Fillmore (1968:85) has called them "pro-V's". It is 
therefore not necessary to distinguish various types of PR^ by 
adding subscript integers, as we do with PR's of adjectives. The 
value of a P % is entirely predictable from the features of the 
noun it is associated with. Paraphrases for P%'s associated with 
(1) Cf. Rensky (1964), who gives a large number of examples of verbo-
nominal phrases. The examples given here are taken from this 
source. 
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different classes of nouns are given below, together with the 
most usual lexical realizations: 
P R
№
f : 
[+STA] 
[-STA] 
be (in) 
[+ACT] : perform (make, give, have, do) 
[-ACT] : occur (take place, happen) 
fig. 2.10 
As we have seen, a PR associated with a noun differs from one 
associated with an adjective in three important respects: 1. a 
PRN can only be elicited in a reading and is not entered in the 
lexicon like the PR's associated with adjectives; 2. it is not 
necessary to discriminate different semantic types of PRJJJ 
3. unlike the PR's associated with adjectives, а Р % is a one-
term predicate. 
Let us comment on the third difference first. The reason 
for the fact that a PRjj takes only one term (which is always 
the (set of) feature(s) constituting the non-predicational 
component of the noun's sense) is that in the present model 
we are only concerned with adjective-noun combinations; the 
predicational component of a verbal noun is therefore only 
relevant in those cases where the adjective stands to the noun in 
a relationship that is semantically similar to that holding 
between an adverb and a verb. It goes without saying that, as 
soon as we go beyond adjective-noun combinations, a verbal noun 
would have to be marked much more fully in the lexicon, in order, 
for example, to account for longer MP's like (2.47), which have 
a sentence-like structure: 
(2.47) John's rapid calculations of stellar 
distances 
In such NP's it is necessary to account also for the semantic 
relations between the head-noun (calculations) and its sub-
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ordinated NP's (John, stellar distances). It is clear that these 
relations are primarily determined by the head-NP, not by the 
subordinated ones, in the same way that it is the verb that 
primarily determines the relations holding between it and its 
subject and object NP's. On the other hand it is also true that 
such semantic relations can only be realized if certain conditions 
are fulfilled by the senses of the nouns which are the heads of 
these NP's. For example, a [+ACT, -PH] noun like calculation would 
have to be marked in the lexicon for having the potential of 
creating an "agent-of-action" relationship between it and its 
subject-NP. But at the same time it would have to be stated that 
this relationship can only arise if the "subjecf-NP has the 
feature [+H ] - a condition which is met by John, so that in the 
reading of John's calculations the "agent-of-action" relationship 
is duly elicited. The mechanism by which these relations between 
a verbal noun and its subordinated nouns - let us call them 
case-relations - are created in readings could, therefore, be 
identical with that which introduces PR's in readings of 
adjective-noun combinations. We have seen that an adjective has 
one or more PR's associated with it, each of these in its turn 
being associated with a CONT feature which specifies the contextual 
conditions under which the PR in question emerges in a reading. 
In the same way we could associate with verbal nouns in the 
lexicon a number of cases specifying the potential relationships 
between the verbal noun and the subordinated noun(s); each case 
would be accompanied by a CONT feature stating the semantic 
conditions that should be met by a subordinated noun in order 
for the given case to be realized. Let us illustrate this with 
an example. In the NP 
(2.48) John's edition of Dryden's works 
the head noun edition has the features [+ACT, -PH]. Suppose it 
has associated with it in the lexicon the cases Cl (=Agent) and 
C2 (=Affected Object). The case-relation Cl is marked (by means of 
a CONT feature) for arising only when edition co-occurs with a 
[+H] noun, and C2 is marked for the contextual restriction 
-[€ writing]- . John has the feature [+н],which, in the matching 
of the proper noun with the headnoun, will cause a match and select 
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the case-relation Cl, so that the reading of John's edition will 
be: CI (John (PRjj (edition) ) ) , which can be paraphrased as: "John 
is the agent of the action of editing". One of the senses of work 
is [G writing]; hence the CONT feature - [G writing] - of edition 
will yield a match with this sense of work (while rejecting other 
senses) and cause the case-relation C2 to be used in the reading, 
which will result in: C2 (works (Ρ% (edition))), paraphrasable 
by: "(Dryden's) works are the affected object of the action of 
editing" . A conflation rule is needed to combine the two 
readings into a reading of the whole of the structure (2.4Θ) 
and to mark this as a NP, in order to distinguish it structurally 
from the readings of sequences like: "John's editing Dryden's 
works" and "John has edited Dryden's works", which have to be 
marked as S. In order to provide conflated readings with such 
categorial markers it will be necessary to label edition and edit 
in the lexicon as [+N] and [+v] respectively; these two entries 
will thus only differ in having different category features. The 
feature [+N] will create a P % in readings, and the feature [+v] 
will give rise to a PV (=verbal predicator). The conflation rule 
will then use a PPj^  marking in an embedded reading to mark the 
full reading as a NP, while a PV in a lower reading will result in 
the categorial marking S of the higher reading. 
The features, matchings and readings needed for the semantic 
representation of (2.48) may be illustrated as in figure 2.11 
(the broken lines connect features which are members in a matching): 
(1) In this example we ignore the predication structure Dryden's 
works. It will be clear that this can be handled on similar 
lines. 
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John's 
HPRIM: [+Н] 
match 1 
edition 
CATEGORY FEAT. : [H-N] 
HPRIM: [+ACT, -PH] 
-CONT: — [+Н] • CI 
[G writing] • 0 . 2 " ' 
of D's works 
LPRIM: [È writing] 
f match 2 Л 
Reading match 1: Cl (John, (PRjj (edition) ) ) 
Reading match 2: C2 (D's works, (P% (edition) ) ) 
Conflation rule: NP [edition (Cl (John)),(C2 (D's works))] 
fig. 2.11 
We have given this outline of a possible extension of the present 
model beyond the scope of adjective-noun combinations in order to 
indicate the role that would be played by PRj, in such an extended 
model: it would serve to distinguish the predicational force of a 
noun from that of a verb whose features are otherwise identical 
with those of the noun. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the fact that we 
assign PR's to nouns in certain readings is not in contradiction 
with what we have said about the general difference between 
adjectives and nouns, namely that adjectives are primarily 
distinguishable from nouns in that adjectives have predicational 
force, while nouns have not. For it should be borne in mind that a 
PRN only occurs in a reading if the noun has the feature [+ACT] 
(either as a LPRIM feature or as part of an extended sense) and 
is thus semantically equivalent to a verb, or if the noun has the 
feature [+STA] (again either as a LPRIM feature or as part of an 
extended sense) and is thus semantically equivalent to an adjective. 
To conclude this section on predicational relators we shall first 
tabulate the classes of adjectives to which each of the thirteen 
PR's is assigned, and secondly, what CONT feature(s) are associated 
with a given PR if this is assigned to a particular class of 
adjectives. In the first column the PR in question is given; the 
second column enumerates the classes of adjectives to which it is 
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assigned; the third column contains the CONT features which are 
associated with the PR if this is attributed to one of the 
classes of adjectives in the second column; in the fourth column 
examples are given of adjectives to which the PR in the first 
column together with its associated CONT feature in the third 
is attributed. It should be noted that the table can be read as 
as many redundancy rules as there are rows in columns two and three, 
if we apply the two following general rules: 
(1) a PR in the first column is redundantly associated with 
every adjective which has one of the features enumerated in column 
two to the right of the PR; 
(2) a CONT feature (or group of CONT features) in the third column 
which is to the right of a feature (or group of features) in the 
second column is redundantly associated with the PR which, on the 
basis of (1), is given to an adjective that has the feature (or 
one of the features) in column two. 
As was pointed out earlier (pp. 86-90 ) some PR's may 
dominate other PR's, or, in other words, some predications may 
entail other, embedded predications. Whenever a PR given in the 
first column of the table below dominates another PR, this is 
indicated in column two by means of an arrow pointing to the 
embedded PR. 
[б dim 1, 2, 3 ] 
[-DIM](2) 
[С intellect] 
[E commi 
[G weather] 
[e truth ] 
[€ duration] 
[< I, € duration] 
- [-LIV] - (1) 
— t+CONC] — (3) 
- [+H] -
- [+H] -
— [e comm] — 
— [€ writing] :[E comm] — 
— [б weather] — 
— [G comm] — 
- [б period] — 
long, wide, large, extensive, 
vast, big, voluminous 
solid, liquid, bright, dry, hot, 
heavy, dark, red, loose, hard, 
empty, rich, beautiful 
intelligent, stupid, smart, clever 
talkative, taciturn, gossipy, 
reticent, communicative, vague, 
abtruse, informative 
rainy, windy, stormy, sunny 
true, false 
long-lasting, eternal, brief, 
continuous 
long, short 
PR2: 
EXPERIENCE 
NOTES: (1) The adjectives big, tall and short have the CONT feature 
[+CONC] . 
(2) There are six classes of adjectives that are dominated by [-DIM] but which 
do not have PRl with the CONT feature [+CONC] . They are the 
following: [Ç. sound], [€ velocity], [G weather], [6 activity], 
[e corp. cond.], [G corp. fune]. These classes are to be found elsewhere 
in the table. 
(3) Adjectives with the feature [£ temp] also have the CONT feature 
[€ weather] , in addition to t+CONC] ; [£ property] adjectives 
have the CONT feature [+н] . 
(4) As pointed out earlier, the PR of these adjectives takes the negative 
operator: ~ PRl. 
1 
[G emotion] 
[e corp. cond.] 
[+H] — 
[+AN] 
sad, angry, jealous, happy, joyful 
tired, hungry, weary, lazy, 
thirsty,rested, healthy 
> PR2 
[б emotion] 
> PR2 
[Ç. corp.cond] 
> PRl 
[E intellect] 
— [+H] - Vi' 
[+AN] (1) 
— [G comm] — 
— [6 writing] : [G coram]J — 
— ^t+ACT, +PH] : [G comm] — 
— [€ sound] : [E comm] J — 
— [б expression] — 
— [[€ bodypt] : [€ expression] — 
- [
+
н] - ( 1 ) 
- [
+
AN] - ( 1 ) 
— [G expression] — 
— [[G bodypt] : [ε expression] — 
— [G comm] — 
(2) 
— [ε expression] — 
sad, angry, jealous, happy, joyful 
proud, surprised, furious, 
gloomy, unhappy 
tired, hungry, lazy, thirsty, 
weary, rested, healthy, 
nervous, sleepy 
See under PRl 
PR3 : 
MANIFEST 
> PRl 
te attitude] 
> PRl 
< SEC of 'χ' 
[G attitude] 
- [ [€ bodypt] : [G expression] ]<ϋ See under PR7 
sheepish, catty, foxy, mulish, 
vixenish, tigerish, wolfish, 
owlish, swinish 
NOTES; (1) Some comment may be needed on the fact that the CONT features - [+H] -
and - [+AN] - are also associated with PR3, in addition to their association 
with PR2 and, in the case of - [+H] -, the PRl of [£ intellect] adjectives. 
Their inclusion under PR3 means that, for example, a phrase like angry man 
will always receive two readings: PR2 (man, angry) and PR3 (man (PR2 (man, 
angry))). This may seem to create undue proliferation of readings, but it is 
an undeniable fact that human beings do not only experience emotional states 
and corporeal conditions but may also manifest their experiencing them, and 
phrases like angry man may occur in contexts where either of the two inter­
pretations is preferable. Of animals it might be said that they can only 
manifest the experience of a corporeal condition or emotional state. This 
seems to be a trivial observation, however, for when we speak of a furious dog 
we do not necessarily want to express that the dog shows his fury; for this 
reason - [+AN] - is given as a CONT feature not only for PR3, but also for PR2. 
With [€ intellect] adjectives the situation seems to be different; when we speak 
of an intelligent dog, we can only mean that we attribute intelligence to him 
on account of his behaviour. Therefore - [+AN] - is not given as a CONT feature 
for [€ intellect] adjectives under PRl, but only under PR3. 
(2) Of the nouns which have the GEN feature I[6 bodypt] : [€ expression]J, 
face, and possibly eyes, are the only ones that can co-occur with [6 intellect] 
adjectives with PR3. 
о 
ы 
ι 
PR4 : 
TIME 
(3) Adjectives which have [€ attitude] either as a LPRIM feature or as 
an extended sense, are typically PR7 (manner) adjectives; thus in 
kind look the adjective denotes the manner of looking. When, however, 
they co-occur with a noun like face, they seem to denote a permanent 
property of the human being involved. The reading of kind face, therefore, 
is: PR3 (face (PRl ([+H], kind))). 
> PRl 
[€ temp] 
[€ luminosity] 
[G humidity] 
[б weather] 
> PR2 
( [e emotion] ) ( 1 ) 
> PR7 
[6 manner] 
[G sound] 
te eval] 
[€ period] 
[G period] 
— [[+АСТ,+РН] : [С period]] — 
te period] 
hot, cold, cool, bright, clear 
dull, wet, dry, rainy, windy, 
stormy, cloudless 
See under PR2 
for adjectives see under PR7. 
Examples of adjective-noun 
combinations are: difficult weeks, 
quiet hours, wonderful day 
NOTE: (1) PR4 dominating PR2 cannot be assigned to all [6 emotion] adjectives. 
Only the more 'general' adjectives in this class can be used with this 
PR, notably happy, unhappy, sad. Thus we have: sad/happy/unhappy days/walks, 
but not: *jealous/angry days/walks. 
> PRl 
[ε temp] 
[ε luminosity] 
[ε humidity] 
[ε weather] 
> PR2 
[ε emotion] 
> PR7 
[ε manner] 
[ε sound] 
[ε eval] 
[ε location] 
—[[ +CONC] : [ε location]] — 
[ε location] 
— [+CONC] : [ε location]] — 
[ε location] 
—[[+CONC] : [ε location] — 
hot, cold, warm, cool, dark, bright» 
clear, wet, dry, moist, humid, 
rainy, windy, stormy, chilly, snowy, 
drizzly, cloudless, sunny, dusky. 
See under PR2 
See under PR7 
It is important to distinguish between those two groups of adjectives because 
under certain conditions the two groups behave differently in readings. When 
an adjective whose typical PR is PR2 (like sad) co-occurs with a [+PERC] noun 
(like event), the resulting reading is no different from that yielded by a 
typically PR6 adjective (like saddening) and a noun which is either [+PERC] or 
[[+н] : [+STA]J (like fool). Thus for the phrases a sad event, a saddening 
event and a saddening fool we get the same sort of reading, that is, one 
that can be paraphrased as "the concept denoted by the noun causes (a) human 
being(s) to feel sad". However, when sad and saddening are predicated of nouns 
that do not have either of the features [+PERC] and [[+H] : [+STA]], different 
readings are required. If sad, however, co-occurs with a noun like tree, which 
has the feature [+CONC] and therefore does not meet the contextual restriction 
of the adjective, the combination should yield a metaphorical reading (c-F. 3.6). 
But if saddening co-occurs with tree, the lack of agreement between the CONT 
features of the adjective and the PRIM features of the noun should not cause 
a metaphorical reading, for nobody would claim that a saddening tree requires 
a metaphorical interpretation. Most people confronted with the phrase paraphrase 
its meaning by saying something like: "there is something about the tree that 
makes one feel sad". In other words, the reading for a combination like saddening 
tree should contain the TR feature TR [+PERC], so that the full reading of the 
phrase becomes: PR6 ([[-AN] : TR [+PERC]], (PR2 ([+н], sad))). Summing up, we 
can say that if there is a met between a basically PR2 adjective and a noun, 
a metaphorical reading is created, whereas a met between a basically PR6 adjective 
and a noun does not yield a metaphorical reading, but a transfer reading. 
о 
с* 
ι 
PR7 : 
MANNER [£ velocity] 
- [+ACT] -
- U + H ] : [+ACT]J -
- [[€ veh.] : [+ACT]J -
- [[ -ACT] : [+АСГ]1 - ( 1 ) 
fast, quick, slow, hurried, 
speedy, leisurely, hasty 
[e attitude] 
[<SEC of 'χ'[С attitude]] 
[б sound] 
[£ intellect] 
[e eval] 
[б manner] 
[>SEC [e mental func]](7) 
— [+ACT] — 
- [ +H] : [+ACT]J -
- [[€ writing] : [€ commi] -(2) 
- [+ACT, +PH] -
- [[+H] : [+ACT, +PH]] -
- [[G veh.] : [+ACT]] -
- [[б instr.] : t+ACT]] - ( 3 ) 
- [+ACT ] -
- ft+H] : [+ACT]] - { 4 ) 
- [-STA] -
- [t+Н] : [+ACT]" -
—[[€ writ] : [€ comm]] — 
-[[€ instr] : [+ACT]] J.5) 
- [+ACT] -
- [[-ACT] : [+ACT]] - ( б ) 
- [+ACT, -PH] -
- [[+H] : [+АСТ, -PH]] -
bold, courageous, lenient, harsh, 
strict, patient, vicious, pious, 
humble, kind, wild. 
see under PR3 
noisy,silent, loud, quiet 
soundless, tumultuous, inaudible 
see under PRl 
good, bad, excellent, awful, 
fair, perfect 
difficult, easy, simple, 
laborious, effortless, troublesome 
blind, dumb, deaf, mute, dead,lame 
I 
О 
-J 
I 
PR8 : 
DEGREE [e degree] 
— [+STA] — 
- Π+Η] : t+STA]] - (1) 
true, real, arrant, utter, mere, 
complete, absolute, sheer, genuine, 
veritable, total 
NOTE: (1) If the matching of a [£ degree] adjective and the noun it co-occurs with yields a met, 
the noun is given the TR feature TR [+STA] in the reading (e.g.: a real car, a true 
democracy). 
PR9 : 
FREQUENCY 
PRIO: 
SEQUENCE 
PRll : 
FACTUALITY 
PR12 : 
PERFORM 
[G frequency] 
- [-STA]-
- [[G writing] : [6 coram.]] 
- '[-SH, -ART] : [-ACT]] - ( 1 ) 
recurrent, occasional, regular, 
repeated, frequent 
NOTE: (1) A few [6 frequency] adjectives - such as regular, part-time, occasional - have 
also the CONT feature - ІД+Н] : [+ACT]J -. 
[£ temp, order] 
[€ modality] 
present participles of 
intransitive verbs 
(i.e. [+ACT, +PH]) 
- [-STA] -
- [[+H] : [+ACT]] -
- [[€ writing] : [€ comm]] -
- [[-SH, -ART] : [-ACT]] -
- [-STA] -
- [G writing] : [ε comm]] -
- [[-SH, -ART] : [-ACT]] -
CONT features are those holding 
between V and Agent 
previous, preceding, subsequent, 
following, next, last, latest, 
late, future, former. 
possible, likely, certain, 
probable 
rotating knives, revolving doors, 
whirling water, running man, 
changing weather. 
NOTE: (1) Combinations like laughing stock, vanishing act and walking stick, which create mets 
when matched as non-linking constructions, are integrated linking constructions. 
PREDICATIONAL 
RELATOR 
PR13 : 
UNDERGO 
ASSOCIATED WITH 
past participles of 
transitive verbs 
(i.e. [+STA, +PH]) 
CONTEXTUAL RESTRICTIONS 
CONT features are those holding 
between V and Object 
EXAMPLES 
felled tree, violated rule, 
raped girl. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we summarize the proposals contained in the 
preceding chapters, comment on one or two points which have 
been mentioned only in passing, and discuss some implications 
of our proposals. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the complete semantic configuration 
of an average lexical entry for a noun and for an adjective, and 
provides a survey of the notation employed for the different 
types of features. 
N O U N 
basic 
sense Í HPRIM •LPRIM [FEAT] [€ feat] 
Г 
ex­
tended <ί GEN_ 
GEN. 
senses SEC 
V 
[[x] : [y]] 
[[x] : [y]] 
[>SEC ...] 
Figure 3 . 1 , 
A D J E C T I V E 
to 
t 
f 
basic 
sense 
A 
< 
HPRIM : [FEAT] 
If LPRIM : [È feat] 
V 
Г 
ex­
tended 
senses 
< 
(+) 
V 
-> PR. ^-* CONT : - [a] -
^ PR. І-» CONT : - [a] -> J 
SECj : [>SEC...] 
[<I ...] 
SEC
n
 î [<LPRIM ...] 
'П 
-> PR, 
->P R i 
+ > ССОТГ : - [ a ] -
-± > CONT : - [ a ] -
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3.1. Nature and function of primary features 
In our brief comments on the nature of PRIM features in section 
2.1, we said two things: first, that features are labels for 
classes of concepts and, secondly, that features are linguistic 
constructs and should not be equated with lexical items. Beth 
statements require some further comment. 
In the literature dealing with semantics in terms of 
componential analysis, discussions of the nature of semantic 
features have not been very frequent. Features have gained common 
acceptance as working tools in dealing with actual semantic problems, 
and semanticists in general content themselves with giving brief 
indications of what they understand by the term 'semantic feature'. 
Some typical definitions of the concept of a semantic feature are: 
"Minimal distinctive features [of the sense of a word]", "atomic 
parts [of meaning]" (Leech 1974:96 and 99); "part of the sense of 
morphemes" (Katz 1972:38); "primitive elements [of meaning]" (T. 
Anderson 1968:396); "atomic concepts" (Katz & Fodor 1963:412). What 
all these definitions have in common is that they reflect an attitude 
towards semantic features that views them as 'fragments' of 
meaning. This is not unnatural for two reasons. In the first place 
most semanticists recognize an analogy between semantic features 
and the distinctive feature theo.ry in phonology, as is shown by 
Leech's term "minimally distinctive features". Secondly, the 
'atomistic' view of semantic features probably originates from the 
fact that so far semantic studies have tended to concentrate either 
on individual lexical items (e.g. bachelor, remind, kill) or on small 
subsets of the lexicon (e.g. Bendix 1966 and Leech 1969). It does not 
follow automatically, however, that if the meaning of lexical items 
is dealt with in terms of features, they should be thought of as 
'fragments' or 'atoms' of meaning. Earlier semanticists, such as 
Roget (for Roget certainly deserves that· name), usually think in 
terms of categories or classes when dealing with word-meaning. 
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Roget, for example, calls his 'features' "classes 
and categories of ideas". It seems that as soon as one starts 
dealing with larger parts of the lexicon of a language one 
naturally and intuitively thinks in terms of classes and subclasses 
of concepts. In the practice of semantics it makes very little 
difference whether one takes the one point of view of semantic 
features or the other, but if one thinks of features as labels 
for classes and subclasses of concepts, the idea that features 
are ordered hierarchically is accepted much more readily than if 
they are looked upon as labels for the fragments of meaning of 
individual senses. 
When Katz and Fodor (1963) proposed to apply the technique 
of componential analysis to the whole lexicon, they were careful 
to point out that their semantic markers should not be equated 
with words: "a marker like (Human) or (Color) is, then, not an 
English word, but a construct represented by one" (p.430). Since 
then, this caveat has, from time to time, been reiterated (see, 
for example,Bierwisch 1970:169). In discussions on controversial 
issues, however, it tends to be forgotten. Thus Fodor (1970), in 
his criticism of Lakoff (1965), talks about the features into 
which, according to Lakoff and McCawley, the verb kill can 
be analyzed (CAUSE, BECOME, NOT, ALIVE), as if they were actual 
words ("cause to become not alive"). He even states explicitly 
that "lexicalization is a transformation which purports to derive 
words from phrases" (p.436; our italics). But the lexicalization 
transformation, as proposed by generative semanticists, does not 
act on phrases, but upon configurations of features. Chomsky (1972) 
makes essentially the same mistake when he discusses the semantics 
(2) 
of the word uncle . The confusion of features with lexical items 
(1) Most of the semantic features that have been used in modern 
semantic studies (including the present one) can be found in 
Roget's Thesaurus, of which we have made very extensive use. 
(2) Cf. Seuren's criticism of Chomsky on this point (Seuren 1974: 
15-17). 
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is not only found in the writings of opponents of generative semantics; 
McCawley (1973:63) criticizes Postal (1969) for committing the same 
error. It may be asked whether it is really important that the 
distinction between semantic features and the words they are 
homophonous with should be maintained. The answer must be positive, 
since not to make this distinction is to ignore the distinction 
between meaning and reference. Thus if we assume that the word 
spinster can be analyzed into the features (unmarried, adult, female, 
human) we may say that of the following two sentences the second 
is a correct paraphrase of the first: 
(3.1) Susan is a spinster 
(3.2) Susan is an unmarried, adult, female person 
It does not follow, however, that the two sentences are equivalent 
in all respects, for in (3.2) something is predicated of Susan 
by referring to four separate properties: 'singleness', 'adulthood', 
'femaleness' and 'humanness', while in (3.1) the single, unified 
notion of 'spinsterhood' is referred to. The predicates in the 
two sentences therefore constitute two distinct acts of reference. 
We can, therefore, distinguish between semantic features and the 
lexical items with which they are homophonous by saying that 
features cannot refer, whereas lexical items, given a context, 
can 
(1) It has been argued (Kempson 1975:36-37) that reference is a 
function of NP's, rather than individual lexical items. If this 
should be so, the predicates in (3.1) and (3.2) would be 
referentially equivalent and, consequently, it would be 
impossible to maintain the distinction between semantic features 
and words. Kempson's argument, however, seems to hold only for 
nouns and not for adjectives. She points out that in order "to 
refer to the class of pencils, or a single object which is a 
pencil, the item pencil is insufficient: it only becomes a 
referring expression when it is part of a noun phrase - i.e. a^  
pencil, the pencils, etc.". From this she draws the conclusion that 
lexical items in isolation do not refer. This, of course, is true 
enough - items in the dictionary do not refer; they can only refer 
within a context. But she also concludes that "the dominating 
node (NP) is interpreted as providing the conditions of 
reference". This would seem to be the case only in simple NP's, 
consisting of just a noun and an explicit or implied determiner. 
It is certainly not true in the case of more complex NP's, 
whose head is premodified. What she probably wants to say is 
that nouns cannot occur in context without some sort of determiner. 
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So far we have dealt with questions relating to the nature 
of PRIM features; another question we have to ask is what 
purpose features are intended to serve. In the literature on 
semantics we find three different points of view regarding the 
role played by features. The first of these might be called the 
'minimal' view, which has been expressed by Bendix (1966) and 
Leech (1974): 
We will look upon a minimal definition of a form as a 
statement of semantic components that are sufficient to 
distinguish the meaning paradigmatically from the meaning of 
all other forms in the language (Bendix, p.2). 
The analysis of word meanings is often seen as a process 
of breaking down the sense of a word into its minimal 
distinctive features; that is, into components which 
contrast with other components (Leech, p.96). 
The assumption that it is the task of semantic features to 
distinguish the sense of one lexical item from the senses of 
all the other lexical items in the lexicon, is, in our 
opinion, too restricted, for the same result might in principle 
be achieved by providing all distinct senses with an index 
number. Semantic features also have to specify other relations 
than mere differentness; in particular, they have to be able 
to specify varying degrees of similarity or dissimilarity 
between the lexical items of a language. This 'relational' 
view of features is taken, among others, by Katz (1972) and 
Bierwisch (1970): 
We want a representation of a sense to formally 
distinguish it from other senses and to formally reflect 
the respects in which it is similar to other senses 
(Katz, p.36). 
These components are not part of the vocabulary of the 
language as such, but rather theoretical elements, 
postulated in order to describe the semantic relations 
between the lexical elements of a given language (Bier-
wisch, p.169). 
A third point of view - let us call it the 'semantic' view -
holds that semantic features should not only serve to distinguish 
senses and to reflect the relations among senses, but should also 
-117-
be able to provide an exhaustive definition of any given sense. 
The majority of semanticists probably hold this view . Two 
problems loom large, however, when the 'semantic' view is endorsed. 
The first is how to distinguish between the relevant components of 
the sense of a word and the factual beliefs about its referents. 
We have already discussed this problem in section 2.1.4 and 
drawn attention to Leech's proposal for dealing with it, 
namely by assigning index numbers to senses belonging to the 
smallest classes that can be set up by means of orthodox features. 
A similar solution would be simply to add the lexical item 
itself as the LPRIM feature lowest in the hierarchy of the 
configuration of features making up its sense. The drawback 
of this sort of solution is its semantic vacuity. Because of 
this it clashes with a second requirement that must be imposed 
on features if it is claimed that features can exhaustively 
define the sense of a lexical item: the labels themselves should 
be meaningful. This is a requirement that most semanticists 
have a tendency to shy away from. The rather limited number of 
features that are in current use so far have been created on 
an ad hoc basis and on usually sound intuitive grounds, so 
that their meaningfulness has remained unquestioned - we are 
supposed to accept them at face value. Some semanticists even 
go so far as to ignore the fact that they should be meaningful 
at all. Leech (1969:20), for example, calls the features he 
posits mere "mnemonic" devices and leaves the reader to wonder 
what these devices should remind him of. We think, however, that 
a question like the one put by T.Anderson (1968: 409) is a 
legitimate one and, indeed, one that needs to be answered:' 
... a component like Animate is meaningful only if we know 
what the word animate means, and it is reasonable to 
inquire how the semantic theory would define animate. 
(1) See, for example. Leech (1974:97): "Componential definitions ... 
can be regarded, in fact, as formalized dictionary definitions". 
It should be noted that this survey of how the function of 
semantic features is viewed, should not be taken to imply 
that any of the writers quoted takes only one of these views 
to the exclusion of the others. Indeed, it is likely that all 
of them would endorse all three aspects of a feature's function. 
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We do not wish to claim that the proposals put forward in the 
preceding chapter have gone anywhere near providing a basic 
solution for the two problems mentioned here; we have, at the 
nost, suggested some patchy remedies. As to the problem of 
drawing a boundary between senses and factual beliefs, we 
can point to our suggestions concerning linking constructions. 
A linking reading, as we have seen, allows the construction of 
an ad hoc LPRIM feature reflecting a factual belief about the 
referent, when the context calls for it. At the same time it 
must be admitted that at present we do not have a clear under-
standing of the contextual conditions under which a linking reading 
should be elicited. This question is dealt with more fully in 
chapter four. As to the requirement that semantic features 
should be meaningful, we may say that we have approximated this 
in two ways: first by means of the rough and ready definitions of 
features in 2.1.1 and, secondly, by imposing a hierarchical 
order on PRIM features: each feature may be said to be defined 
by the features dominating it, and by the features which it, in 
its turn, dominates. 
3.2. Extensions of primary features: factual beliefs and the 
notion "typically associated with" 
A configuration of PRIM features represents, as we have seen, 
the basic sense of a lexical item, that is, that sense from which 
other senses can be systematically derived. These derived 
senses we have called extended senses. We have distinguished 
between two categories of extended senses: GEN senses and SEC 
senses. The principal difference between the two categories is 
that in the latter the basic sense is backgrounded, while in 
the former it is not. 
The most usual type of GEN feature is one that represents 
an extension from a 'rather concrete' to a 'more abstract' meaning. 
More precisely, it is an extension from a basic sense dominated 
by [+CONC] to a [-CONC, +PERC] sense, usually either [+ACT] or 
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[+STA]. Such features may be looked upon as containing a lexical 
cross-reference; more technically, we have called them "mergers 
of two senses" (p. 53). What does it mean to say this? We have 
seen that it is the individual senses of a lexical item that 
have referring capacity. If, therefore, we say that a GEN 
feature is a merger of two senses (and not the sum of two 
individual senses), this is in effect equivalent to saying that 
a GEN sense can be used to refer to a single object in two 
different ways (and not, of course, to refer to two objects). If, 
for example, we use the GEN feature of a noun like teacher we 
refer to a single object, both as a human being and as a 
performer of the action of teaching. It might be questioned 
at this point whether we really need two senses to account for 
the meaning of teacher: a basic sense ([+H, £ professional]) 
as well as a GEN sense ([[+H] : [+ACT]]). We do - for the two 
senses do not have the same reference . It is, for example, 
possible to say something like 
(3.3) For a policeman, he is not a bad teacher 
In other words, if we refer to a person as a teacher, we do 
not necessarily imply that he has teaching as his profession. 
An even clearer example is provided by the noun student, for 
which the dictionary records both the basic sense (a) and the 
GEN sense (b): 
(a) person who is studying at a college, polytechnic or 
university 
(b) anyone who studies or who is devoted to the acquisition 
(2) 
of knowledge 
(1) Cf. McCawley (1973:193): "It is necessary to distinguish 
between a stative agent nominalization (John is a composer) 
and an active agent nominalization (John is the composer of 
that song)", where the former is equivalent to the [€ professional] 
sense and the latter to the GEN sense. 
(2) See Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 
3rd edition, OUP, London. 
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We have used the phrase "typically associated with" to 
indicate the extension of meaning in a GEN feature, and we have 
said that the extension names a concept which, in our real-world 
experience, is contiguous to the concept denoted by the basic 
sense. To say this is, of course, to draw upon our factual 
beliefs about the referent of a concept. We have also pointed 
out, however, that the extended sense does not identify the 
factual belief that we hold about the referent, for this, in our 
opinion, would muddle the issue of what is and what is not 
semantically relevant and obscure the distinction between what 
information belongs in the lexicon and what properly belongs 
in an encyclopedia . By allowing extensions of senses to 
states or actions associated with the referents of basic 
senses we therefore merely acknowledge the fact that some 
factual belief about a particular referent is shared by all or 
most users of the language. 
It should be pointed out that in GEN features containing 
an extension to a [+ACT] sense, this extension may be ambiguous 
when there is more than one activity that is typically associated 
(2) 
with the basic sense . This sort of ambiguity is illustrated 
in the following quotation: 
"Your poems. Are they difficult?" 
She smiled and, unaccustomed to speaking English, 
answered carefully, drawing a line in the air with two 
delicately pinched fingers holding an imaginary pen, 
"They are difficult - to write". 
He laughed, startled and charmed. 
"But not to read?" [ ' 
(1) For a discussion of the nature of this distinction, see Katz 
(1972: 73-77). 
(2) This ambiguity is not found in features containing an 
extension to a [+STA] sense; in these cases the extension usually 
refers to all the properties that are typically associated with 
the referent of the basic sense, unless in the wider context 
one or more properties are specified. 
(3) From: John Updike, Bech: A Book, New York, 1970, p.49. 
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The two activities which may be associated with a noun like 
poem (or book, novel, letter,etc.) are reading and writing. 
The quotation shows that when a PR7 adjective like difficult 
is predicated of such a noun the ambiguity between the two 
activities is inherent in its sense and that disambiguation 
can only occur through specification in the wider context. 
Considering the reaction of the "he" to the sentence "They are 
difficult - to write", the passage also seems to suggest that, 
without further specification, one activity (in this case 
reading) is more likely to be associated with the sense of 
the noun than the other. It goes without saying that this is 
something which cannot be accounted for in the lexical entry 
for the noun - any attempt to do so would result in a hopeless 
confusion of our general knowledge of the world with what 
is semantically relevant. 
A GEN feature, then, is assigned to a lexical item when 
it is assumed that all the members of the language community 
hold the same factual belief(s) about the possible referents 
of its basic sense. What exactly these factual beliefs are is 
not expressed by the GEN sense; their nature is only very 
generally indicated by such HPRIM features as [+ACT], [-ACT] and 
[+STA], and, occasionally, slightly more specifically by LPRIM 
features like [€ comm], [6 loc] and [6 expr]. 
In section 2.2.1 we pointed out that the fact that a given 
noun does not have a GEN extension in the lexicon does not 
preclude the possibility of its being associated with a particular 
activity or state by means of the context in which it occurs. In 
other words, it is possible to have a factual belief about one 
specific referent of the sense of a noun without holding it 
about the class of possible referents of the noun's sense. Such 
a factual belief can, therefore, only arise in the specific 
context in which the noun occurs . For this reason TR features 
cannot be entered in the lexicon, but can only be elicited in 
(1) This semantic fact, which establishes the basis for our TR 
features, has also been recognized by Janssen (1976) as a 
"presupposed close relation" ("bekend veronderstelde nauwe 
betrekking"). 
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readings. Very generally, we can say that a TR feature is 
used in a reading if an adjective co-occurs with a noun to 
whose basic sense it does not 'properly belong'; if this is 
the case, the adjective is, strictly speaking, predicated not 
of the noun's basic sense, but of a state or action associated 
with the referent of the noun by virtue of the context in which 
the noun is used. As we have seen in 2.2.1 and in the table of 
2.3, TR features are therefore elicited in readings resulting 
from adjective-noun combinations that cause a met (i.e. a clash 
between the CONT features associated with the PR of the 
adjective and the features of the noun) but which, at the same 
time, do not call for a metaphorical interpretation, because 
no backgrounding of the basic sense of the noun takes place. 
The semantic rule which creates a TR feature is, however, 
similar to the one which yields a metaphorical reading: the 
typical CONT features of the PR of the adjective are transferred 
to the noun. But whereas in a metaphorical reading the basic 
sense of the noun is backgrounded, a TR feature has the same 
form as a GEN feature: the extension of meaning, provided by 
the CONT feature of the adjective, is added to the basic sense 
of the noun, thus creating a merger of the noun's basic sense 
and its extended sense. As indicated in the table of 2.3, a 
TR feature is given to a noun when it yields a met in a matching 
with a PR6,PR7 or PR8 adjective.The typical CONT features of 
these PR's are, respectively: - [+PERC] -, - [+ACT] - and 
- [+STA] -. We have, therefore, the following relation between 
these PR's and TR features: 
PR6-»PR2 : if met with N, then: [[x] : TR [+PERC]] 
PR7 : if met with N, then: [[x] : TR [+ACT]] 
PR8 : if met with N, then: [[x] : TR [+STA]]. 
ι 
3.3. The function of contextual features 
Contextual restrictions, as we have seen, are associated with 
the PR's of adjectives and are stated in terms of PRIM or GEN 
features of nouns. As appears from the above discussion, the 
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function of CONT features (or, by another name, selection 
restrictions) is rather different from that assigned to them 
in previous treatments. In the present model they are not 
viewed as providing a (syntactic or semantic) blocking mechanism; 
the failure of a matching of the CONT features of an adjective 
with the features of a noun (i.e. a met) does not entail the 
rejection of the adjective-noun combination as syntactically 
or semantically deviant, it entails the application of inter-
pretive rules which are different from the ones that are 
applied when an adjective-noun combination has yielded a match. 
The result of these met-rules may be a reading containing a 
TR feature, a metaphorical reading or a semi-metaphorical reading, 
depending on the nature of the features of the adjective and 
noun involved. The function of CONT features, then, is to 
trigger particular interpretive rules. But this is not the 
only difference between our use of CONT features and more 
'orthodox' uses; for, as we have seen in our discussion of TR 
readings (and as we shall see when we discuss metaphorical 
readings), the typical CONT features of the PR of an adjective 
contribute to the combined meaning of an adjective-noun 
combination, constituting an essential part of the reading. If 
the CONT features of an adjective can contribute to the meaning 
of adjective-noun combinations, they must be looked upon as 
part of the meaning of the adjective . In other words, in the 
present model CONT features are not mere devices to make the 
model work, but constitute just as essential an element of the 
meaning of an adjective as all the other features making up its 
lexical entry. 
(1) The view that contextual features constitute part of 
the meaning of lexical items is also held by Kempson 
(1975), who also adduces other evidence for this point 
of view. 
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3.4. Secondary features 
SEC features, as we have seen in 2.2.2, are lexically integrated 
extended senses whose origin can be explained by the same sort 
of rules that account for the interpretation of non-integrated 
metaphorical or semi-metaphorical readings. We use the term 
* semi-metaphorical' to indicate that it is impossible to draw 
a clear line between 'normal* readings and metaphorical readings. 
It is not the case that normal readings and metaphorical 
readings are opposites divided by a boundary line between what 
is normal and what is deviant; rather, normal readings and 
metaphorical readings are the two extreme ends of a continuum, 
on which we find readings involving GEN features, TR features, 
SEC readings based on negative PR's, on I-values, on E-values 
and on CONT features . Still, as we pointed out earlier, 
it is possible to draw some sort of dividing line between 
integrated (GEN) and non-integrated (TR) extensions of meaning 
on the one hand, and SEC senses on the other: in the latter the 
basic sense is backgrounded, while in the former it is not. 
In a SEC extension of the meaning of a noun some typical 
quality of the class of referents denoted by the basic sense 
of the noun is attributed to a referent not belonging to this 
class of referents, as, for example, in John is a fox. The basic 
sense is, as we say, backgrounded (not suppressed). We use the 
terra 'backgrounded' to indicate that the property ('slyness' in 
our excjnple) which is predicated of the 'new' referent ('John') 
is still recognizable as being 'borrowed' from the class of 
referents denoted by the basic sense of the noun (the class 
of 'foxes'). Therefore, (3.4) is both similar to and different 
from (3.5): 
(3.4) John is sly 
(3.5) John is a fox 
(1) See also p. 81 . The same point is made in Aarts and 
Calbert (1976). 
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The two sentences are similar in that the property of 'slyness' 
is attributed to 'John' in both of them; they are different in 
that in (3.4) the property of 'slyness' is referred to directly, 
whereas in (3.5) it is referred to indirectly, by making use of 
the knowledge, shared by the members of the (English) language 
community, that by cultural convention 'slyness' is a property 
typically attributed to foxes. That in (3.5) 'slyness' is 
referred to only indirectly and that the basic sense of fox 
is only backgrounded and not suppressed, is shown by the fact 
that a sentence like (3.6) is not felt to be pleonastic: 
(3.6) John is a sly fox. 
SEC senses of nouns are thus essentially shifts from a 
'substantival' sense (i.e. a sense denoting an entity) to an 
'adjectival' sense (i.e. a sense denoting a property). SEC 
senses of adjectives do not involve this categorial shift. 
They are based on our ability to view one descriptive category 
in terms of another, that is, to denote properties and states 
of one class of referents by using lexical items normally 
denoting properties and states of another class of referents 
Even though the SEC sense of an adjective involves a shift from 
one descriptive category to another, the semantic function of 
the SEC sense thus remains basically 'adjectival'. 
It should again be noted that SEC extensions of meaning 
may be formed both on the basis of semantic elements belonging 
to the denotative level of a lexical entry and on the basis of 
elsments belonging to its connotative level. A SEC reading may, for 
instance, be created by using the I-value of the basic sense of 
an! adjective (constituting a LPRIM feature) but also by using 
the connotative Ε-value. We mention this double provenance of 
SEC extensions because we want to emphasize that the connotative 
value of a word is not a piece of semantic embellishment, but 
an element that contributes to the interpretation of adjective-
noun combinations and is therefore just as much part of the 
meaning of a lexical item as PRIM features, GEN features, 
integrated SEC features, PR's and CONT features. 
(1) This ability is perhaps most clearly apparent in cases of 
synaesthesia. For an extensive discussion of synaesthetic transfer, 
see Ullmann (1957:266-289). 
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3.5. Polysemy 
At this stage we should briefly return to a point raised only 
in passing in 2.2, viz. the distinction between homonymy and 
polysemy. There we said that ultimately this distinction is a 
rather arbitrary and idiosyncratic one and that the problem of 
drawing the distinction should be approached along pragmatic 
lines, by trying to find out what the nature is of the relations 
that hold between two or more senses of a homophonous 
item (p. 50). This we have tried to do in sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
so that we are now in a position to say something more about 
what exactly should be understood by the term 'polysemy*. Let 
us first say what, in our opinion, polysemy is not: it is not 
mere sense similarity, as has sometimes been suggested. Katz 
(1972), for example, in replying to Weinreich's criticism that 
the proposals of Katz-Fodor (1963) failed to distinguish 
between "lexicologically interesting polysemy" and "fortuitous 
homonymy" says: 
... there is no simple dichotomy between "lexicologically 
interesting cases of polysemy" exhibiting similarity in 
meaning and cases of "fortuitous homonymy" exhibiting no 
similarity in meaning. Rather, there is a range of similarity 
in meaning, the limiting cases of which are synonymy, at 
the one extreme, and, at the other, complete difference 
in meaning ... there is a scale of sense similarity in 
terms of which pairs of lexical items can be compared and 
their differences in degree of sense similarity estimated 
(p. 70). 
It is misleading, we think, to talk about, polysemy in terms of 
similarity of meaning, the degree of which is statable by the 
number of shared components of two lexical items , because 
this may easily lead to a confusion of the notion of polysemy 
on the one hand and those of semantic inclusion, hyponymy and 
superordination on the other. It is true that polysemy has to 
do with relatedness of senses, but it has to do with relatedness 
(1) The same view of polysemy seems to be held by Kooy (1971:124) 
when he says that he will regard "a lexical element as 
homonymous when its different senses have no relevant components 
in common". It is unclear, though, what exactly Kooy means when 
he uses the term "relevant components", and later on it would 
seem that what he has in mind are senses related through 
extension of meaning. 
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of a special kind, namely that of sense-derivation. This is 
recognized by Lyons (1968) when he says: 
Ultimately, [the distinction between homonymy and polysemy] 
rests upon either the lexicographer's judgement about 
the plausibility of the assumed 'extension' of meaning or 
some historical evidence that the particular 'extension' 
has in fact taken place (p.406; our italics). 
Apart from supporting our view that polysemy has to do with 
relatedness of senses arising through extension of meaning, the 
quotation (particularly the italicized part) shows that in 
Lyons' view judgements about polysemy are intuitive judgements 
about 'assumed' extensions of meaning. Kooy (1971) seems to 
endorse the point of view that the recognition of polysemy is 
an intuitive matter when he says: 
The distinction, it should be admitted, draws heavily 
upon some presupposed awareness of relatedness between 
senses, and upon the description of these relationships 
(p.124; our italics). 
These two quotations suggest - and we agree with the suggestion -
that as soon as the relationships that Kooy has in mind have 
been explicitly described and the extensions of meaning are no 
longer 'assumed', as Lyons puts it, but have been precisely 
characterized, the problem of polysemy ceases to exist and we 
have, strictly speaking, no further need for the term. We 
think we can claim that, in our discussions of extended senses 
and of PR's in the preceding sections of this chapter, we have 
succeeded in defining at least some 'polysemous' relationships. 
We also think that these discussions have shown that what has 
gone under the name of polysemy in previous treatments of the 
issue, covers a wide variety of meaning relations, and that the 
'assumed' extensions of meaning are sometimes not real 
extended senses at all. This is most clearly exhibited in 
cases of 'polysemy' involving different PR's associated 
with the same adjective. Such cases have been discussed in the 
literature as instances of polysemy. Thus McCawley, in two of 
his papers (1968a and 1968b), discusses two 'senses' of the 
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adjective sad, which he labels sadl and sad2 and paraphrases 
as 'experiencing sadness' and 'evoking sadness' respectively, 
and he argues that they should be treated as two different 
lexical items. Now it is clear that McCawley's sadl corresponds 
to our PR2 ('experience') of the adjective sad and his sad2 to 
our PR6 ('cause'). It should be borne in mind, however, that 
PR6 dominates PR2 (= 'cause to experience'), so that there 
can be no question of two different senses of sad, let alone 
of two different lexical items ; instead there is only 
one sense of sad, though its predicational potential may 
change, depending on the noun it collocates with. The term 
'polysemous item' would seem to be more suitably applied to 
lexical items with genuine extended senses, represented by 
GEN and SEC features. But among these, too, there are great 
differences. There are differences as we have seen, not only 
in the nature of these extended senses (viz. between class-
merging (GEN) and class-changing (SEC) senses), but in the 
ways the extensions of meaning are brought about (viz. by 
means of I-values, Ε-values, negative PR's, 'typical' CONT 
restrictions and by drawing upon our factual beliefs about 
referents). If, then, we want to use the term 'polysemy' in a 
non-intuitive manner, we should be aware of the wide variety of 
sense relations covered by it. 
3.6. Metaphorical readings and the notion "semantic background" 
To conclude this chapter, we must deal with a subject that we 
have not yet discussed systematically, namely the creation of 
ι 
(1) In (1968a) McCawley does not seem to realize that 'cause' (PR6) 
dominates 'experience' (PR2), and that his paraphrase of sad2, 
'evoking sadness', might in its turn be paraphrased as 
'causing to experience sadness'. In (1968b) he must have had 
some awareness of the relation between the two paraphrases, 
for there (p.192) he paraphrases sad2 as 'evoking sadl-ness'. 
That he does not, however, fully realize the implications of 
this change in his position, appears from the fact that he still 
talks of sadl as "the basic sense" and of sad2 as "the derived 
sense". 
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metaphorical readings. There is perhaps no other subject 
about which so little is known and about which so much has 
been written; a recent bibliography of metaphor (Shibles 
1971) runs to a total number of close to 3,000 items. We 
shall not deal with any previous discussions of metaphor here, 
simply because we do not know where to begin, and also because 
most of them bear no direct relevance to our own approach, with 
a few exceptions that will be mentioned below. Most books or 
articles on metaphor will yield abundant evidence that the 
subject of metaphor can, apparently, be discussed only in 
metaphorical language. To attempt to talk about metaphor not 
in metaphorical terms insofar as this is feasible) but in 
explicit terms, employing the semantic tools we have discussed 
in the preceding sections, is, therefore, to stick out one's 
neck so far that one runs the risk of losing one's head 
Yet we are committed to doing this because we have already 
introduced semantic elements like "integrated SEC features" 
and "the connotative level" of a lexical entry, and also because 
we have claimed that, under certain conditions, elements on the 
connotative level may play an active role in the interpretation 
of adjective-noun combinations on the denotative level. 
(1) We consider it an act of linguistic arrogance to say, as 
Bickerton (1969:36) does, that "non-linguistic approaches 
to metaphor have done little more than obscure the issues, 
and it can be argued that they have failed precisely because 
they are non-linguistic". The other extreme is a point of 
view like that of Stutterheim (1968:450) who maintains that 
it is unlikely that anything reasonable can be said about 
metaphor ("waarschijnlijk is er ook in het algemeen niets 
redelijks over te zeggen"). An example that non-linguistic 
approaches to metaphor can be very illuminating is provided 
by Black (1962). 
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As we pointed out before, the notion of deviance or 
unacceptability as such plays no role in the present model: 
'deviance' (that is, lack of agreement between the CONT 
features of an adjective and the features of a noun) only 
serves to trigger particular interpretive rules. Any attempt 
to distinguish between what is simply deviant and what is 
metaphorical is, it seems to us, doomed to failure. Such an 
attempt is made in Bickerton (1969), who distinguishes between 
what is deviant and meaningless and what is deviant and 
metaphorical. His own examples, however, show the futility 
of the attempt. Thus non-metaphorical deviance is illustrated 
by *she has stabbed my self-respect, *refreshing poison, and 
surprisingly, *green ears and "Çreen elbows , whereas hearts 
that spaniel'd me at heels, take no notice of her, she's poison 
and green thought are cases of metaphorical deviance. As the 
examples show, the distinction is trivial and untenable -
apparently, what is 'metaphorical deviance' is everything that 
can be qualified as a 'dead metaphor' as well as every 
instance of deviance that has ever been produced in a literary 
context. Especially the latter criterion leads to absurdities: 
green ideas, for instance, was simple deviance when given as an 
example by Chomsky in a linguistic context, but becomes 
'validated' as metaphorical deviance when a poem (by another 
linguist) is written around it (Bickerton 1969:49). We would 
sooner agree with Matthews (1971:416) in his criticism of 
(2) 
Bickerton that "given the proper context almost ANY deviant 
sentence can be interpreted as metaphorical". This does not mean 
that we claim that our metaphorical readings give a 'full' 
interpretation of any metaphorical combination. Our metaphorical 
readings range from rather explicit (as, for example, in cases 
(1) The latter two are, of course, not deviant at all; it does not 
require much of an effort of the imagination to think up 
contexts where both expressions are perfectly normal and 
acceptable. 
(2) And, we would add, the proper mode of interpretation. 
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where we have the transfer of an I-value) to very vague, as is 
the case with an example like green thought, where neither green 
nor thought contain special semantic elements that contribute to 
such a reading. As we shall see below, the metaphorical reading in 
that case can only indicate in what manner (i.e. by means of which 
PR) the adjective is predicated of the noun. It should be observed 
that such vagueness is inherent in an interpretive model that 
attempts to draw a line between what is semantically relevant on a 
conceptual level and what belongs to the realm of factual beliefs 
about referents. One may, of course, try to make one's interpretation 
of a particular metaphor as explicit as possible by creating numerous 
'features' which reflect our factual beliefs. This is what 
Matthews (1971) does when in trying to account for the 'full' 
meaning of the man is a wolf, he assigns to wolf such 'features' as: 
[+nocturnal, +vicious, +predatory, +avoids man]; it would not 
be difficult to extend this list of qualities that we might 
attribute to wolves. But one cannot seriously claim that they 
should be part of the lexical entry for wolf in the lexicon. As 
we have seen in 2.2.2, we only use features reflecting one of the 
many properties associated with a class of referents (e.g. 
[>SEC 'sly'] of fox), when they have been lexically integrated, 
that is, when by cultural convention one particular property has 
been 'selected' as being typical of a whole class of referents. 
In the account of metaphorical readings that follows we 
use the terms 'foreground' and 'background' as synonyms for 
'denotative level* and 'connotative level' respectively . It is 
evident that a term like 'background' - or, for that matter, 
'connotative level' - is itself a metaphor. We must therefore try 
to define what we understand by the term. In our discussion of 
Ε-values we have said that they properly belong to the connotative 
(1) We use these terms by the side of 'denotative and connotative 
level' because they are linguistically more pliable; we can thus 
speak, for instance, of "backgrounding" and "features being back­
grounded". It should be noticed that the term 'foregrounded' is 
used differently from the way it has been used in previous 
linguistic literature. Leech (1966), for example, uses the term to 
indicate literary deviance and speaks of "deviant or foregrounded 
features of literary language" (p.145). 
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level of lexical items and that they make the concept which is 
denoted by the lexical item and which is explicated as 'a good 
thing' or 'a bad thing' by the features on the denotative level. 
In other words, we use the connotative level of a lexical entry 
to indicate the attitude of the average speaker towards the 
concept denoted by the features on the denotative level. It 
should be emphasized that in the lexicon the connotative level 
of a lexical entry only serves the one purpose of marking the 
negative or positive emotional value attached to it (if such a 
value is associated with it at all). The connotative level, 
however, also plays a role in metaphorical readings as the area 
of a word's meaning to which the features constituting the basic 
sense may be backgrounded. We assume, then, that every word can 
have a connotative level of meaning; this level does not have 
referring capacity, but represents an attitude towards a class 
of referents or towards one particular referent; this attitude 
may either be the negative or positive emotional attitude of the 
average user of the language towards the concept denoted by the 
basic sense of the lexical item, in which case it is represented 
in the lexicon as a positive or negative Ε-value; or it may be 
the attitude of one user of the language towards one particular 
referent, in which case it is represented in a metaphorical 
reading by the backgrounded features constituting the basic 
sense of the lexical item which is applied to that referent. If, 
for example, the phrase royal tree is used to refer to 'the king' 
(Shakespeare: Richard III, 3, 7, 167), we say that the basic sense 
of tree is backgrounded and therefore conveys the 'attitudinal' 
meaning that is typical of the connotative level. The backgrounded 
basic sense of tree, then, may be roughly paraphrased as follows: 
"My (i.e. the speaker's) attitude towards the human referent is 
the same as towards a tree (in some respect)".The addition "in 
some respect" relates to what has been called the 'ground' or 
'wariranty' for the metaphor. As we have argued, this cannot be 
explicated within the limits of an interpretive semantic model, 
because any attempt to do so would have to draw on everything we 
know, feel and think about trees. It hardly needs mentioning that 
it is the 'ground' for the metaphor that determines its value 
within a literary context and that enables people to discuss 
whether a metaphor is 'successful' or not. 
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There is one important respect in which our treatment of 
metaphor deviates from most previous treatments. Metaphorical 
phrases are usually considered to be unambiguous as to which 
lexical item is used metaphorically. This point of view has 
been stated most plainly by Chafe (1970): 
If we are confronted with a surface structure such as 
The chair laughed and forced to give it a meaning of some 
kind, what we do is to interpret chair as if it were 
abnormally animate, as dictated by the verb. What we do 
not do is to interpret laugh as if it were a different 
kind of activity, performed by inanimate objects (p.97). 
We would argue that in metaphors neither of the two terms is 
typically the dominant member, as Chafe claims, but that a two-
term metaphor is always potentially ambiguous as to which of 
the two terms is the dominant member in the metaphor (cf. 
Aarts 1971). Chafe's point is quite easily disproved if we 
change his example and consider a metaphorical sentence like 
The trees are crying instead; in this case it would not be at all 
difficult to interpret crying "in an abnormal way, as if it were 
a different kind of activity", such as, for example, 'dripping 
with rain'. What Chafe does is confuse the notions of 'possible 
reading' and 'likely reading' (cf. 1.2). In The chair laughed it 
is unlikely for chair to be the dominant member in the metaphor 
(or, in other words, it is difficult to think up an appropriate 
context in which this would be the case), but it is not impossible. 
In The trees are crying, on the other hand, it is unlikely that 
the verb should be the head of the metaphor, thus entailing a 
'human' interpretation of trees,-that it is not impossible, 
however, appears from the example royal tree quoted above, where 
the noun does have a human referent. And again, it would not be 
difficult to imagine a context where royal tree would mean, 
approximately, 'stately tree' . Usually, but not always, this 
essential ambiguity of two-term metaphors is resolved in context. 
The following quotation from Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel, 
(1) Cf. Spenser's "the Cedar proud". Faerie Oueene, bk 1, canto 1, 
St. 8. 
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occurring in a passage where he speaks of the Roman Catholic 
doctrine of transubstantiation, shows not only that a two-term 
metaphor is not always necessarily disambiguated, but that a 
poet may make conscious use of its inherent ambiguity: 
Such sav'ry deities must needs be good 
As served at once for worship and for food 
(11. 120-121; our italics). 
Before giving a brief survey of the way in which 
metaphorical readings are handled in the present model, it will 
be helpful to draw attention to the following points: 
1. Each PR
n
 has associated with it: 
(a) a typical CONT feature: these typical CONT features have 
been given in the preliminary listing of PR's (pp.89 -93 )· 
(b) a class of adjectives, delimited by a HPRIM or LPRIM 
feature,of which PR
n
 is the typical PR (appendix 1). 
2. Ev-features may be assigned to adjectives in metaphorical 
readings under the following conditions: 
(a) the basic sense of the adjective has an I-value and the 
noun does not have an Ε-value: when the basic sense of 
the adjective is backgrounded, this I-value is turned into 
an Ev-value if the foregrounded PRIM features of the 
adjective are those of a non-scalar class; 
(b) the adjective has an I-value and the noun has an E-value: 
the I-value is turned into an Ev-value according to the 
table on p. 74, and this Ev-value is assigned to the 
adjective's denotative level; 
(c) the adjective has an Ε-value and the noun does not: the 
Ε-value is foregrounded as an Ev-value on the adjective's 
dénotât ive leve1; 
(d) both the adjective and the noun have an Ε-value: the E-value 
of the adjective is turned into an Ev-value according to the 
table on p. 74, and this Ev-value is assigned to the 
adjective's denotative level. 
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3. An I-value of the basic sense of an adjective is kept on 
the denotative level if the basic sense is backgrounded 
and if the foregrounded PRIM features of the adjective are 
those of a scalar class. 
After this summary of points discussed in sections 2.2.2 and 
2.3, we can now state the rules that are applied to elicit 
metaphorical readings in those cases where the matching of 
adjective and noun has produced a met, and where the met cannot 
be resolved by TR-rules. As we have said above, every metaphor 
yields two readings: one with the adjective, the other with the 
noun as head. The rules below are grouped accordingly. 
A. Adjective as dominant member 
i. The features constituting the noun's basic sense are 
backgrounded. 
ii. The CONT feature associated with the typical PR of the 
adjective's basic sense (see la above) is assigned to the 
denotative level of the noun. 
B. Noun as dominant member 
i. The basic sense of the adjective together with its typical 
PR is backgrounded to the connotative level of the adjective. 
ii. The PR whose typical CONT feature is identical with 
(or dominates) the PRIM feature constituting the noun's 
basic sense (PRn) is assigned to the denotative level 
of the adjective. 
ili. The PRIM feature delimiting the class of adjectives of 
which PRn is the typical PR (see 2b above) is assigned 
to the denotative level of the adjective. 
iv. An Ev-feature may be assigned to the denotative level 
of the adjective in accordance with 2a-d above. 
v. An I-feature may be assigned to the denotative level of 
the adjective in accordance with 3 above. 
We shall here give one example to illustrate the way in which 
metaphorical readings are constructed. Various metaphorical 
readings are exemplified and discussed more extensively in the 
next chapter. Our example is the phrase sad tree; figures 3.2 a, 
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b and с represent, respectively: part of the lexical entries for 
the words sad and tree, the semantic configuration of the two 
lexical items in the metaphorical interpretation of the phrase 
with the adjective as head, and their configuration in the 
interpretation with the noun as head. Some comment on the 
example will be found in the notes below. 
figure 3.2 
a. sad tree 
PR2 : - [+H] - [-AN] 
[£ emotion] 
E-
(2) b. adjective as dominant member 
PR2 
[e 
sad 
: - [+H] -
emotion] 
tree 
[
+
H] ( 3 ) 
Ε- [-AN] 
(4) 
c. noun as dominant member 
sad 
PRl ( 5 ) 
[+STA, +PH , 
PR2 : - [+H] -
[€ emotion] 
Ev-<7>] 
tree 
[-AN] 
(1) Only the typical PR is given here. Other PR's that are 
associated with sad are: PR3, PR4, PR5, PR6. 
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(2) The reading for b is as follows: 
PR2 ([+H/-AN], [€ emotion/E-]). 
The backgrounded part of the reading for tree may be 
paraphrased as: "the speaker's attitude to the human 
referent is the same as towards a tree (in some respect)". 
(3) - [+Н] - being the CONT restriction of the typical PR of 
sad, it is assigned to the denotative level of tree in 
accordance with Aii above. 
(4) The reading for с is as follows: 
PRl ([-AN], [+STA, +PH, EV-/PR2 ([+н], [€ emotion])]). 
The denotative part of this reading can be paraphrased as: 
"the tree is in some physical condition that is negatively 
evaluated"; the connotative part may be paraphrased as follows: 
"the speaker attributes this negatively evaluated condition 
to the tree in the same way that he attributes the experiencing 
of the emotion of sadness to human referents". 
(5) in trying to apply Bii, we find that the PRIM feature of tree, 
[-AN], is not a typical contextual feature for any PR^ By 
means of the redundancy rule (2.3) we therefore examine 
whether any of the features dominating [-AN] is a typical 
CONT feature and find that [+CONC] is one. This feature is 
the typical CONT restriction for PRl; PRl is thus assigned 
to the denotative level of sad. 
(6) The class of adjectives of which PRl is the typical PR is 
delimited by [+STA, +PH]. These features are therefore 
assigned to the denotative level of sad, in accordance 
with Biii above. 
(7) The feature [Ev-] is created on the basis of the connotative 
Ε-value of sad (see Biv above). 
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APPENDIX 1 
On p. 134 it was said that each PRp has associated with it a typical 
CONT feature as well as a class of adjectives of which PRjj is the 
typical PR. The table below gives a survey of the various PR's (first 
column), their typical CONT features (second column) and the class 
of adjectives of which they are the typical PR (third column). It 
is not possible to associate one single class of adjectives with 
PR's 4 to 7; after these PR's, therefore, the most general 
adjectival feature, [+STA], has been entered in the third column. 
PR12 and 13 are not given because they belong to verbs rather 
than adjectives. 
PR1 : HAVE 
PR2 : EXPERIENCE 
PR3 : MANIFEST 
PR4 : TIME-WHEN 
PR5 : PLACE-WHERE 
PR6 : CAUSE 
PR7 : MANNER-IN-WHICH 
PR8 : DEGREE-OF 
PR9 : FREQUENCY-OF 
PR10: TEMPORAL-SEOUENCE-OF 
PR11 : FACTUALITY-OF 
- [+CONC] -
- [+H] -
- [€ comra] -
- [б period] -
- [€ location] -
- [+PERC] -
- [+ACT] -
- [+STA] -
- [-STA] -
- [-STA] -
- [-STA] -
[+STA, +PH] 
[+STA, -PH] 
[+STA, -PH] 
[+STA] 
[+STA] 
[+STA] 
USTA] 
[б degree] 
[б frequency] 
[б temp.ord] 
[e modality] 
APPENDIX 2 
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ACT 
AN 
ART 
ATTR 
bodypt 
COLL 
comm 
CONC 
CONT 
corp.cond 
corp.func 
DIM 
diml 
dim2 
dim3 
E 
Εν 
EVAL 
eval 
G 
GEN 
H 
hor i ζ 
HPRIM 
I 
instr 
LIV 
ABBREVIATIONS AND 
action 
animal 
artifact 
attribute 
part of the body 
collective 
communi cati ve 
concrete 
contextual 
corporeal condition 
corporeal function 
dimensional 
one-dimens ional 
two-dimensional 
three-dimensional 
emotional value 
evaluation 
evaluative 
evaluative 
qoal 
generative 
human 
horizontal 
higher-level primary 
intensity value 
instrument 
living 
SYMBOLS 
LPRIM 
M 
raus 
PERC 
PERF 
PH 
PR 
PRIM 
PROG 
pt 
SEC 
SH 
STA 
temp 
temp.ord 
TR 
veh 
vert 
w 
[ ] 
e 
> 
< 
r*j 
a/b 
lower-level primary 
male 
musical 
perceptible 
perfective 
physical 
predicational relator 
primary 
progressive 
part 
s econdary 
shape 
state 
temperature 
temporal order 
transfer 
vehicle 
vertical 
whole 
enclose features 
"is included in the 
class of" 
"has developed into" 
"has originated from" 
negative operator 
a belongs to the 
denotative level, 
b to the connotative 
level of a sense 
merger of senses a and b 
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STELLINGEN 
1 
In verscheidene 'generative features' (zie dissertatie pp.52-61) wordt een 
verbinding gelegd tussen een objekt of een menselijk wezen enerzijds en de 
handeling "typically associated with it" anderzijds. Dit verband vindt op 
lexikale wijze gestalte in samengestelde woorden waarvan het eerste element 
verbaal en het tweede nominaal is, zoals in het Engels ι watchman, cleaning 
woman, workman, liftlock, driveshaft en pruning knife; in het Nederlands: 
leermeester, werkman, loopjongen, slijpsteen, schrijfstift en aandrijfas. 
2 
ledere semantische analyse dient op enigerlei wijze rekenschap te geven van 
het feit dat de mens geneigd is alles wat niet door hemzelf is gemaakt door 
een antropomorfe bril te bezien en menselijke eigenschappen toe te schrijven 
aan de dierlijke en plantaardige wereld. In onze studie wordt dit onder meer 
gedaan door het toekennen van - |!*-ΑΝ] - als 'contextual feature' niet alleen 
aan PR3 ('manifest') maar ook aan PR2 ('experience'). 
3 
Formalisme is in de linguïstiek in het algemeen, en in de semantiek in het 
bijzonder, onmisbaar omdat het de taalkundige in staat stelt te spreken over 
wat ongewis en vaag is. 
4 
Zinnen met it zoals: 
(Why could not John be there?) £t was because he was abroad 
kunnen verklaard worden als elliptische 'cleft sentences'. Dezelfde 
analyse zou toegepast kunnen worden op: 
If s just that he is a fool 
It's only that I don't like him 
It's simply that she is a woman 
It's not that I don't want him here. 
5 
Als men Gleitmans (1965) principe dat coördinatie van twee verschillende zins-
typen onmogelijk is, of Diks (1968) conditie van 'functional equivalence' 
onderschrijft, wordt het moeilijk een verklaring te vinden voor zinnen als de 
volgende: 
Join us and you'll be a rich man 
Go away or I'll kill you 
We still keep up all the old traditions and who pays for it? 
Zie: Lila R.Gleitman (1965), "Coordinating Conjunctions in English", in 
Language 41, 260-93. 
Simon C.Dik (1968), Coordination. Its implications for the theory of 
general linguistics. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
pp.25-29. 
6 
Randolph Quirks notie van 'serial relationship' is een van de beste voor­
stellen tot dusver om het moeilijk te hanteren maar algemeen erkende ver­
schijnsel van de analogie in de taal te beschrijven en te verklaren. De 
voornaamste reden waarom zijn artikel onvoldoende aandacht heeft gekregen 
is dat het gepubliceerd werd in een tijd die geen grijze nuances in de taai­
beschrijving verdroeg. 
Zie: R.Quirk, "Descriptive Statement and Serial Relationship", in Language 
41 (1965), 205-217. 
7 
Het taalgebruik van Sir Roger L'Estrange in diens 17e eeuwse krant The 
Observator is er een goed voorbeeld van dat men het gebruik van een 'colloquial 
vocabulary' niet te snel gelijk moet stellen aan dat van een 'colloquial 
style' . 
θ 
De snelle ontwikkeling van de algemene taalwetenschap en de opkomst van de toe­
gepaste taalkunde in de zestiger jaren zijn verantwoordelijk geweest voor een 
tijdelijke stilstand in de Nederlandse anglistiek. Er is echter, in tegen­
stelling tot wat o.a. Vachek (1972) heeft gezegd, geen sprake van een crisis 
in de Nederlandse anglistiek. 
Zie: Josef Vachek (1972), "Middle and Modern English" in T.Sebeok, ed., 
Current Trends in Linguistics. Vol.9: Linguistics in Western Europe, 
pp.1420-21. Mouton, Den Haag. 
9 
Literaire evaluatie moet gebaseerd blijven op de intuïtieve reaktie; taal-
kundige analyse kan niet in de plaats hiervan treden. 
10 
Het niveau van de kennis van het tweedegraads vak van de gemiddelde eerstejaars 
student aan de lerarenopleiding dient een waarschuwing te zijn dat men de 
nadruk op de beroepsmatige aspekten in de opleiding niet ten koste moet laten 
gaan van de vakmatige component. 
18 juni 1976 Jan M.G.Aarts 


